This chapter discusses the integration of AI into the judicial systems of Lithuania and Poland. It provides a historical context, outlining the progress of both countries in digitalisation and AI readiness. The chapter notes relevant political and planning documents and then focuses on the current state of AI in non-judicial and judicial activities within the courts of Lithuania and Poland. The authors present technological solutions used for case assignment, case handling, and document processing, anonymisation of judgments, voice-to-text transcription, and tools developed for automating press release preparation. The chapter then explores the potential for AI in judicial decision-making, considering the prospects for partial and full judicial automation and identifying scenarios where AI could play a more significant role without compromising the quality of judicial outcomes. It highlights the Polish pilot project ‘Digital Judge’s Assistant’, and discusses the stringent regulations under the EU AI Act 2024 and the GDPR that govern the use of AI in judicial processes.

Chapter 17 explores the implication of the failure to establish a proper legal sovereign in the Mandates under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The tension was never resolved between the Mandatory power exercising the attributes of sovereignty and actually possessing it, notably on the all-important issue of maintaining ‘public order’. Repression as interpreted politically through the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) thus shaped Mandatory rule. Three examples show dialogue between the PMC and the Mandatory powers articulated sovereignty as a system of legal practice. The repression of the Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922 and the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–27 muddled the distinction between Class C and Class A Mandates. The repression of the Arab revolt in Palestine of 1936–38 exemplified legalist tensions within the Mandate system that had been there all along. Neither the PMC nor the Mandatory power (Britain) could either construct sovereignty over a unitary Palestine or partition it. As Europe veered towards war in 1939 and as the League itself started to disintegrate, ‘public order’ in Palestine came to exist for its own sake, disconnected from any resolution of the political stalemate.

Many in the founding generation believed that a virtuous citizenry would protect against abuses of power in a democracy. But their experience during the period of the Articles of Confederation revealed the limits of republican virtue as a check on abuses of power and underscored the challenge of limiting the opportunities for minority and majority factions to impose their will on their fellow citizens.

This chapter examines the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) tools and digital solutions within the Estonian justice system, highlighting its pioneering approach to digital transformation following independence in 1991. The initial section explores the factors behind Estonia’s rapid digital transition, emphasising the centralisation of support services and the development of a unified public-sector digital infrastructure that has significantly influenced court operations. The Estonian judiciary employs integrated information and communications technology systems that utilise shared data storage, enabling efficient digital and remote court proceedings. These advantages were particularly evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. While AI and machine-driven decisions are restricted to support functions, excluding substantive judicial roles (no ‘robo-judges’), efforts are ongoing to enhance data-driven practices and automation in court proceedings. However, a key legal challenge lies in aligning digital court processes with the constitutional mandate for public justice.

The founding generation condemned political parties as the archetypal manifestation of political factions. Yet they quickly sorted themselves into the Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican parties. As the Framers anticipated, the nation has experienced growing partisanship and a winner-takes-all, majority rules, understanding of the political process. A result has been what might be called a soft tyranny of the ruling majority faction.

This scholarly exploration examines the Islamic perspective on environmental stewardship, climate change, and ethical resource management through the lens of Shariah (Islamic Sacred Law). Grounded in the principles of Tawhid (divine unity), the article argues that Muslims have a fundamental religious obligation to protect the Earth and its resources as trustees or "Khalifa" (guardians). The text analyzes how Islamic ethical principles, particularly the Maqasid Shariah (higher objectives of sacred law), directly relate to contemporary environmental challenges, especially global warming and fossil fuel consumption.

The author emphasizes that the Islamic worldview inherently promotes ecological consciousness, viewing humans as stewards responsible for just and compassionate management of natural resources. By referencing Quranic injunctions and Prophetic traditions, the article advocates for fossil fuel divestment, renewable energy adoption, and sustainable development. It presents a compelling case that environmental protection is not merely a scientific or political imperative, but a profound spiritual and moral responsibility deeply rooted in Islamic teachings of mercy, justice, and interconnectedness.

The word “genocide” was coined by Raphael Lemkin – like Arendt, a refugee from the Nazis. Lemkin was convinced that the destruction of an entire people is a unique crime, over and above the mass destruction of the individuals who make up that people. His reason was that each people makes its own contribution to universal civilization. For Arendt, by contrast, there is no such thing as a universal civilization; what makes genocide unique is its attack on the diversity of peoples, which she calls a crime against the human status. This chapter begins by discussing Lemkin’s career and thought. It criticizes his “civilization” theory, and the critique sets the stage for discussing Arendt’s theory. One philosophical puzzle is that in The Human Condition, Arendt’s concept of plurality refers to the manyness of individuals, not of peoples or other groups. The chapter explains why the diversity of groups as well as individuals matters to Arendt.

In the absence of a targeted legal framework, the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary’s ‘Guidance for Judicial Office Holders’ remain the primary source of regulatory guidance determining how artificial intelligence (AI) ought to be appropriately used by the judiciary in the United Kingdom. This chapter critically reflects upon the content and effectiveness of these guidelines, ultimately concluding that more extensive – and legally binding – regulatory action is needed to ensure accurate and accountable judicial decision-making in the era of AI. The chapter first surveys general attitudes towards AI within the UK judiciary, before engaging directly with the technical foundations of AI and examples of its usage in administrative and judicial decision-making in the UK. It concludes with an analysis of the guidelines, following discussion of several key legal and constitutional issues that may arise where AI is deployed in judicial settings. Throughout this contribution, we caution that the regular use of AI to make decisions does not simply change the process of discrete procedures, but rather, challenge existing structures within the legal and political system at a broader level.

In a world grappling with pressing environmental challenges, the intersection of Islamic epistemologies and sustainable development models offers a unique perspective. This chapter book delves into Islamic perspectives on environmental ethics and sustainability, exploring the theological foundations, ethical principles, and practical implications of stewardship and trust in Islam. Drawing upon Quranic teachings and scholarly insights, it examines humanity’s role as stewards of the Earth, emphasizing responsible resource management, moderation, and justice. Rooted in concepts of Khilafah (stewardship) and Amanah (trust), Islamic environmental ethics highlight the ethical obligation to ensure sustainable resource use and protect the environment for future generations. Additionally, the concepts of moderation and justice, known as "Al-Wasatiyyah," offer guidance for achieving balance, equity, and harmony in all aspects of life, including environmental conservation. Through case studies and examples, this chapter book demonstrates how Islamic principles can inform environmental decision-making processes and contribute to holistic, sustainable development efforts. By integrating spiritual dimensions into environmental conservation practices, it advocates for a more comprehensive approach to addressing contemporary environmental challenges, fostering a harmonious relationship between humans and the natural world.

This chapter turns to the collapse of moral judgment Arendt saw in the early weeks of the Third Reich, and which she connects to the collapse of common sense and adherence to conspiracy theories in mass societies. The chapter draws on The Origins of Totalitarianism, coupled with contemporary “virtue epistemology” – the study of intellectual virtues and vices and their relation to knowledge. Arendt, I argue, is an exceptionally insightful virtue epistemologist. The chapter analyzes Arendt’s account of how European social conditions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to the collapse of common sense in the face of a barrage of political lies. She warns that “if everyone always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but that no one believes anything at all anymore.” The result is a dangerous mix of gullibility and cynicism, what in the chapter I label culpable credulousness.

The research for this chapter was undertaken on the lands of the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin Nations. As is customary in the country in which I live and work, or so-called ‘Australia’ (see Watego, 2021), I acknowledge them as the traditional owners of country, as well as elders past and present. I acknowledge that sovereignty over these lands was never ceded, and that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples remain strong in their enduring connections to land, sky, water and culture.

Chapter 14 examines how the rise of American philanthropic foundations – particularly the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) – shaped international law during the League of Nations era. Although the United States government remained formally outside most League institutions, American influence was felt as private organizations brought their considerable resources to bear on the development of the social sciences, including the discipline of international law. The chapter explores how the CEIP’s legal philanthropy sustained international law as a transnational professional practice linking League officials, judges, academics, and practitioners. Drawing on archival research from the League of Nations and the CEIP, as well as a dataset of roughly 25,000 individuals affiliated with League bodies and related NGOs, the chapter addresses several key questions: What strategy guided the Endowment’s funding decisions? How did this strategy interact with broader geopolitical dynamics, particularly the ambivalent US–League relationship? And how did recipients leverage foundation support to advance their own agendas? The chapter traces the CEIP’s project of replacing a militarized global regime with a rules-based international order administered by trained legal professionals but also offers insights into the structural impact of philanthropic funding on the sociological makeup of the legal profession in the League era.

This chapter focuses on the use of AI at sentencing. First, we note that AI can be used in different ways in the task of sentencing offenders. Second, the chapter considers when a ‘robot’ judge can be said to perform sufficiently well to replace a human judge. We argue that a plausible criterion for the assessment of the performance of a robot judge is contingent on penal ethical considerations and since these have not been sufficiently developed, we do not yet possess an applicable criterion for a comparison robot and human judges. Third, this conclusion also has implications for less radical applications of AI (such as the use of algorithms as sentencing advisory systems), for assessing competing types of AI models, and for carrying out post hoc evaluations of the performance of sentencing algorithms once they have been implemented.