The present volume focuses closely on the constituents of performing law in its transitive and mobile enactments both inside and outside the courthouses where trials are staged. Working with actors, dancers, musicians, and lawyers, Performing Law provides a novel approach to the dramatics of justice, the theatre of veridiction, through analysis of the elements of its manifestation in architectural, artistic, corporeal, choreographic, filmic, and dance modalities of relay of legal action in the public sphere. These include the stage directions that legal doctrine provides to legal actors, the masks worn, the affective spaces created, the phantasms of interior and exterior, desire and terror, resistance and laughter that perform the long neglected media of the auditory and visual transmission of law as a form of life.

As the Framers anticipated, factions remain a powerful force in American politics. The founding generation disagreed about much, but there was a broad consensus that factions, the inevitable companions of democracy, lead to democratic excess and the abuse of power. Ironically, the factor most responsible for the continued influence of factions and particularly for the dominant influence of majority faction has been the steady democratization of the American constitutional system. The Framers would not be surprised. The best prospects of constraining the negative influences of faction are restoration of the balance between state and national powers and acceptance of the need for constraints on simple majority-rules democracy.

International human rights courts and treaty bodies are increasingly turning to automated decision-making (ADM) technologies to expedite and improve their review of individual complaints. These tribunals have yet to consider many of the legal, normative, and practical issues raised by the use of different types of automation technologies for these purposes. This chapter offers an initial assessment of the benefits and challenges of introducing ADM into international human rights adjudication. We weigh up the benefits of introducing these tools to improve international human rights adjudication – which include greater speed and efficiency in processing and sorting cases, identifying patterns in jurisprudence, and enabling judges and staff to focus on more complex responsibilities – against two types of cognitive biases – biases inherent in the datasets on which ADM is trained, and biases arising from interactions between humans and machines. We also introduce a framework for enhancing the accountability of ADM tools that mitigates the potential harms caused by automation technologies in this context.

Chapter 15 provides a biographical analysis of Manley O. Hudson’s role as a networker between the League of Nations and American elites during the interwar period. As a professor at Harvard Law School, Hudson played a pivotal role in advancing the League’s agenda in the United States. Through his extensive travels and engagements with American elites, Hudson circulated information, offered advice, and forged connections that helped to shape the American perspective on international law. The chapter examines how Hudson’s life and profession shaped his development into a prominent figure in a transatlantic network formed around the League of Nations system. Drawing on Hudson’s private papers and other archives, the chapter situates his intellectual and professional work within its social and historical context. By exploring Hudson’s intersecting roles as practitioner, advocate, and academic, we gain insight into his evolution as a leading American international lawyer. This examination allows us to understand the self-perception and worldview of one of the key figures in the development of international law and the complex relationship between the League and the United States. The chapter contributes to the trend in international and transnational history that uses biography to portray transnational spaces and experiences beyond national frameworks.

Say an AI program passes a Turing test because it can converse in a way indistinguishable from a human. And say that its developers can then teach it to converse – and even present an extended persuasive argument – in a way indistinguishable from the sort of human we call a ‘lawyer’. The program could thus become an AI brief-writer, capable of regularly winning brief-writing competitions against human lawyers. If and when that happens, this chapter argues, the same technology can be used to create AI judges, judges that we should accept as no less reliable than human judges, and more cost-effective. If the software can create persuasive opinions, capable of regularly winning opinion-writing competitions against human judges, we should accept it as a judge, even if the opinions do not stem from human judgment.

Continuing the previous discussion, this chapter discusses Arendt’s view of group identity. She argues for a political or speech-act theory of identity ascriptions. In times of persecution, she explains, it would be an evasion for her to answer “Who are you?” with anything other than “I am a Jew”; in other contexts, that answer would be a pose. This helps explain her well-known dictum, “If you are attacked as a Jew, you must defend yourself as a Jew”: Persecuted groups “can resist only in terms of the identity that is under attack.” Understanding group identity in this way helps explain Arendt’s initial attraction to Zionism, but also her eventual break with the Zionist movement. The danger of this political conception of identity politics is that it seemingly imposes no humanitarian limits on what one can do to resist the persecutor, a danger foreseen by the Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt. The chapter formulates Arendt’s answer to Schmitt’s challenge, based on her “idea of humanity.”

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the history and developments of AI in courts. In particular, through the lens of legal informatics, we explore four phases in the development and evolution of AI in courts: judicial information retrieval, human-made models of judicial reasoning, machine learning for judicial prediction, and large language models for courts. For each of these, we explore the opportunities and challenges in their implementation and adoption within the judicial system.

Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability that operates to make one person legally liable to compensate a plaintiff for a tort that has been committed by another person. Non-delegable duty is slightly different, because it does not impose liability for the tort committed by another person, but rather it imposes liability directly on the ultimate defendant (D2) for their own tort (which is constituted by combination of the harm-causing conduct of another tortfeasor (D1) and D2’s own failure to comply with a personal duty owed directly to the plaintiff). So, while the two doctrines are similar in that they both focus on the harmful conduct of one person (D1) that is ultimately paid for by another person (D2), vicarious liability imposes liability on D2 for the wrongdoing of another, whereas the doctrine of non-delegable duty imposes liability on D2 for their own wrongdoing.

The Nordic countries became members of the League of Nations in 1920. This changed the international position of the five Nordic states considerably and also had legal reverberations. During the League’s function, a substantial number of jurists from the five Nordic states contributed to the diverse discourses on the legal dimensions of the organization, its character, and its many functions. The legal expertise on international law grew out of the nineteenth-century inter-Nordic union conflicts that prepared the Nordic jurists formodern international law at the beginning of the twentieth century. The legal scholars were often both jurists and politicians and their legal reasoning and political considerations were intimately intertwined. This chapter studies for the first time the many contributions from over thirty Nordic lawyers that were involved with the legal issues of the League system.

The judiciary must reflect the diversity of the population it serves to ensure justice is both impartial and perceived as fair. This chapter examines how AI in courts influences judicial diversity and legitimacy. While AI can uncover unconscious biases and enhance case analysis, judicial diversity remains essential to prevent AI from reinforcing existing prejudices. The chapter also explores identity awareness and institutional legitimacy. Like other democratic institutions, courts using AI must uphold representativeness. AI can foster collaborative constitutionalism by incorporating diverse perspectives in constitutional debates, helping address concerns about judicial legitimacy when unelected judges overturn decisions by elected representatives. Finally, the chapter considers how judges’ engagement with AI- driven social media affects transparency and public trust. As these technologies shape perceptions of the judiciary, they must be carefully managed to support judicial diversity and legitimacy. This is particularly important for judges from diverse backgrounds, who face greater risks of digital harassment, potentially undermining institutional trust and judicial integrity.

Moving beyond the structural antagonism of criminal law, this chapter explores the subject positions of actors in scenarios of sexual harm. If the sex offender emerges as a felon bearing the head of a wolf, the victimized white child emerges as the exemplary figure of vulnerability. While tropes of vulnerability are mobilized to justify paternalistic state coercion, they are also a powerful reminder of humans’ interdependence and mutuality. Thinking with vulnerability as an analytical category focuses attention on the lingering traumatic effects of sexual assault, as well as the severe punitiveness toward sex offenders. Addressing sexual violence does not require draconian penalties; conversely, addressing carceral expansion does not necessitate minimizing sexual violence. Centering vulnerability may allow us to rethink the foundations of our social contract in ways that acknowledge both our precariousness and the sovereign violence that holds us in its thrall.

Chapter 20 explores the role of the League of Nations frameworks in the internationalization of human rights, with a focus on refugees, stateless individuals, and minorities. The League Covenant did not explicitly address human rights, but it did consider some humanitarian issues, such as the rights of populations in Mandated territories, stateless refugees, and minorities in specific regions like Danzig or Upper Silesia. Despite this, human rights were not a significant factor in shaping international law during the interwar period. Jurists, who were mostly male and aligned with national interests, favoured other issues like state sovereignty, international peace, and collective security. However, in 1929, the Institute of International Law (IIL) adopted a ’Declaration of International Rights of Man’, based on a project by the exiled Russian jurist André N. Mandelstam, that integrated gender equality. The aim was to submit it to the General Assembly of the League in 1933 in order to conclude a ’World Convention on human rights’. These efforts aimed to universalize human rights at a time dominated by colonialism, civilizational discourse, and inequality. The chapter delves into these initiatives within the IIL and their attempts to push for broader human rights legislation in the League of Nations.

This chapter introduces the EU AI Act and examines how it will apply to artificial intelligence (AI) used by judicial authorities. The chapter gives an overview of key regulatory concepts of the EU AI Act and discusses its risk classification, particularly which AI systems used by judicial authorities would fall under the category of high- risk AI systems and which other provisions could be relevant for the use of AI by judicial authorities. The chapter investigates practical examples of how the provisions are expected to apply in practice and which obligations follow for judicial authorities, including which exemptions could apply. The author also provides context and rationale for the relevant provisions and their evolution during the legislative process.