This chapter introduces the foundations of international law. It covers the definition of public international law, the legal nature of public international law, historical developments, natural law and positivism, alternative approaches, sub-areas of international law, adjacent legal fields, and the nation state and international law.

This chapter demonstrates that cyber-espionage does not breach sovereignty. First, it argues that digital intrusions are not similar to physical trespass and – as espionage per se is not an international wrongful act – cyber-espionage does not breach international law either. Second, it disagrees with a view which gained support over the last years, and according to which damage should be taken into account to determine whether a breach of sovereignty occurred. In fact, damage is irrelevant in assessing whether a breach of sovereignty occurred, and the contrary view does not find satisfactory support in State practice. Even if this view was valid, cyber-espionage would not breach sovereignty, as it results in minimal effects. Several case studies are included.

This chapter addresses regional intergovernmental organisations. It covers, the Organisation of American States, the European Union, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and other regional intergovernmental organisations.

This chapter provides a novel, multi-dimensional framework to study the failure of the Industrial Relations Act 1971. It synthesises several literatures and conceptual debates to provide four recurrent analytical themes that underpin the book’s overarching argument. The chapter argues that taken together these ‘themes’ are prerequisites for understanding the government’s strategic flaws and the Act’s ultimate failure. In outlining the complex socio-political landscape that the Heath government inherited, the chapter unpacks how the complex and often fractious relationship between trade unions and the law, the internal dynamics of trade unions themselves and fragile corporatist structures created a fraught and highly politicised governing context. More significantly, the chapter illustrates how politicians often turn to ‘depoliticised’ governing in an attempt to externalise accountability for the reform of problematic policy areas, creating a shift in perceptions about ultimate responsibility and if successful by recalibrating societal expectations. In a novel contribution, the chapter builds on existing literature on (de)politicisation to move away from thinking about the Act as a simple transition from ‘politicised’ to ‘depoliticised’ governing, instead acknowledging a more complex and messy process as the two aspects interact as part of the same strategy to shape the wider publics perceptions about ownership of industrial relations as a political problem.

These preliminary words briefly explore the history of espionage and the emergence of cyber-espionage. The main challenges are mentioned – i.e. the possibility to evade arrest and attribution, the cheap cost and the special nature of cyber-space.

This chapter focuses on international economic law. It covers the development of international economic law, the World Trade Organization, the International Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, international monetary organisations, regional economic organisations and agreements, and development cooperation.

Chapter 4 addresses a notable gap in the literature by exploring the period during which the government built its new institutional framework. The chapter argues that establishing credible and respected institutions was essential to legitimise the Act’s legal rules, but the process was bedevilled by internal tensions and disagreements about presentational aspects of reform between ministers, the ‘lower-levels’ of the core executive and officials working in the new institutions. The chapter provides insights into the institutional formal rules and informal norms that ministers hoped would secure institutional credibility and the perception of independence. This was a critical part of a wider framing contest over the merits of reform. By tracing the staggered introduction of the Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers (Phase 1), the Commission of Industrial Relations (Phase 2), the Industrial Arbitration Board and the National Industrial Relations Court (Phase 3), the chapter discusses the informal mechanisms of influence and control that developed as the day-to-day practicalities of institutional ‘independence’ dominated internal debates. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the Act’s ‘non-role’ during the first miners’ strike (December 1971 – February 1972), indicating the limits of ‘depoliticised’ strategies at moments of heightened tensions. This section provides the first detailed account of the discussions that took place surrounding use of the Act’s emergency procedures in this dispute and explains why ministers were so cautious about intervening for fear of ‘repoliticising’ the government’s role in industrial relations before the Act had settled in.

This chapter provides greater detail on treaty law. It covers sources of treaty law, the entry into force of treaties, reservations to treaties, interpretation of treaties, the validity and effect of treaties, state succession in respect of treaties, and national law and the entry into force of treaties.

This chapter addresses international environmental law. It covers the internationalisation of environmental law, principles of environmental law, relevant UN conferences, institutionalisation, and environmental treaties.

This chapter introduces the dominant narrative associated with the Industrial Relations Act’s failure. It argues that, in the context of Britain’s relative economic decline and widespread unofficial, wildcat strikes, trade unions were easily framed by the political class as a ‘problem’ that had to be solved. As the ‘voluntary’ system of postwar industrial relations fractured, the Conservative Party sought to depart from the status quo by introducing a formal legal framework into British industrial relations to regulate collective bargaining practices for the first time. Building on these insights, the chapter outlines two key contributions that underpin the book’s rationale. First, despite the existence of an extensive secondary literature, this book is the first substantive account of this Act’s failure to draw on recently released documents from the National Archives, Modern Records Centre and Conservative Party Archive. Second, the book is framed using a novel, multi-dimensional framework to argue that the Act is best understood as a flawed attempt to disengage from – and thus ‘depoliticise’ – the process of industrial relations reform and, in doing so, shape societal perceptions about political ownership of the trade union problem.

This chapter addresses the sources of international law. It covers the sources of international law more broadly before introducing treaties, customary international law, decisions of international organisations, other sources of law, and the relationship between international sources of law and legal rules.

This chapter contributes the first account of the final 18 months of the Act to draw heavily on archival material. It argues that, in a changing industrial context, the Act continued to function in the background, but, with the exception of a few notable cases, it was an irrelevance in the major disputes of the day. In addition to the challenge of trade union non-cooperation, the chapter explains that the Act failed to function as intended in part because the industrial relations landscape had been transformed. The short notice, wildcat strikes of the 1960s had largely given way to large-scale, public sector disputes that were, by their nature, highly politicised given the state’s position as de facto employer. With the government now operating an incomes policy, its role in the micro-management of the economy was reaffirmed. As a depoliticised governing strategy, the Act had failed to reconfigure the system of industrial relations and, as perceptions of governmental interference were affirmed, the framing contest over the merits of reform was lost. When the miners recommenced industrial action in autumn 1973, the Act’s status as a liability was confirmed. Heath calculated that his only remaining option was to turn to the electorate and ask: Who governs Britain? The Conservative Party’s defeat in February 1974 confirmed the Act’s failure as the government was held directly responsible for the crisis of British industrial relations.