This chapter addresses the settlement of disputes. It covers general and special rules, diplomatic methods, international arbitration, the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the panel procedures of the World Trade Organization, and the Inspection Panel of the World Bank.

This chapter addresses international criminal law. It covers the development and character of international criminal law, international criminal responsibility, prosecution and punishment of international crimes by national authorities, international crimes in domestic criminal law, international criminal courts and tribunals, the International Criminal Court and its procedures, cross-border organised crime, terrorism, and international organisations for combating crime.

This chapter demonstrates that cyber-espionage is neither prohibited, nor promoted by the UN Charter. According to a traditional ‘instrumental’ interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51, the use of force and armed attacks must involve a specific means: weapons. However, cyber-espionage devices do not qualify as such. Alternative interpretations were proposed by experts, and the consequentialist approach is part of them. According to this view, a cyber-operation qualifies as use of force (or an armed attack) when its effects are similar to a non-cyber operation rising to the level of a use of force. If this approach is progressively gaining acceptance among States, it does not result in a prohibition of cyber-espionage either, as it fails to cause destruction. This lack of prohibition does not mean, however, that cyber-espionage is authorised. In fact, it results in significant tensions and is not endorsed by the UN Charter. Most States also acknowledge the development of intelligence programs, but without claiming a right to do so.

This chapter covers the subjects of international law and considers the concept of international legal personality and the forms it can take, how it relates to states, how it connects to recognition of intergovernmental organisations and liberation movements, and more recent forms of international legal personality.

This chapter addresses global international organisations other than the UN. First, it compares the UN with other international organisations before examining the International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Maritime Organization.

Opinio juris ‘means that the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation’. If legislation pertaining to intelligence collection is certainly established with ‘a sense of legal right’, this chapter doubts that the implementation of this legislation – i.e., by carrying out espionage or cyber-espionage activities – is carried out with the same ‘sense of legal right’. It means that the existence of opinio juris – whether in terms of authorisation or prohibition – cannot be proved in that respect.

The conclusion explains that, for a long time, espionage was only indirectly constrained by international law – and States were satisfied with this. This regime was however destabilised by the digitalisation of espionage. Hence, cyber-espionage is neither authorised nor prohibited: it is not unlawful, but States do not want to create a right to spy. As a matter of fact – and for the time being – regulation of cyber-espionage is mainly achieved through domestic laws. The conclusion also focuses on the managerialist approach to international law, and explains how a need to fill a so-called legal vacuum emerged in doctrine.

Despite it often being said that few governments were as prepared for office as the 1970–-74 Conservative one, this chapter argues that once elected Heath and his ministers favoured haste at the expense of detailed strategic planning. This fixed several contradictions into the eventual Act. The chapter illustrates how the government was captured by unrealistic expectations. It isolated key representatives of major interest groups – the TUC and CBI – when, despite protestations from trade unionists, employers and Department of Employment officials, ministers refused to meaningfully consult and stampeded the Act towards the statute book in August 1971. Drawing on newly released archival material, the chapter shows how this major miscalculation led to the solidification of TUC opposition in the form of its ‘non-cooperation’ policy. The chapter analyses the sense of urgency that dominated the policy-making process, before demonstrating how this risked undermining any ‘depoliticising’ effect before the Act had even reached the statute book. The government gambled that it could overcome short-term tensions, viewing the resulting discord as a necessary evil to achieve its longer-term goals.

This chapter defines the main notions in the book – i.e. ‘cyber-espionage’ and ‘cyber-space’ – and highlights their characteristics. In particular, cyber-espionage is distinguished from cyber-sabotage and from other intelligence-related activities, while cyber-space is often described as the ‘fifth domain’ – and hence, different from land, sea, airspace and outer-space. This difference has consequences in terms of regulation by international law, which are highlighted here.