This conclusion pulls together the previous chapters. Arendt’s moral philosophy is, first and foremost, a moral psychology that turns on the concepts of thinking, judging, and common sense, and the catastrophic consequences of their absence. Its normative core lies in respect for human dignity, which she roots in the human conditions of plurality and natality. The chapter explains why Arendt’s early ambivalence about morality rests on mistakes. It then returns to four issues catalogued in Chapter 1: the problems of incongruity between person and act; the problem of principles and particulars; the problem of judgment; and the problem of moral realism. The chapter summarizes and expands on the solutions Arendt offers to these problems. It concludes by explaining the connections between Arendt’s moral thought and her ideas about international law. Holding perpetrators accountable for core crimes is one crucial way of acknowledging human dignity and of realizing the “idea of humanity.” Although Arendt is objectionably purist about the mission of international criminal justice, her contributions to its theory are impressive. They include a deep analysis of the crime of genocide, a critique of sovereign immunity, a recognition that states can be criminals, and an understanding of why some crimes are of international concern.

The means by which factions persist are many, including political parties, lobbying, partisan media, passion and prejudice, rent-seeking, the permanent campaign, the politics of identity and principle, and today’s high-tech political campaigns.

The evolution of AI presents both challenges and opportunities for courts. To date, most discussion and examination of AI and courts has focused on decision-making tools, reflecting a broader trend in discourse around courts that unduly centres on courts’ adjudicatory functions. Yet courts perform a far wider set of functions and societal roles. This chapter examines the current and potential uses of AI, questions of suitability and ethics, and the challenges and opportunities that arise through this broader consideration of what it is courts actually do, beyond determining disputes. While AI may enhance access to justice, reduce costs, save time, and potentially improve the quality of justice, significant challenges arise, including the potential erosion of judicial respect, inaccuracy, and concerns for the separation of powers. Crucially, court users and the public ought to be more widely consulted in how AI is developed and deployed for courts to achieve better, fairer, and more effective justice.

Federalism, separation of powers, bicameralism, the electoral college, judicial review, constitutionally guaranteed rights, and the relative difficulty of amendment have all helped limit the influence of political factions.

Negligence governs the legal obligations individuals and organisations owe to others to avoid causing harm. Once liability is considered, however, there are defences available that can reduce or even eliminate a defendant’s responsibility. These defences reflect the fact that the blame for that harm cannot – or should not – always be laid solely at the defendant’s feet and that the actions of the plaintiff themselves can affect legal outcomes.

In this chapter, we’ll explore the key defences to negligence, such as voluntary assumption of risk (volenti), the statutory defence provisions that exist in various jurisdictions and contributory negligence. By examining the legal principles and significant cases behind these defences, you’ll gain insight into how the courts deal with these defences and the impact they can have on liability.

Ever since the earliest Arabic writings on medicine we meet treatises on widespread illnesses or crowd diseases, including epidemics. Some of those works discuss the causes and treatment; others deal with the treatment only. This paper is limited to the works that deal with environmental pollution as a cause of such illnesses. They cover subjects like air and water contamination, solid waste mishandling and environmental assessments of certain localities. The treatises reviewed are those written by (1) al-Kindi, (2) Qusta b. Luqa, (3) alRazi, (4) Ibn al-Jazzar, (5) al-Tamimi, (6) Abu Sahl al-Masihi, (7) Ibn Sina, (8) Ali b. Ridwan, (9) Ibn Jumay’, (10) Ya’qub al-Isra’ili, (11) Abdullatif alBaghdadi, (12) Ibn al-Quff and (13) Ibn al-Nafis. Studying the contents of each work shows which authors were merely copying the Greek theory of humours and miasma, and which made genuine contributions to the field. The period covered in the paper is up to the end of the thirteenth century A.D. This is because the Black Death took place in the fourteenth century, and encouraged several authors of that time to write about epidemics and plagues. Other contemporary researchers have studied these later works.

This chapter discusses the importance of the audience in research on forensic performance. “Forensic performance” is taken here to include the dramaturgical techniques that inform Erving Goffman’s account of “the presentation of self in everyday life,” extending not only to ways of affirming one’s own position but also to ways of portraying the various figures or propositions in a legal dispute. These practices include the use of speech, gesture, and ritual to convey arguments, embody or criticize legal authority, and impersonate a party, witness, or any other participant in an actual or imagined scenario. The audience includes those in the courtroom and imagined observers in the larger public. The chapter begins by examining criticisms of forensic performance in the early modern period and then turns to the use of cross-examination in the nineteenth century. Finally, the discussion considers judges’ behavior, particularly when they encourage the audience to laugh in response to their questions. By doing so, judges merge the role of an impartial interlocutor attending to policy questions and the role of an individual to whom the law might apply.

The present chapter attempts a comparative analysis of three different legal systems and their approaches to environmental law, contributing to the extensive literature on this area of law in numerous areas of the world such as the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. However, that literature appears to have had little coverage of the treatment of environmental law in Islamic law, one of the three main global legal systems together with common and civil law. The bold spread of Islamic tendency in the Middle East that followed the so-called “Arab Spring” assures major changes in the political and economic sphere, including environmental and natural resource levels. Environmental threats are very pressing all over the world, as the Earth needs to be protected through the adoption of universally applicable legal rules and the right to a healthy environment needs to be elaborated on in international instruments. Man’s position in the universe is premised on two principles: the stewardship of man which means that man is not only a creature but also God’s khalifa (steward) on earth.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are used in court to analyse legal data, cite case law, evaluate and generate evidence, or support judges with prediction. As technological advancements enter the courtroom, assessing their impact on core judicial values is crucial. This chapter asks whether AI undermines procedural fairness in judicial decision-making. To address this question, it first presents procedural fairness as a normative concept studied across different disciplines. It shows why procedural fairness matters and what values fair procedures aim to foster. Drawing on case studies and scholarly work, it then illustrates how AI systems may impair these values. It then investigates how regulatory attempts and ethical frameworks for AI in judicial systems aim to address the resulting issues by analysing fundamental principles of technology regulation. The main argument of the chapter is that AI regulation must be complemented by specific procedural rules tailored to the judicial domain. In the age of AI, fair procedures should realise participation, increase trust, preserve neutrality, and provide mechanisms to detect errors in AI systems.

Chapter 7 examines how the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) strategically engaged with scholarly international law between 1920 and 1925 to challenge the post-Versailles international order. Drawing on extensive archival research, it explores how the AA mobilized legal scholars, subsidized international law publications and institutes, and sought to exploit the legal framework established by the League of Nations as a double-edged sword – originally designed to serve the Entente, yet also capable of inflicting damage on its wielder. The study demonstrates that the AA covertly collaborated with international law scholars as informants and agents and actively sought to influence international legal discourse – as seen, for example, in the case of the Hague Academy of International Law. It highlights the AA’s increasing sophistication in navigating within the newly formed Versailles system of international law. Ultimately, the study reveals a deeply entangled relationship between diplomacy and academia, suggesting that international law was not merely a normative framework but an instrument of statecraft in German foreign policy, weaponized in the service of national interests under the guise of academic independence.

Al-Mizan: A Covenant for the Earth was completed which is led by United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) under the umbrella of Faith-Based Organizations and is contributed by Muslim thought leaders worldwide. The covenant reminds that responsibility of humanity, especially Muslim communities, is on climate change and is to project natural resources and biological variety of world’s common heritage. Moreover, the covenant emphasizes that it is a sacred aim that humanity must respect the natural balance in accordance with values that establish the fundamental of Islam.

This chapter focuses on the present and potential uses of artificial intelligence (AI) in Turkey's court system, including non-judicial tasks. Although Türkiye lacks sophisticated AI applications in a strict technical sense, the National Judiciary Informatics System (UYAP) has modernised judicial processes by digitising legal proceedings. While this system enhances accessibility and efficiency, the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation are exploring more advanced AI models. These courts are leveraging AI for tasks such as case classification, decision support, and reducing backlog.

Islamic legal scholarship is split on the permissibility of corporate personhood. While some scholars advocate unequivocal permissibility, others are critical because Islamic law prohibits limited liability in most contracts. The religion also regards the human being as the only subject of Divine command. Despite their differences, most jurists agree that the corporate form is an effective tool to mobilize large amounts of capital. However, only one scholar, Ahmad Ali Abdullah addresses the exploitative impact corporations have on human rights and the environment. In this context, I argue that we should address the issue of corporate personhood from a maqasid framework. The preservation and protection of wealth is a legitimate purpose of Islamic law. However, the preservation and protection of life is a higher purpose in the hierarchy. The preservation of life is directly linked to the preservation of the earth. While recognizing the corporate form’s utility, I advocate creating alternative business models that lead to more sustainable development.