Chapter 10 examines whether states bear duties of international cooperation with respect to forced migration, including the mass displacement caused by Myanmar’s campaign of ethnic cleansing against its Rohingya Muslim minority. It makes the case that the international community has accepted the protection of forced migrants as a common concern of humanity under the community’s joint stewardship.

This chapter explores how the law has identified the biological sex of an individual where it is indeterminate or contested. Legal systems with highly ridged sex-based rules developed social and legal mechanisms for authoritatively determining what sex a person was where this was unclear. The traditional approach of the law was to categorise the individual in question by reference to which sex was more ‘predominate’, following a crude assessment of physiology. The classification of sex has evolved significantly since then, with the House of Lords identifying a precise list of ‘indicia of human sex’. In determining biological sex, the law looks for congruence between a person’s chromosomes, gonads and genitals at birth. If there is congruence, then the law will treat that person as biologically male or female as the case may be. If there is incongruence between the physiological factors, that person is recognised as having a DSD and is subject to a separate legal analysis which looks to further factors to determine what sex an individual is classed as, including social upbringing and self-perception. Our law does not conflate issues of sexual development with issues of gender identity. The default position in our law is that a transgender person is legally recognised as being of their biological sex, regardless of medical intervention.

Chapter 6, “Envisioning a Pluriversal Governance: Scientific and Indigenous Ontologies in the Amazon”, examines the prospects for including scientific and indigenous ontologies in the international governance of the Amazon. The Chapter assesses the different governance models for enlarging ecological democracy and having nature’s interests represented in political spaces. For this aim, it analyzes the most prominent scientific bodies dealing with the climate emergency, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), compared to the Science Panel for the Amazon (SPA), the first scientist platform dedicated to the largest rainforest in the world. The Chapter proposes enlarging ecological democracy under a pluriversal governance in which nation-states, scientists, and Indigenous peoples would share the political stage to negotiate their different worldviews and the authority to represent their own natural worlds. This might trigger ontological clashes, but also the possibility of creating ontological coalitions around indigenous rights, the protection of nature, and the appropriate means to deal with the climate crisis in the basin.

Anti-Haitian sentiment is so entrenched in the Dominican Republic that it has its own name: antihaitianismo. The long history of discrimination and persecution of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent includes a massacre in 1937, which claimed around 18,000 lives. While such large-scale violence has not been repeated, Haitians and Haitian–Dominicans have experienced ongoing discrimination and human rights violations. Since the 1990s, there have been repeated mass deportations into Haiti, and in the 2010s, over 100,000 Haitian–Dominicans were stripped of their citizenship, rendering them stateless. By the early 2000s, many recognised the presence of risk factors for genocide in the Dominican Republic. Yet despite the risk, such violence did not occur. Moreover, since then multiple risk assessment models have documented decreasing risk. This chapter explores this constructive trajectory. It considers the risk factors and the factors that have promoted resilience over the period in question. Understanding how and why the violence of 1937 has not been repeated, and the gradual amelioration of risk in the Dominican Republic, can help us identify key factors that promote resilience to genocide.

One of the most contentious issues relting to sex and gender identity is whether a transgener person has a right to keep informaiton about their biological sex private from others. Related to the right to freedom of expression, discussed in previous chapters, is the countervailing right to private life. Nowhere encapsulates the potential for human rights to conflict more clearly than the tension between the interest of one person to disclose information that another party would rather be kept private. This chapter examines circumstances when it may be lawful to disclose information about the biological sex of another when they would strongly wish that information not be shared at all. Relatedly, it explores circumstances when heightened rights of privacy may obtain as a result of data protection obligations placed on businesses and public bodies. There is no absolute right to keep the fact of one’s sex private, but there may be some circumstances where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy and where disclosure may be unlawful.

When Germany occupied Denmark in April 1940, Danish opposition to the persecution of its Jewish minority was clear from the outset. As the occupation progressed, many individuals and groups vied for influence on this issue, including the King, the church, public figures, German officials in Denmark and the Danish Nazi party. The uneasy cooperation between Denmark and Germany held until August 1943, before collapsing in acrimony. The Nazis then sought to take advantage of the crisis to deport the Jews. The Danish people, however, mounted an extraordinary resistance to thwart their plans. The chapter examines the daring rescue of the Jews and the creation of a safe passage to Sweden. It also explores the fate of those who were captured and deported to Theresienstadt; and those children who stayed behind in hiding in Denmark. The next section of the chapter seeks to understand these exceptional experiences. It considers what made the rescue of Danish Jewry possible, and what were the leading factors that contributed to this outcome. Finally, the chapter concludes by considering how this case study can contribute to our understanding of what promotes resilience to genocide.

Political scientists have discovered the European Court of Justice, but has it discovered law? We address this enduring question, first posed by Armstrong in 1998, by tracing the evolution of law in political science work on the CJEU, from a concept understood in rudimentary terms as an external constraint on judicial behaviour to more recent nuanced accounts of legal concepts, doctrine, and judicial practices. While political science has come closer to the nuts and bolts of CJEU decision-making, we argue that there is untapped potential in exploring the multidimensionality of legal cases and the micro-level details of legal interpretation and adjudication.

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the UK Suprme Court’s decision in For Women Scotland v The Scottish Ministers, the landmark case which considered the definition of sex in the Equality Act 2010. The Court set out a test for determining when a Gender Recognition Certificate will not modify an individual’s legally recognised sex. In so doing, the Court reiterated the default common law position that sex is binary, biological, and immutable as a matter of fact. The Gender Recognition Act will not modify an individual’s legally recognised sex where the terms, context, and purpose of another enactment show that sex was intended to mean biological sex, because of a clear incompatibility between a certificated reading of sex and another enactment or where an enactment’s provisions are rendered incoherent and unworkable by a certificated sex interpretation. Applying this test to the Equality Act 2010, the Court concluded that a biological meaning of sex prevails. In concluding as such, the Court maintained equality of status for those protected under the characteristic of gender reassignment and reiterated that transgender people remain protected from associative or perception-based sex discrimination. While doctrinally a modest clarification, the judgment has significant social impact, correcting widespread misinterpretations of sex and gender in law.

The field of comparative judicial behaviour has substantially expanded in recent decades, attempting to explain the choices judges make amid a variety of political conditions. The vast majority of empirical research in this field has primarily addressed domestic courts, leaving open questions about the relevance of international courts, such as the CJEU, in this discussion. This chapter aims to review how scholars have addressed judicial behaviour at the CJEU. It divides the discussion into three parts: (1) judge-level factors, (2) internal institutional factors, and (3) external factors. It argues that while the scholarship has engaged well with rational choice accounts of judicial behaviour, substantial opportunity exists to apply attitudinal, identity, and ‘thinking fast’ approaches. Furthermore, the international character of the CJEU may allow scholars to add new facets to the judicial behaviour scholarship, as the combination of diverse legal traditions and linguistic traditions may increase judges’ costs of achieving their own policy goals in a given case. Taken together, engaging with judicial behaviour scholarship is a profitable avenue for CJEU scholars and may provide insights that are unique to such international contexts.

Chapter 1 draws on the history of Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine to distinguish two conceptions of sovereign equality under international law. It argues that that international law in the twentieth century embraced a constitutional and equitable conception of sovereign equality, generating state obligations to cooperate with one another to resolve disputes over matters of common concern in accordance with equitable principles.

The passage of submarines through waters subject to coastal State sovereignty is the focus of this chapter. Coastal State sovereignty over its territorial waters is subject to the right of all ships, including submarines, to innocent passage. Submarine passage may not prejudice the peace, good order or security of the coastal State, it must be on the surface with flag flying, and adhere to requirements in place for navigational safety, potentially including any traffic separation schemes or routeing measures. For international straits subject to the regime of transit passage and in archipelagic sea lanes, submarines may stay submerged. The requirements associated with passage through international straits and archipelagic waters are examined in this chapter, including the parameters of coastal State rights to regulate these forms of passage and respond to potential violations of passage rights.