The criminal law comprises a state response to wrongdoing on the part of the population, proscribing conduct that lies outside of the normal expected conduct of citizens. As such, the criminal law seeks to regulate socially transgressive or unacceptable (criminal) behaviour.In providing a framework of rules to address these behaviours, the criminal law actually comprises two discrete branches: substantive criminal law and procedural criminal law. This chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 1.2 looks at the nature of the criminal law; its purposes, limits and sources. This part examines a number of important issues, such as the purposes of the criminal law, the legitimate limits on its scope and its sources. Section 1.3 examines the notion of criminal responsibility, looking at who may be held liable for a criminal offence and the principles that underlie the state’s obligations in proving an offence.

Drugs are endemic in the criminal law, not the least because many offenders are regular users of them. Understanding drug law and policy begins with understanding the diversity of drug effects. In this chapter, we consider some of the key offence provisions relating to drug crime. From the outset it is important to recognise that the substantive criminal law overlaps heavily with a range of investigative and procedural law, including rules of evidence. For present purposes we are confining the current work to the offence aspects of drug offences and restricting the analysis to unlawful drugs as opposed to the control of medicines. The investigation of crime, especially drug offences, has evolved into a highly complicated field of law and practice, involving intersecting state and federal laws regulating surveillance, telecommunications, controlled purchases and covert investigation. This field of law is highly technical, and beyond the scope of the present chapter.

This chapter seeks to examine the impact and legacy of the failed Sunningdale initiative on British policy in Northern Ireland. At a superficial level British policy towards the problem oscillated markedly in the 25 years between the Sunningdale and Belfast/Good Friday Agreements. The approach of seeking to build a power-sharing devolved government with a strong Irish dimension proved unattainable in 1974. Over the subsequent years the British appeared to toy with: Irish unity; full integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom; devolution without an Irish dimension (or indeed much power to share); and a variant of joint authority with the Irish government without power-sharing in Northern Ireland, before returning successfully to the Sunningdale model in the late 1990s. This chapter will question the reasons for this oscillating approach. Was it a result of a disillusion with Sunnningdale amongst British policy-makers; a reflection of their pragmatism; a desire to insulate wider British politics from the Irish question; or an indication of a lack of ideological commitment and interest in Northern Ireland in wider British political circles? Drawing on the available archival sources, and interview data from British policymakers, the chapter will argue that it was not slow learning that delayed the ‘return’ to Sunningdale for the British, but the realities of events on the ground in Northern Ireland and the political attitudes of those involved in the conflict. The British were key players in this conflict but their ability to control events and outcomes was severely limited. Sunningdale represented what the British believed would be the most acceptable solution to the problem in 1973, but the conditions were not conducive for almost a quarter of a century.

This chapter considers the circumstances in which a person will be liable for the torts of another person. It primarily looks at the doctrines of vicarious liability (the liability of am employer for the tortious actions of an employee or a principal for the tortious actions of their agent) and non-delegable duties (the circumstances in which a duty arises which cannot be delegated to another person, such as a contractor). Note that there is often advocacy to change the legal position – to extend the legal circumstances in which liability can be extended to a third party – but also note that redefinition of relationships (such as the employment relationship) often requires adjustments in the law.

This chapter analyses the impact of the Sunningdale Agreement and its aftermath on unionist politics in Northern Ireland. It will begin by placing divisions within the unionist bloc, many of which preceded Sunningdale, in context. It will outline how divisions on power-sharing crystalized between the publication of the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals in March 1973 and the collapse of the power-sharing executive at the hands of the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) in May 1974. It will consider how opposition to Sunningdale created short-lived unity among disparate strands of unionism, which disintegrated once the executive collapsed. Drawing extensively from archival evidence, it will demonstrate how, after 1974, unionists experienced a prolonged limitation of their capacity to influence policy as British governments refused to countenance a return of devolution without nationalist involvement. This cemented a lasting cleavage within unionism between a small minority prepared to countenance power-sharing and the considerable majority that demanded a return to majority rule. Both desired devolution, but the latter, paradoxically, pursued policies that ultimately reinforced direct rule. The consistency of the British government’s stance on nationalist involvement in any devolved settlement and the absence of a local administration that unionists could focus their protests against ensured that the 1974 UWC strike was the zenith of rejectionist unionism. This combination of factors imposed clear limits on unionist political influence in subsequent years.

This chapter traces the ideas that shaped the concept of power-sharing within the SDLP, and subsequently Northern nationalism, highlighting the significance attached to the Irish dimension as a core feature of power-sharing, which caused divisive debates within the party post-Sunningdale. It will also trace how the concept evolved within British and Irish government circles, where much of the talk focussed on ‘government by consent’ as opposed to power-sharing during the rest of the 1970s. The fall of Sunningdale in 1974 has been attributed to many things, and the popular narrative emphasises that it was an agreement too soon, or a lost opportunity. This explanation does not account for the level of intra-party conflict that existed before the executive was even set up or during the negotiations. Further, it overlooks the very real challenge that power-sharing posed (and continues to pose) to democracy and legitimacy. Brian Faulkner, Chief Executive in the 1974 power-sharing Executive, retrospectively questioned the legitimacy of the SDLP sharing power in Northern Ireland: ‘Given the history of the SDLP over the previous years, and particularly their attitude that Northern Ireland had no right to exist, it was natural that unionists should feel strongly against SDLP participation in government’. The mandatory coalition between parties who were at ideologically opposite ends of the spectrum, including a party that had the demise of the state as one of its core aims, further highlighted the undemocratic nature of the agreement that inevitability would have caused problems, had the experiment not failed in 1974. The emphasis the SDLP attached to the Irish dimension as an integral part of power-sharing additionally eroded the democratic complexion of power-sharing. This has very real repercussions for the Northern Ireland Assembly today. While the 1998 Agreement ended the violence (or at least the level of violence) associated with the prior three decades of the ‘troubles’, there is no real commitment to democratic pluralist institutions at Stormont and instead there has been a reinforcing of the historical choices offered to the electorate of selecting candidates or voting on the basis of their shade of orange or green.