This chapter concerns immunities from jurisdiction. The first example is sovereign or state immunity, which is also closely related to the concepts of non-justiciability and act of state. The chapter traces the move from absolute to restrictive immunity in this respect, both in the UK and the US, as well as other states, through the case law. This has shifted attention to the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign acts. The question of sovereign immunity and violations of human rights is also raised. The definition of commercial acts is also addressed, as is the definition of the instrumentalities and organs of the state. Immunity for senior government figures is discussed. The chapter then turns to diplomatic immunity in the light of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The question of the inviolability of the mission premises is covered, as is the immunity of the diplomatic bag and the immunities of diplomatic property and personnel. The chapter concludes with a review of consular immunities.

This chapter attempts to articulate a new framework for a modern (contemporary) conception of ICA. It asserts that the current Free Proof rubric is but an ad hoc black-box paradigm of unworkable adjudication. Even though an aprioristic exclusionary evidential approach is discouraged, the point is made that such understanding of evidence is hardly foreign to ICA, and is contained in the IBA Rules. A fine line, so that argument says, must be drawn between preserving the inherent powers of arbitrators and the workings of an objective evidential regime. Hypotheticals are offered in this regard. Lastly, the chapter examines the need to have a workable approach to witness examination. Here the myth that cross-examination has its origins in Anglo-American trial work is substantively challenged by the classical writings of Plato.

The introduction justifies telling the story of the forgotten bully Louis Bieral. His life was extraordinary not only because of his interactions with famous people, but also because of his wide range of adventures. Moreover, his brutal career helps us understand the importance of private, nonlethal violence to the operation of nineteenth-century America.

This chapter focuses on the use of force by states. It begins with a brief survey of law and force from the era of the ‘just war’ to the rise of the United Nations. The relevant provisions of the UN Charter concerning the use of forces are then examined. In particular, the meaning of art. 2(4), which prohibits the threat or use of force against states, is discussed. The various categories of compulsion are noted, from retorsion and reprisals to the right to self-defence. The latter is carefully examined in the light of practice and art. 51 of the Charter. The use of force in self-defence against non-state actors is addressed, as is the concept of collective self-defence and intervention. The phenomenon of civil wars is noted, as is the theory of humanitarian intervention. The question of terrorism and international law is examined before the chapter turns to the issue of cyber warfare.

This chapter is a quest for objective standards that would govern (i) the taking of evidence and (ii) the presentation (admissibility) of evidence, along with the weight to be accorded to such evidence. It undertakes this analysis within the framework of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (the IBA Rules). The IBA Rules are constructively critiqued, in part, because they employ definitions that are operational and not substantive. This want of objective nomenclature leads to a relativistic single standard for both (i) the taking and (ii) the presentation (admissibility) and weight of evidence. It is asserted that foundational concepts such as “relevance” and “materiality” must be imbued with objectivity in order to remove the indeterminacy that arises from an otherwise relativistic and ad hoc standard. The IBA Rules are compared and contrasted to provisions from the US federal evidence rubric.

This chapter consists of an empirical statistical study of the settlement rates of the US federal and state court civil proceedings. It concludes that less than 1 percent of all civil proceedings are adjudicated pursuant to a jury trial. In nonjury trial proceedings, a paradigm that in many conceptual aspects resembles an ICA arbitral tribunal, approximately 83 percent of proceedings are concluded pursuant to a final judgment after the end of all first instance judicial labor. The factual bases for the high settlement rate pervading federal and state civil judicial proceedings are examined in detail. The text explores the extent to which such grounds providing for settlement in a judicial context are transposable to ICA. The conclusion is reached that ICA cases only settle at a rate of approximately 27 percent because stakeholders structurally cannot engage in timely risk assessment. This figure is lower in investor–state dispute settlement proceedings.

This chapter concerns the international protection of human rights. It first traces the development of international human rights law from the initial positivist doctrine of strict state sovereignty to the changes wrought by the League of Nations and the minority protection and mandate regimes and to the advent of the United Nations. Basic principles such as domestic jurisdiction and the exhaustion of local remedies are noted and references are made to the COVID-19 pandemic and responses thereto. The core principles of the UN system of human rights protection are then discussed, ranging from the protection of collective rights, non-discrimination and self-determination. The UN implementation system is then examined from the various political bodies, such as the Human Rights Council to the expert bodies established by UN organs, such as the Human Rights Committee. This is followed by an examination of the range of regional human rights bodies from the European Court of Human Rights to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.