Some actions are intrinsic motor units that can be concatenated as needed to solve a problem. In contrast, many actions are correlated with one another when engaging in particular types of behaviour, such as predation, mating or aggression. Moreover, how those actions are associated depend on intrinsic rules of organisation. Consequently, selecting markers to measure as if they are independent may be misleading. For example, scoring success in grasping a piece of food may fail to reveal that different combinations of limb movements may be capable of comparable rates of success. The lack of independence among actions and the potentially misleading conclusions that can be drawn from end-point measures point us to the second principle – understanding the intrinsic organisation of behaviour. Knowing something about the intrinsic organisation of a behavioural sequence can be critical in identifying markers that reflect that organisation.

Traditionally, to test whether the hypothesised organisation of behaviour generates the behavioural markers selected for measurement has required experiments or comparisons across species, sex and age. In the last couple of decades, important strides have been made in developing ways to create virtual animals, either on a computer screen or as freely moving robots, that can be programmed to produce the behaviour of interest. If the programmed rules are sufficient to produce the behaviour of real animals, then that adds independent evidence for the proposed organisation. Novel testing methods is one direction for the future. Another is to identify additional organisational principles. For example, some level of randomness seems essential for the production of effective functional behaviour. A challenge for the future is to understand how random processes are integrated with the causal processes described in the preceding chapters.

Knowing the perceptions that an animal controls and the brain-based rules that regulate which actions are performed may not be sufficient to explain the overt behaviour performed. The reason for this is that the animal’s particular body anatomy and the structure of the environment within which the actions are performed may constrain them to a particular form. To be certain that it is perceptions or intrinsic motor organisation that is responsible for the behaviour being expressed, the role of body anatomy and environmental context needs to be assessed. These are the third and fourth principles of behavioural organisation. Without taking these principles into account, the behavioural markers selected for measurement may be misleadingly attributed to neural causes and evolutionary processes.

As an empirical science, the study of animal behaviour involves measurement. When an animal engages in a series of actions, such as exploring or catching prey, the problem becomes that of identifying suitable components from that stream of action to use as markers suitable to score. The markers selected reflect the observer’s hypothesis of the organisation of the behaviour. Unfortunately, in most cases, researchers only provide heuristic descriptions of what they measure. To make the study of animal behaviour more scientific, the hypotheses underlying the decision of what to measure should be made explicit so as to allow them to be tested. Using hypothesis testing as a guiding framework, several principles that have been shown to be useful in identifying behavioural organisation are presented, providing a starting point in deciding what markers to select for measurement.

Some actions are intrinsic motor units that can be concatenated as needed to solve a problem. In contrast, many actions are correlated with one another when engaging in particular types of behaviour, such as predation, mating or aggression. Moreover, how those actions are associated depend on intrinsic rules of organisation. Consequently, selecting markers to measure as if they are independent may be misleading. For example, scoring success in grasping a piece of food may fail to reveal that different combinations of limb movements may be capable of comparable rates of success. The lack of independence among actions and the potentially misleading conclusions that can be drawn from end-point measures point us to the second principle – understanding the intrinsic organisation of behaviour. Knowing something about the intrinsic organisation of a behavioural sequence can be critical in identifying markers that reflect that organisation.

Knowing the perceptions that an animal controls and the brain-based rules that regulate which actions are performed may not be sufficient to explain the overt behaviour performed. The reason for this is that the animal’s particular body anatomy and the structure of the environment within which the actions are performed may constrain them to a particular form. To be certain that it is perceptions or intrinsic motor organisation that is responsible for the behaviour being expressed, the role of body anatomy and environmental context needs to be assessed. These are the third and fourth principles of behavioural organisation. Without taking these principles into account, the behavioural markers selected for measurement may be misleadingly attributed to neural causes and evolutionary processes.

As an empirical science, the study of animal behaviour involves measurement. When an animal engages in a series of actions, such as exploring or catching prey, the problem becomes that of identifying suitable components from that stream of action to use as markers suitable to score. The markers selected reflect the observer’s hypothesis of the organisation of the behaviour. Unfortunately, in most cases, researchers only provide heuristic descriptions of what they measure. To make the study of animal behaviour more scientific, the hypotheses underlying the decision of what to measure should be made explicit so as to allow them to be tested. Using hypothesis testing as a guiding framework, several principles that have been shown to be useful in identifying behavioural organisation are presented, providing a starting point in deciding what markers to select for measurement.

When engaging in some behaviour, some actions by an animal are more likely to resonate with us as observers than others and those impressions often form the basis for the behavioural markers that we choose for measurement. However, as much as possible, we should view the context from the animal’s perspective as it is what is important to them that guides their behaviour. Of what the animal may be able to sense, some sensations rank as perceptions that are relevant to the animal in that context. Moreover, in dynamic situations, it is often those perceptions that the animal seeks to stabilise. This means the behaviour controls those perceptions, so many actions can be explained as being compensatory. Without knowing what an action is compensating for, actions may be mistakenly abstracted as markers to measure. So, the first principle is to identify the perceptions that are relevant to the animal.