This chapter relates the concept of the ecological self, as described in Ulric Neisser's “Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge” (1988), to research and theory on the perceptual and cognitive aspects of body experience, particularly as these concern self-awareness. By and large, the relationship is established by adopting a historical perspective, describing a context and line of continuity that integrate that corpus of research and theory with many of the topics discussed in this volume.

Two ecological psychologies

J J. Gibson

According to Neisser, “The ecological self is the self as perceived with respect to the physical environment: “I” am the person here in this place, engaged in this particular activity” (1988, p. 36). The concept of ecological selfhood has its origins in the theory promulgated by J. J. Gibson, that systematic flow patterns in the visual field contain sufficient information to specify the situations that give rise to them. These ideas were first proposed to explain visual perception (Gibson, 1950). They evolved into a more general ecological psychology that assigns objective existence to information that arises from the external world (Gibson, 1979; Neisser, 1990).

Introduction

Self-recognition in nonhuman primates is often equated with mirror selfrecognition (Anderson, 1984; Gallup, 1970; Itakura, 1987a,b; Povinelli, 1987). Nevertheless, for humans, “it is the ability to recognize and respond to self independent of contingency which represents the important developmental milestone in self-recognition” (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979b, p. 218). Human children begin to recognize their contingent-independent image in photographs only after mirror self-recognition (MSR), with most children at 22 months of age correctly labeling a photograph of themselves among photographs of other infants, and some infants doing so as early as 16 months (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979a, p. 12). The recognition of a contingency independent self in photographs is relatively unstudied in primates (but see Miles, SAAH16; Patterson & Cohn, SAAH17). The only previous instance described is open to interpretation: The sign-using chimpanzee Lucy, after observing an image of herself and her cat (which had died three months previously), signed “Lucy's cat, Lucy's cat” repeatedly for ten minutes as she stared at the picture (Temerlin, 1977).

This instance suggests not only that Lucy recognized her own image and her cat's, but also that she viewed the cat as her own – as a possession. Although possession in nonhuman primates has been studied in the context of control over objects (Kummer, 1973; Thierry, Wunderlich, & Gueth, 1989; Torii, 1975), there is no evidence that possession in these primates is mediated by a self-concept or a concept of the other, such that they view these objects as symbolically representing themselves or another.

Infants' sense of self and other has been supposed by both attachment theory (Bretherton, 1987; Harter, 1983; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1985) and psychodynamic theory (Emde, 1983; Kernberg, 1976; Kohut, 1984; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975; Stern, 1985) to be a function of interactions with primary caregivers. Primary emphasis on the influence of interactions on infants' acquisition of self reflects a bias in our theorizing. Winnicott (1965), for example, stated that “there is no such thing as an infant” to underscore the importance of the mother-infant relationship. In nature, of course, there is not only the infant and the mother but also ongoing interactions between infant and mother. Current theories of infants' self-development vary in their emphasis on infants' capacities that reflect normative functioning (e.g., Neisser, 1988, 1991) and those that emphasize individual differences as a function of variability in infants' interactions with their mothers (e.g., Mahler, et al., 1975). Although infants' biological survival depends on caregivers' support, once this support is assumed within an average expectable environment, our thesis is that infants' sense of self and other is related to a number of diverse factors, including species characteristics, the development of infants' capacities, and characteristics of interactions between infants and mothers.

This paper reports further observations, experiments, and methodological considerations concerning mirror-mediated self-recognition and mirrorcorrelated behavior in pigtailed monkeys (Macaca nemestrina) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). We also describe from videotape an instance of apparent self-recognition by a monkey. Last, we discuss behavioral processes we think applicable to the “passing” of the Gallup mark test and to the larger issues of self-awareness and a self-concept.

The empirical facts of mirror-mediated/mark-directed (MM/MD) responding in some chimpanzees and orangutans, but not in gorillas nor in the dozen or more monkey species tested by the well-known Gallup (1970) procedure (hereafter, the “mark test”), have been widely discussed (e.g., Anderson, 1984; Gallup, 1987). A positive mark test is said to imply – even to operationally define – self-recognition, self-awareness, a self-concept, and, ipso facto, consciousness. From there, questions of proximate causes, function, development, and evolution are pursued; species discontinuities are postulated; comparisons with human cognition are made, and searches are prompted for indications of empathy, deception, attributions of mental states, and more. If sentience or self-awareness is attributed to any nonhuman animals, ethical and legal questions of human obligations toward animals are made even more urgent. In short, the importance of this range of issues should find us disquieted that experimental investigations of self-recognition in primates have relied so strongly on tests with mirrors (see discussion by Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; commentary by Povinelli & deBlois, 1992).

To date, the only species to show compelling evidence of self-recognition are humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans. (Only one gorilla, Koko, has displayed self-recognition; see Patterson & Cohn, SAAH17). An important question is whether self-awareness is a uniquely primate (great ape–human) ability or a potential outcome of any sufficiently intelligent system. In order to address this question we can compare tests of self-awareness in primates with another taxonomic group that has diverged extensively from them yet displays a comparable level of neurobehavioral complexity, namely, the Cetacea. Comparisons of primates and cetaceans, therefore, form the basis for a test of convergent cognitive evolution and could set the stage for subsequent tests of the generality of Gallup's (1982) model of self-awareness.

Dolphins are provocative candidates for self-awareness for a number of reasons. They share those neurological, cognitive, and social characteristics with great apes and humans that are generally regarded as having been important for the development of self-awareness in primates. Humans, great apes, and dolphins show similarities across several measures of encephalization, including a high brain-weight / body-weight ratio (Glezer, Jacobs, & Morgane, 1988; Jerison, 1982), extensive cortical surface area (Jerison, 1982), and a high neocortical-volume / total-cortical-volume ratio (Glezer et al., 1988). The bottlenose dolphin is capable of high levels of performance on a variety of auditory learning, artificial language comprehension, and memory tasks comparable to those mastered by chimpanzees (for a review of this literature see Herman, 1986).

Introduction

The concept of self has interested the Western mind from the beginning of recorded history. How we approach our understanding of ourselves has varied, both in method and study. Historically, we have been concerned with our relationship with God, and that of ourselves to others, as well as with the idea of identity. In this chapter I have chosen to focus on the general problem of the self. Three questions are addressed:

1. What is a self?

2. How do we measure a self?

3. What does a self do?

In the first, I try to distinguish between many of the current ideas about the self, bringing to bear the idea of levels of self. Of importance here is a particular aspect of the self, perhaps the most restrictive: that of the self as aware of itself. In the second question, I suggest that the measurement of self is highly dependent upon what is meant by self. Here I suggest that the self, aware of its self, can best be measured, especially in nonverbal creatures, through self-recognition. Finally, in addressing the third question, I consider the issue of the social and the feeling self. These three questions address what for me are some of the critical issues in the study of self, and in particular, in the study of its development.

Neisser (1988; see also this volume) has done a great service by attempting to specify the different kinds of knowledge that human beings may have of themselves. My concern is with both interpersonal and conceptual knowledge of the self, as I believe that these are intimately related. I am interested in how human beings form a concept of themselves – the “me” of Mead and James – and I believe, as they did, that this can be done only by organisms that are social or interpersonal in a very special way. This chapter is an attempt to specify the nature of this special form of sociality by focusing on recent research and theory in developmental psychology.

The 9-month miracle

Human infants are social creatures from the beginning. They show an interest in people's faces and behavior from as early as we care to measure it (Stern, 1985; see also this volume). They engage in rhythmic interactions with their caregivers (Trevarthen, 1979; see also this volume) and match their behaviors to those of their caregivers within minutes after birth (Meltzoff & Moore, 1989).

In his paper “Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge,” Neisser (1988) reminds us of J. J. Gibson's (1979) argument that the self and environment are always coperceived. Gibson's discussion was mainly about what Neisser calls the ecological self, which is directly perceived. However, if, as Neisser has argued, the interpersonal self is also directly perceived, then the coperception of self and environment should occur on this level as well as on the level of the ecological self. If so, then while we engage in interactions with other persons, we perceive not only the other person but ourselves. What do we learn about the self in this way? I believe we learn about the self as actor in an environment inhabited by other humans: We learn how others react to us, how our actions influence the course of events, and whether our assumptions about the world, including ourselves, are correct.

Neisser makes the further, and very important, point that the perception of the interpersonal self must be in species-specific terms: “The successful achievement of intersubjectivity depends not only on the operation of the perceptual and motor systems, but on some additional, specifically human mechanism that permits us to relate to members of our own species” (1988, p. 12).

The starting point for these reflections is Ulric Neisser's essay “Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge” (1988), which I wish to challenge or, at any rate, to read with an emphasis differing from its author's.

During the semester preceding the conference for which this essay was prepared, E. J. Gibson conducted a seminar on the ontogenesis of the perceived self. At the head of her outline for the seminar, she placed a statement from J.J. Gibson: “To perceive the world is to coperceive oneself” (1979, p. 141). Accepting this maxim, I want also to reverse it: To perceive oneself is, except in very peculiar circumstances, to coperceive the world. As J.J. Gibson put it some pages earlier than the statement just cited, “We were created by the world we live in.” Thus, to be aware of ourselves, I would say, is to be aware not only of a product of that world but also of aspects of the world that bear on its production.

Self-knowledge is fundamentally and inalienably ecological, and so is the object of such knowledge. Of course, as Neisser argues, there are a number of paths to self-knowledge: If I want to know who I am, I can consult my children, my colleagues, my tax accountant, my bathroom scale, my birth certificate, even, to a degree, my memory images or my aches and pains, and so on.

This volume is devoted to Ulric Neisser's first two kinds of self-knowledge: ecological and interpersonal. My focus here is on the second of these, interpersonal knowledge. Pertinent writings by G. H. Mead and Martin Buber will be considered, then, in terms of how their writings contribute to, or differ from, Neisser's view (1988; see also this volume). At the risk of some redundancy, I begin by summarizing the main features of Neisser's account of the interpersonal self (1988, pp. 41-46).

Neisser opens by stating that this self is “engaged in immediate unreflective social interaction with another person.” When the actions of one person “mesh appropriately” with the actions of another, they create an occasion of intersubjectivity. This mutuality can be perceived both by the external observer and by the participants. Direct perception rather than inference is the basis of this mutuality or intersubjectivity. As studies of infants indicate, the interpersonal self is specifically oriented by and through expressive gestures; communication through gestures develops the interpersonal self. This process is “an emotional business: the two partners are obviously sharing an affect” (p. 44).

Introduction

Although various forms of self-knowledge and self-awareness are thought to be present in human infants (Neisser, 1988; Stern, 1985), the question of selfawareness in nonhuman primates has been overshadowed by discussion of their capacity for mirror self-recognition (Gallup, 1977a, 1985; Suarez & Gallup, 1981). Evidence for mirror self-recognition (MSR) via passing the mark test and/or examining body parts not visible without a mirror have been obtained for each great ape species (Gallup, 1970; Hyatt & Hopkins, SAAH15; Miles, SAAH16; Patterson & Cohn, SAAH17; Suarez & Gallup, 1981). In contrast, evidence for MSR in monkeys is much more questionable (Anderson, SAAH21; Gallup, SAAH3): Self-examination using the mirror is typically absent, and mark-directed behaviors during the mark test are infrequent and different in form than that seem in the apes (e.g., Itakura, 1987; Thompson & Boatright-Horowitz, SAAH22).

The rationale for using the mark test in the assessment of self-recognition is that the individual must have a mental representation of the self that he or she understands to be reflected in the mirror (Gallup, 1988). The presence of the mark is a violation of that internal representation, and therefore is a novelty to which the individual's behavior is directed.

Macaques may have failed to provide evidence for MSR for reasons other than a failure to have an internal representation of the self. First, few subjects have been used in the tests of self-recognition, ranging from one (Gallup, 1977a) to four (Gallup, 1970) of any particular species.

Gordon Gallup's significant contribution to the psychological study of the self is twofold: He introduced an objective empirical method to examine selfrecognition in nonverbal organisms through the mirror self-recognition (MSR) test, and he developed a challenging theoretical account that postulates an inherent link between the ability for MSR and the capacity to infer mental states in others, that is, for having a theory of mind (ToM). Briefly, Gallup's model states that

1. MSR implies self-awareness;

2. this “self-awareness is tantamount to being aware of being aware” (Gallup, 1991, p. 123); and

3. being aware of one's own “mental states and their relation to various external events” allows one “to gain inferential access” to the mental states of others (Gallup, 1991, p. 123).

Thus, because Gallup's model attributes to the organism showing MSR a level of self-awareness that satisfies the representational preconditions for inferring beliefs in others, he predicts a developmental synchrony between the appearance of MSR and “introspectively based social strategies”, such as intentional deception, that implies a ToM.

Evidence demonstrating that organisms that seem to possess a ToM – such as young children (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988) and chimpanzees (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990; Woodruff & Premack, 1979) – also show MSR (Gallup & Suarez, 1986), is clearly in line with this prediction.

The comparative analysis of when and how animals become aware of themselves has at least two levels of focus. One has to do with a conceptual awareness. It implies some representational memory and is reflected in some self-referencing behavior that discriminates unique features of the individual (Gallup, 1970; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Lewis and Brooks-Gunn call this level the “categorical self”. The other level of focus has to do with a perceptual sensitivity. It implies some detection mechanism and is reflected in some self-referencing behavior that discriminates self from nonself at least momentarily. Lewis and Brooks-Gunn call this level the “existential self”. This paper will be limited to a consideration of how infants detect their existential selves. It is the simpler of selves, but it has been none the less elusive in the history of developmental psychology.

Theoretical concern for detection of self

Self-discovery in Freudian and Piagetian theories

The two major developmental theories of this century, Freud's and Piaget's, each assume that normal development in humans requires an initial investment in the task of differentiating the self from its external environment. The theories differ as to when and how the task is accomplished. As for timing, Freud proposed a relatively speedy accomplishment within the first few months, whereas Piaget proposed that the task would take two or three times as long (Wolff, 1960). As for how the distinction between self and nonself is accomplished, the two theorists differed fundamentally.

Freud (1911/1946) attended to why we would be motivated to do so.

Commentaries submitted by the qualified professional readership of this journal will be considered for publication in a later issue as Continuing Commentary on these articles. Integrative overviews and syntheses are especially encouraged.

How does the nervous system control the equilibrium trajectory?

[EB] The classical monkey limb perturbation experiments of Bizzi et al. (1982; 1984) greatly influenced motor control studies. Their findings, as well as those of Asatryan and Feldman (1965) on the unloading of the human forearm, were in good agreement with Feldman's hypothesis that the nervous system controls limb movements not by programming EMG bursts or force pulses for the limb acceleration and deceleration, but by defining a new equilibrium of the “limb/external load” system. In their target article, however, Bizzi et al. reject the concrete neurophysiological mechanism proposed by Feldman for how the system's equilibrium position is controlled.

Alpha-lambda controversy. It is suggested by Bizzi et al. that the X model is a subset of the a model, because the former uses a concrete form of the relationship between joint angle, central control parameters, and the level of a activity. They also reject the necessity of a muscle invariant characteristic for an equilibrium point (EP) model and argue that “the reflex apparatus contributes in a modest way to force generation” (see, however, Gandevia & Burke, this issue).