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Will the developing world attain mean IQs that match those of the developed world in the foreseeable future? There is no doubt that a significant IQ gap between the two exists. Lynn and Vanhanen (2002, 2006) recorded it and suggested that the developing world does not have the intelligence to equal the record of the developed world for economic growth. I suspect it is not that simple. In 1917, Americans had a mean IQ of 72 (against today’s norms) and a good estimate for 1900 would be 67. Only two developing nations fall significantly below this (Saint Lucia and Equatorial Guinea). The US did not leap from 67 to 100 as a prerequisite for industrial development; rather it was a matter of reciprocal causality. The first step toward modernity raised IQ a bit, which paved the way for the next step, which raised IQ a bit more, and so on. It was like climbing a ladder: start with one foot, next step up with the other foot, until you reach the top.
First, I will argue that the evidence that inferior genes for intelligence handicap the developing world is suspect. Second, I will note something unexpected: the IQ gains of the developed world seem to be persisting into the twenty-first century. If this continues, it will be more difficult for the developing world to catch up. Third, I will show that even so, the developing world has the potential to gain at a faster rate. Malnutrition, inbreeding, and ill health are present there and, if overcome, promise dividends. By contrast, these factors have had little effect on IQ in the developed world since 1950. Fourth, I will give evidence that IQ gains in the developing world have begun.
Box 6 in Chapter 3 gives estimates for gains over time on certain WISC and WAIS subtests and projects those gains into the future (up to 2012). It is derived from four tables.
(1) Table AI1 gives WISC gains on all subtests from the WISC (1947.5) to the WISC-IV (2001.75). Table AII3 in Appendix II adds detail on the calculations.
(2) Table AI2 uses past trends to project the gain from the WISC-IV to the “WISC-V” on the assumption that the latter will be normed in 2012. This entails pro-rating all subsequent trends over the interval of 24.5 years that separated the norming of the WISC and WISC-R. All calculations are explained at the bottom of the table. The final column gives what I think the actual ScaledScore gains (SD = 3) will be from the WISC-IV to the WISC-V, just for fun. To get the modern age values in Box 6 , average the four Modern world values numbered (1) to (4) respectively.
(3) Table AI3 gives WAIS gains on all subtests from the WAIS to the WAIS-IV. Table AII2 in Appendix II adds detail on both scores and calculations.
(4) Table AI4 uses past trends to project the gain from the WAIS-IV to the “WAIS-V” on the assumption that the latter will be normed in 2016. This entails projecting all subsequent trends over the interval of 24.5 years that separated the norming of the WAIS and WAIS-R. All calculations are explained at the bottom of the table. The final column gives what I think the actual Scaled Score gains (SD = 3) will be from the WAIS-IV to the WAIS-V, just for fun. To get the modern age values in Box 6 , average the four Modern World values numbered (1) to (4) respectively.
Race and gender IQ differences arouse strong emotions and therefore I excluded them from What Is Intelligence? I did not want critical assessment of my views on intelligence lost in a welter of acrimonious debate. Look at what happened to The Bell Curve, which was 90 percent about other subjects and debated as if it were 90 percent about race.
I have offered my case that the black/white IQ gap is probably environmental in origin elsewhere (Flynn, 1980, 2008), and will not repeat it here. However, much of this book preaches the message that differences between Wechsler subtests are central to interpreting IQ trends. The following will, I hope, show that these subtest differences are not central to the race and IQ debate, at least not for the reasons given by thinkers such as Jensen and Rushton. As a bonus, we may enhance our understanding of why WISC subtests differ in a variety of ways: not only in the size of the black/white performance gap, but also in terms of their g-loadings, heritability, and sensitivity to inbreeding depression.
Some thirty-five years ago, I began my periodic visits to the field of psychology. Over time, I became uneasy about something that seemed both odd and crippling: the isolation of the study of intelligence from an awareness of the social context within which all human behavior occurs. Many psychologists are happy to infer the social consequences of what they learn about intelligence. But all the causal arrows tend to run one way: they do not infuse their study of intelligence with social awareness.
Over 50 years ago, C. Wright Mills (1959) published The Sociological Imagination. The sociological imagination is the ability to see people socially and take into account how they interact and influence each other. I will emphasize a facet of the sociological imagination: always asking what social behavior lies behind measurements and models. To illustrate what happens when social awareness recedes into the background, I will offer 14 examples.
The mystique of the brain
Students of intelligence look forward to the day when all cognitive behavior can be explained in terms of brain physiology. But if they become obsessed by that task, they forget that understanding brains is only part of understanding human intelligence. Jensen (2011) is worth quoting at some length.
In On Nature and Language Noam Chomsky develops his thinking on the relation between language, mind and brain, integrating current research in linguistics into the burgeoning field of neuroscience. This 2002 volume begins with a lucid introduction by the editors Adriana Belletti and Luigi Rizzi. This is followed by some of Chomsky's writings on these themes, together with a penetrating interview in which Chomsky provides the clearest and most elegant introduction to current theory available. It should make his Minimalist Program accessible to all. The volume concludes with an essay on the role of intellectuals in society and government. Nature and Language is a significant landmark in the development of linguistic theory. It will be welcomed by students and researchers in theoretical linguistics, neurolinguistics, cognitive science and politics, as well as anyone interested in the development of Chomsky's thought.
Cognitive science is a cross-disciplinary enterprise devoted to understanding the nature of the mind. In recent years, investigators in philosophy, psychology, the neurosciences, artificial intelligence, and a host of other disciplines have come to appreciate how much they can learn from one another about the various dimensions of cognition. The result has been the emergence of one of the most exciting and fruitful areas of inter-disciplinary research in the history of science. This volume of original essays surveys foundational, theoretical, and philosophical issues across the discipline, and introduces the foundations of cognitive science, the principal areas of research, and the major research programs. With a focus on broad philosophical themes rather than detailed technical issues, the volume will be valuable not only to cognitive scientists and philosophers of cognitive science, but also to those in other disciplines looking for an authoritative and up-to-date introduction to the field.
The big question in the science of psychology is: why is human cognition and behavior so different from the capabilities of every other animal species on Earth - including our close genetic relations, the chimpanzees? This book provides a coherent answer by examining those aspects of the human brain that have made triadic forms of perception and cognition possible. Mechanisms of dyadic association sufficiently explain animal perception, cognition and behavior, but a three-way associational mechanism is required to explain the human talents for language, tool-making, harmony perception, pictorial depth perception and the joint attention that underlies all forms of social cooperation.
How is it possible that in more than one hundred years, the nature-nurture debate has not come to a satisfactory resolution? The problem, Dale Goldhaber argues, lies not with the proposed answers, but with the question itself. In The Nature-Nurture Debate, Goldhaber reviews the four major perspectives on the issue - behavior genetics, environment, evolutionary psychology and developmental systems theory - and shows that the classic, reductionist strategies (behavior genetics and environmental approaches) are incapable of resolving the issue because they each offer a false perspective on the process of human development. It is only through a synthesis of the two holistic perspectives of evolutionary psychology and developmental systems theory that we will be able to understand the nature of human behavior.
This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions. By reuniting the causal approach with the rational approach, the causalists opened the way for a naturalistic stance in action theory and thus for an integration of philosophical and scientific enquiries. Many philosophers introduce a conception of intentions as distinctive, sui generis, mental states. Intentions are responsible for triggering or initiating the intended action (initiating function) and for guiding its course until completion. Dual-intention theories provide a partial answer to the problem of causal deviance. The chapter concentrates on the functional architecture of motor cognition, introducing some of the theoretical concepts, models, and hypotheses that play a central role in current thinking in the motor domain and are of particular relevance for philosophical theorizing on action.
William James famously held that we consciously experience all and only those stimuli that we attend to. A theoretical and only mildly philosophical question is that of state/event consciousness. Higher-order theorists (HOT) resist the perceptual model, and maintain that merely having a thought about the first-order state will suffice for consciousness, provided that the thought arose from the state itself without benefit of (person-level) inference. This chapter discusses some philosophical issues. Sensory qualities ("qualia" in the strict sense) are the first-order qualitative features of which we are aware in sensory experience: colors, pitches, smells, textures. The second problem is the intrinsic perspectivalness, point-of-view-iness, and/or first-personishness of experience, as discussed by K. Gunderson, T. Nagel, and others. The third problem is the existence of funny facts and/or special phenomenal knowledge. The last problem is the explanatory gap called to our attention by J. Levine.
The phrase "the Representational Theory of Mind" (RTM) is used in two different but related ways. To understand the difference, one must distinguish two levels at which human beings can be described. The first is personal and belongs to common sense or folk psychology. The second level, in contrast, is subpersonal and scientific. Cognitive scientists and philosophers of cognitive science have offered various characterizations. This chapter begins with the author's own view, based on C.S. Peirce's general theory of representation, and then uses that as a basis of comparison to other views. Cognitive scientists, who conceptualize the mind/brain as, or as substantially like, a computer, take the representation-bearers of mental representations to be computational structures or states. Peirce hypothesized two broad kinds of ground for representation: similarity and causation. Mental representations play multiple roles in cognitive science explanations, which themselves come in many kinds.
This chapter provides empirical and theoretical understanding of cognition. Today localizationism dominates neuroscience, ranging from single cell recording to functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI), while anti-localizationism has a new home in dynamical systems modeling. Cognitive science encompasses both. It is sometimes said that the cognitive revolution stemmed from seizing on a new technology, the digital computer, as a metaphor for the mind. Artificial neural network represents a counterpoint to discrete computation. Symbolic architectures share a commitment to representations whose elements are symbols and operations on those representations that typically involve moving, copying, deleting, comparing, or replacing symbols. The chapter highlights just two trends: the expansion of inquiry down into the brain (cognitive neuroscience) and out into the body and world (embedded and extended cognition). The expansion outward has been more diverse, but the transitional figure clearly is James J. Gibson.
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the modern science of memory and presents some significant issues in the field. The contributions of Hermann Ebbinghaus, Frederick Bartlett, and Brenda Milner reveals important insights into how memory works, and the chapter draws upon each approach in characterizing the functional organization of human memory. One of the most significant questions in memory research has been whether there is a fundamental difference between the retention of information across short delays versus long delays. Working memory (WM) model proposes a separation between short-term storage (or maintenance) and the manipulation of information in the service of task goals. Successful memory performance depends not only on how information is encoded, but also on interactions between encoding and retrieval processes. Forgetting can occur even for information that was adequately processed at encoding. Consolidation theory and interference theory are the most popular accounts of forgetting.