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Culture arises from the interaction of many individuals sharing knowledge and collaborating over time, and, because of this, culture must be studied using different methods to those that are commonly employed in many areas of psychology. The majority of our understanding of the social learning underpinning culture is generalised from ‘dyadic’ experiments, in which a single participant observes a single model, and as a result leaves questions about the relationship between the individual- and group-level unaddressed. Such questions include how different forms of cultural information spread across the population and how individuals work together to produce cultural products. Diffusion experiments present a method for such dynamics to be examined. This chapter reviews the varieties of diffusion methods available and the strengths and weaknesses each type of diffusion design provides in answering questions about cultural evolution. It also reviews recent innovations in studying the spread of culture via social relations using social network analyses. We argue that social network analyses could be especially useful for examining a dynamic which has hitherto not been widely considered in studying cultural evolution; that is, the feedback relationship between social structure (relations) and social learning, with copying behaviour fulfilling both a role of information exchange and a role of affiliation.
Many different claims have been made concerning the function and role of the human mirror system. This chapter first examines the question of what makes the mirror system special, and whether this particular network can be clearly distinguished from visuomotor systems in the brain. Current studies suggest it is surprisingly hard to draw clear distinctions between mirroring and visuomotor systems. The second part then distinguishes between models for understanding, predicting and responding to social stimuli. I suggest that responding theories have been somewhat neglected, and that social responding should be considered as an important function of the mirror system, in the same way that grasping objects is an important function of the visuomotor system.
In this chapter we will introduce a new theory of aesthetics in the performing arts that is based on communication via movement. With a specific focus on dance performances, we propose that movement messages are communicated from performer to spectator. We suggest that the aesthetic impact of dance (and perhaps all performing arts) is a result of successful message-passing between performer and spectator. We show how Grice’s four maxims of successful conversation can be applied to the performance situation. We propose that communication during a performance is interactive and bidirectional. Information being passed from performer to audience is primarily communicated through observed movement kinematics and choreographic structure: we will distinguish between the processing of syntactic information of postures, movements and movement sequences, on the one hand, and processing of semantics of movement intentions, on the other hand. Aesthetic processing of the movement message will further depend on the spectator’s visual and motor expertise. In a dimensional model of aesthetic appreciation of dance, we distinguish between processing fluency and novelty/complexity of information as two distinct sources of movement aesthetics that relate to specific brain mechanisms. Aesthetic judgements of preference and interest will reflect a combination of both implicit processing fluency and the explicit aesthetic strategy of the observer. Our theory differs from existing accounts of aesthetic experience in that it emphasises successful communication as the primary source of aesthetic experience. Appreciation of dance in this context is neither just a function of dance movement features (as an objectivist aesthetics suggests) nor of the spectator’s processing fluency (as a subjectivist aesthetics suggests). Instead, our emphasis on communication implies some level of experience-sharing between dancer and spectator.
Social cognition is composed of at least two major types of processes – bottom up and top down. Bottom-up processes are stimulus-driven, fairly automatic and fast. Top-down processes, on the other hand, require effort; they are deliberate and flexible. The mirror neuron system (MNS) is a recently discovered neural system that seems to map fairly well on bottom-up social processes. During social interactions, two individuals internally mirror each other’s actions via the MNS, hence connecting their bottom-up processes. At the same time, top-down mechanisms in each interacting person modulate the bottom-up activity. By doing so, each individual’s top-down mechanism also influences the other social agent via the bottom-up activity. Here, we discuss the two processes and how they interact with each other. We propose that the interplay between bottom-up and top-down processes creates a strong and dynamic link between the minds of two individuals and suggest a mechanistic model for how these processes may transform two minds into one functional social unit.
In this chapter we examine task representations in shared task settings like the joint (“social”) Simon task. Over the past decade, ideas pertaining to shared representations and co-representation have been advanced to account for performance in such settings (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011; Wenke et al., 2011). Here we argue that we can do without these notions. On the one hand, we show that shared representations cannot account for typical findings in shared task settings. This is the negative part. On the other hand, we show that task performance can be explained by the claim that individuals shape their individual task representations according to the needs of the shared task. This is the positive part. Consequentially, we claim that performance in shared task settings relies on shaping individual representations, not sharing common representations (Dolk et al., 2011; Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013).
Social mimicry is the ubiquitous tendency to copy the bodily movements, expressions, postures and speech patterns of an interaction partner. Since the 1990s social psychologists have studied this phenomenon intensively and have revealed many interesting findings about the factors that moderate mimicry and its consequences. Recently, social cognitive neuroscientists have also begun to study mimicry, with an emphasis on uncovering its mechanistic underpinnings. In particular, mechanisms that have been studied in tasks such as action observation and automatic imitation have been assumed to play a role in social mimicry. Although intuitive, the notion that these mechanisms are common to both tightly controlled laboratory tasks and more naturalistic social mimicry is an assumption that requires empirical investigation. Here, I present recent work that begins to provide this missing empirical link. I contextualize this work with respect to both the social psychology and the cognitive neuroscience literatures.