Thriving at work is closely related to the way employees are embedded in their social contexts, such as the structure of their communication relations with coworkers. In previous research, communication relations have been found to negatively relate to thriving at work. However, social network theory suggests that communication relations are beneficial in obtaining resources in the workplace, which might increase thriving at work. To reconcile the seemingly conflicting mechanisms, we draw on social network theory to unpack the mechanisms underlying communication relations by considering the instrumental and expressive roles. Using a structural equation model, we investigate the indirect effects of communication networks on thriving at work via advice-seeking networks (instrumental) and friendship networks (expressive). Our findings indicate communication relations are negatively related to thriving at work via advice-seeking relations, but are positively related to thriving at work via friendship relations.

Following the first-ever rule of law conditionality procedure in September 2022, a resolution was adopted by the European Parliament which declared that Hungary could no longer be considered a full democracy, as it had turned into a ‘hybrid regime of electoral autocracy’. Against this background, this article explains the business and human rights (BHR) gap in Hungary and presents its consequences for the Ukrainian refugee crisis. We first provide a general overview of the role of business in the development and consolidation of the Orbán regime over the past 13 years, highlighting how businesses are both agents and victims of legal and political developments. The paper distinguishes four types of ‘business’: multinational and foreign companies that are direct beneficiaries of the regime; local companies that are direct beneficiaries of the regime; multinational companies that are targets of restrictive and repressive populist rhetoric and economic policies; and the ‘rest’, the remainder that try to avoid becoming targets of oligarchic takeovers. The article also documents how the state and other stakeholders are failing to meet their commitments under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The next part of the article assesses how companies are responding to the refugee crisis caused by the war in Ukraine, Hungary’s neighbour. If the government does not adopt Pillar I and Pillar III of the UNGPs, what room for manoeuvre do companies have? The focus here is on how companies, domestic and foreign, multinational enterprises (MNEs) and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), engage in humanitarian (and human rights) crisis management.

Preliminary research has demonstrated that not all assessment center (AC) exercises are viewed as equally just or motivating. The current research builds upon this research and investigates the relationships between six AC exercises and perceptions of self-efficacy, motivation, assessor bias, and fairness. Using a 2 × 2 × 2 experimental design (two informational justice interventions and one rating timing intervention), 286 working adults completed a survey designed to investigate differences between AC exercises and to investigate interventions designed to influence AC exercise perceptions. The results show not only significant perceptual differences between assessor-rated exercises and an ability test but also differences among the rated exercises. The results suggest that an ability test can be perceived as both among the most just and motivating exercises. Lastly, even though the experimental interventions did not have their anticipated effects, the results suggest benefits to having assessors rate recorded participant behaviors versus rating “live” behaviors, benefits that to a certain extent depend on whether participants had previously attended an assessment center.

The rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) technology and its application by businesses has created a potential need for governmental regulation. While the federal government of the United States has largely sidestepped the issue of crafting law dictating limitations and expectations regarding the use of AI technology, US state legislatures have begun to take the lead in this area. Nonetheless, we know very little about how state legislatures have approached the design, pursuit, and adoption of AI policy and whether traditional political fault lines have manifested themselves in the AI issue area. Here, we gather data on the state-level adoption of AI policy, as well as roll call voting on AI bills (classified on the basis of consumer protection versus economic development), by state legislatures and analyze the political economy of AI legislation. We find that rising unemployment and inflation are negatively associated with a state’s AI policymaking. With respect to individual legislator support, we find that liberal lawmakers and Democrats are more likely to support bills establishing consumer protection requirements on AI usage. The results suggest that economic concerns loom large with AI and that traditional political fault lines may be establishing themselves in this area.

This study generates new insights on the role of initial impressions in assessment centers. Drawing from the “thin slices” of behavior paradigm in personality and social psychology, we investigate to what extent initial impressions of assessees—based on different slices of assessment center exercises (i.e., two minutes at the beginning, middle, and end of AC exercises)—are consistent across and within AC exercises, and are relevant for predicting assessment center performance and job performance. Employed individuals (N = 223) participated in three interactive assessment center exercises, while being observed and evaluated by trained assessors. Based upon video-recordings of all assessment center exercises, a different, untrained group of raters subsequently provided ratings of their general initial impressions of assessees for the beginning, middle, and end of each exercise. As criterion measure, supervisors rated assessees’ job performance. Results show that initial impressions in assessment centers are (a) relatively stable, (b) consistently predict assessment center performance across different slices of behavior (i.e., across the three time points and exercises), and (c) mostly relate to job performance.

Defense contractors play an essential role in US security operations. Among other responsibilities, contractors manufacture arms, manage logistics, analyze intelligence, and carry out cybersecurity operations. Historically, defense contractors were either publicly traded corporations or privately owned companies. The past two decades, however, have seen a major shift in the ownership structure of the US defense industry. Private equity firms—once niche actors in the US national security marketplace—have carried out over 1,500 deals involving defense contractors since 2000. This study employs a mixed-methods research design to assess the effects of private equity investment on the financial stability of the US defense industry. Using data on over 8,000 defense contractors, the inquiry finds that contractors with private equity backing experience bankruptcy at higher rates than contractors with no prior private equity investment. In addition, the study evaluates private equity activity in the military satellite services market—a field of growing importance in the strategically important domain of outer space. The inquiry’s findings have notable international security implications. Given the US’ role as a lynchpin in numerous alliances around the world, higher rates of bankruptcy among defense contractors have the potential to affect the security of the United States and its allies.

In contexts of institutional crisis, conflicts arise in which different pressure groups try to maximize their influence, seeking to adjust a political reality in line with their own interest. This article analyzes the changes in the attitudes of economic elites regarding the process of drafting of a new Constitution in Chile. Based on the literature on the political culture of entrepreneurs, the research hypothesis posed in this study suggests the existence of a widespread conservative attitude within this social group regarding a change in institutional rules. This mainly relates to the perception that a new Constitution in Chile could threaten its predominant place in the distribution of economic and political power. The results obtained after analyzing in-depth interviews with presidents or vice presidents of the main business organizations in the country show changing positions throughout the different stages of the constituent process. Even though some attitudinal changes towards an adaptation become visible, what ultimately prevails is an unmitigated rejection of the constituent process. These findings clearly suggest a return to the initial stances of most entrepreneurs, something that also happened in the elite examined as well as in the rest of Chilean society. Thus, one can speak about a sort of “boomerang effect”: the attitudes of rejection have once again dominated the space of discursive expression where the pressure exerted by public opinion seemed to pave the way for a certain reformism or a transforming reaction. This evidence confirms a disconnection found in the literature which reveals the dynamic nature of short-term attitudes linked to each specific situation, albeit with more stable values and positions specific to the political culture which exist on a more persistent basis.

Why do voters shun some business tycoons yet elect others into power? As structural conditions facilitate the entry of super-wealthy actors into politics, the differential electoral support across business elites suggests a puzzle. We conceptualize four mechanisms behind the popular support for “tycoon candidates”: competence signaling, framing, fame, and clientelism. To test their relative efficacy, we leverage an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in South Africa, an important developing democracy where certain tycoons are successfully running for office. We find that, across distinct electoral appeals by tycoon candidates, clientelism is particularly effective, especially for mobilizing support from the less affluent voters. Racial framing significantly decreases support among white voters. Meanwhile, tycoons’ competence signaling or fame do not help them at the ballot box. By identifying the micro-level underpinnings of voter support across tycoon candidates, our study contributes to the literatures on business and politics, voting behavior, and clientelism.

We propose that while positive performance feedback is positively related to firm sentiment, negative performance feedback is negatively associated with the firm sentiment. Additionally, overconfident Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) will improve the positive relationship between positive performance feedback and firm sentiment and reduce the negative relationship between negative performance feedback and firm sentiment. Using 7,182 firm-year observations for the 2004−2017 period, we show that positive performance feedback positively affects firm sentiment, and negative performance feedback negatively influences firm sentiment. We also found that higher levels of CEO overconfidence will minimize the negative impact of negative performance feedback on firm sentiment. Our research extends the current discourse on organizational impression management (proxied by firm sentiment) and CEO overconfidence research as we provide a nuanced relationship between firm performance feedback and organizational impression management. Our findings have theoretical and practical implications for corporate governance leaders and shareholders.

To make informed decisions, assessment theorists, researchers, and practitioners can evaluate the overlap among (1) relevant theories, (2) empirical contributions, and (3) best practices. Unfortunately, such a task may seem daunting due to the so-called science-practice gap, which can thwart collaboration among these parties. This paper presents an epistemology for delineating the importance of integrating these three sources of knowledge. We then apply this epistemology to show that our current knowledge of assessment and development topics are well integrated in some places, but still quite lacking in others.

Public decision-makers incorporate algorithm decision aids, often developed by private businesses, into the policy process, in part, as a method for justifying difficult decisions. Ethicists have worried that over-trust in algorithm advice and concerns about punishment if departing from an algorithm’s recommendation will result in over-reliance and harm democratic accountability. We test these concerns in a set of two pre-registered survey experiments in the judicial context conducted on three representative U.S. samples. The results show no support for the hypothesized blame dynamics, regardless of whether the judge agrees or disagrees with the algorithm. Algorithms, moreover, do not have a significant impact relative to other sources of advice. Respondents who are generally more trusting of elites assign greater blame to the decision-maker when they disagree with the algorithm, and they assign more blame when they think the decision-maker is abdicating their responsibility by agreeing with an algorithm.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is one of the most important mega-regional trade agreements signed to date. Yet, it failed to include an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in its investment chapter. What explains this omission? To unpack this, we examine international negotiations as a two-step process. In the first stage, we theorize that initial preferences towards ISDS are based on countries’ orientation toward foreign direct investment (FDI), experience with ISDS, and past treaty practice. Second, we theorize that during protracted negotiations, adverse regime developments and domestic politics can have a profound impact on treaty design. To test our framework, we examine the RCEP negotiations. Our analysis shows that mounting cases as well as the eroding norm of ISDS in other treaties lowered support for ISDS as the negotiations progressed. Then, a change of government in Malaysia shifted that country’s position dramatically, which tipped the balance against ISDS in the final round of negotiations. Our findings have important implications for the international investment regime. They highlight the factors that determine countries’ initial preferences while also demonstrating the importance of developments during the negotiations, which can lead to the abandonment of the institutional status quo.

The innovation value of open government data (OGD) drives firms to the participation in OGD-driven innovation. However, to fully excavate the innovation value of OGD for firms, it is essential to explore the factors and mechanisms that affect OGD-driven innovation capacity. On the basis of the technology–organization–environment (TOE) framework, a theoretical model affecting OGD-driven innovation capacity is proposed for analysis by partial least squares structural equation modeling with 236 sample data from China. The results indicate that top leaders’ support positively impacts on OGD-driven innovation capacity in firms. And we also prove that technical competence, organizational arrangement, and innovation support partially mediate the relationship between top leaders’ support and OGD-driven innovation capacity on the basis of the TOE framework. Consequently, the findings provide new research perspectives and practical guidance for promoting OGD-driven innovation capacity in firms.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of managerial capitalism is well known, with some arguing that MacIntyrean thought is antithetical to contemporary capitalist business. Nevertheless, substantial efforts have been taken to demonstrate how different business activities constitute MacIntyrean practices, which points to an incoherence at the heart of MacIntyrean business ethics scholarship. This article proposes a way of bridging these perspectives, suggesting a reimagined MacIntyrean approach to business that is thoroughly ‘practice-led.’ A detailed comparison of accounting and management shows that while neither are practices in ‘good order,’ they differ in significant ways: where management does not meet the criteria for a MacIntyrean practice, accounting is a ‘distorted’ practice. This leads to a categorisation of practice-led business activity, whereby the traditional tasks of management are subsumed, shared or subordinated to practices and practitioners. Insights on how this can be implemented are drawn from the ‘communities of practice’ literature and a consideration of professions.

Political instability is commonly thought to discourage investment and reduce economic growth. We challenge this consensus by showing that instability does not systematically depress investment. Using an event study approach, we examine daily returns of national financial indices in every country that experienced an irregular regime change subject to data availability. Returns following resignations are large and positive (+4 percent), while those following assassinations are negative and smaller in magnitude (−2 percent). The impact of coups tends to be negative (−2 percent), but we show that a pro-business coup results in large positive returns (+10 percent). We also find evidence that authoritarian or anti-business regime changes are more likely to lead to capital flight than democratic or pro-business changes. The immediate impact of political instability on investment is therefore dependent on the type of regime change and its expected impact on future growth.

Evidence from previous research suggests that frame-of-reference (FOR) training is effective at improving assessor ratings in many organizational settings. Yet no research has presented a thorough examination of systematic sources of variance (assessor-related effects, evaluation settings, and measurement design features) that might influence training effectiveness. Using a factorial ANOVA and variance components analyses on a database of four studies of frame-of-reference assessor training, we found that (a) training is most effective at identifying low levels of performance and (b) the setting of the training makes little difference with respect to training effectiveness. We also show evidence of the importance of rater training as a key determinant of the quality of performance ratings in general. Implications for FOR training theory and practice are discussed.