Our aim with this special issue on the future of artificial intelligence (AI) politics, policy, and business is to give space to considering how the balalnce between risk and reward from AI technologies is and perhaps should be pursued by the public and private sectors. Ultimately, private firms and regulators will need to work collaboratively, given the complex networks of actors involved in AI development and deployment and the potential for the technology to alter existing policy regimes. We begin the introduction of this special issue of Business & Politics with a discussion of the growth in AI technology use and discussions of appropriate governance, followed by a consideration of how AI-related politics, policy, and business intersect. We then summarize the contributions of the authors in this issue and conclude with thoughts about how political science, public administration, and public policy scholars have much to offer, as well as much to study, the establishment of effective AI governance.

This paper explores the motives and mechanisms behind data localization implemented by states to protect data, which is essential to emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence. Despite the significant negative aspects of data localization for states, the practice has become increasingly prevalent, leading to the unexplored question of why states choose to implement it. This suggests that data localization is a form of economic means derived from digital technologies and employed by states to serve political objectives. Focusing on the data in platforms, the theoretical mechanism of data localization is captured in light of two factors: network perception and security externality. Network perception pertains to a state’s perception of the positive network effect generated by platforms, while security externality refers to a state’s consideration of the security implications in relation to the economic benefits derived from the positive network effect, serving the national interest in domestic and/or international contexts. To substantiate these theoretical propositions, the paper employs a comparative case study approach where Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia have been chosen as empirical cases based on the selection strategy. The paper bridges the concept of economic statecraft with digital technologies, fosters interdisciplinary discussions, and offers policy implications.

Under what conditions do countries lose their status as the leading global financial center? Some scholars argue that such shifts follow shortly after transitions in the distribution of other key capabilities (e.g. GDP), while others argue that path dependence or other more bespoke capabilities might be able to sustain financial leadership long after decline in other capabilities. This paper aims to understand the causes of the Anglo-American financial transition. I argue that the ability to manage political risk for investors is critical to the position of countries as financial entrepôts. In the case of British financial leadership, I argue that Britain’s position as an entrepôt hinged on its power projection capability, which enabled Britain to limit political risk for investors in ways that other states could not replicate. The gradual loss of those capabilities, in turn, saw Britain eventually become overshadowed by the United States. I support my claims with a TERGM analysis of the interwar sovereign debt network.

This paper uses the case study of Gordon & Gotch, media import/exporters, to explore how the transnational sale of British media contributed to a common cultural identity within the British World. Gordon & Gotch, founded as a media import firm in Australia in 1853, opened a London branch in 1866 which became independently owned and operated in 1890. This paper argues that the London and Australasian firms of Gordon & Gotch played an important and understudied role in tying Australia to Britain through lines of business that benefitted men in Melbourne and London, creating an “imagined community” of British readers that spanned oceans. The paper also explores how the divergent strategies of the London and Australasian Gordon & Gotches in the wake of the Second World War help us to understand the timeline of Australia’s cultural disentanglement with Britain. As new political economies developed in Britain and Australia, the London firm was forced to pivot to a European or more generally “global” strategy, while the Australian firm refocused its energies to domestic and American media. The consequence for Australian consumers was a reduced presence of British media and a greater preponderance of American, Australian, and locally printed multinational media in Australia. The long history of the British and Antipodean Gordon & Gotches reveals the contingency of British media saturation in Australia and the value of business historical approaches to studying change in cultural markets.

The potential for mutual influence or “spillover” between economic and security cooperation is a long-standing area of interest for policymakers and scholars alike. This paper examines how network dynamics affect spillover. We focus on two prominent types of formal bilateral cooperation—defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—both of which have proliferated dramatically in the post-Cold War international system. We argue that existing theoretical and empirical approaches to economic-security spillover focus too strictly on influences at the bilateral level. As with other forms of international cooperation, BITs and DCAs comprise larger international networks. Governments develop portfolios of BITs or DCAs with distinct structural goals in mind, and they implement specific strategies in pursuing those goals. With BITs, governments follow a network-hierarchy strategy that allows them to influence treaty design and protect their firms. In DCAs, governments instead favor a network-community strategy focused on pooling collective security goods among groups of like-minded collaborators. When these network strategies complement one another, they promote cooperative economic-security spillover. When they conflict, however, they inhibit spillover, such that cooperation in economic or security issues discourages cooperation in the opposing issue area.

Since the publication of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue in 1981, tensions inherent to the relationship between morally educative practices and the institutions that house them have been widely noted. We propose a taxonomy of the ways in which the pursuit of external goods by institutions undermines the pursuit of the internal goods of practices. These comprise substitution, where the institution replaces the pursuit of one type of good by another; frustration, where opportunities for practitioners to discover goods or develop new standards of excellence are frustrated by institutional priorities and resource allocation; and injustice, which undermines the integrity of relationships within the organization and/or with partners. These threats, though analytically distinct, are often mutually reinforcing. This conceptual contribution is illustrated both by the extant literature and by a novel context, the three-ring circus.

The Japan–Korea whitelist dispute (2019–2023) embodies key features of interstate disputes related to economic statecraft ideas. Against the backdrop of the legal dispute over Japan’s “essential security interests” claim based on GATT Article 21 (Security Exceptions), this study analyzes South Korea’s response to the whitelist dispute, with a focus on its materials–parts–equipment localization policy. The findings indicate that the policy process and outcomes align with very few of the criteria suggested by the new industrial policy literature. Notably, the policy’s goals and tools were driven by ideology rather than by science, and the implementing agency—The Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy—while competent, was politically captured. In conclusion, this study suggests that policymakers should purposefully and consciously connect security with trade or implement industrial policies within a well-defined strategic framework.

Like other creative industries emerging in mid-1945 from 12 years of Nazi rule, including six years of war, German publishing was ideologically suspect, internationally isolated, and insular. By the 1950s, however, the book trade in the two German successor states was once again varied and vibrant. And it was also tightly integrated into the international publishing business, within which it had become an increasingly active and important presence. This article analyzes the development of the German book publishing industry during the Allied occupation, 1945-1949, through the lens of knowledge transfer. It was a time during which capital-starved German publishers harnessed the political and ideological objectives of the occupiers and their prewar contacts to achieve their own commercial and cultural ambitions, including taking initial steps toward internationalization. The focus is on literary fiction, a genre that constituted a minority of all published output in the postwar period, but which also included all top bestsellers. Literature in translation, moreover, accounted for a substantial proportion of those bestselling books, and at the same time represented a key vehicle for internationalization. Two case studies, one drawn from the Soviet zone of occupation, the later East Germany, and one from the western zones that came to be dominated by the Americans, the later West Germany, illustrate two different, yet remarkably similar paths through which this interplay of ideological alignment and commerce played out among a range of actors and laid the basis for the subsequent development of the industry.

This paper explores the potential causal relationship between political orientation and education investment by using panel data from 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2020 and utilizing estimators that address endogeneity (i.e. 2SLS, System GMM, and Lewbel 2SLS). In particular, using communist influence as a physical instrument for political orientation, we find a positive impact of the right political orientation on education investment, and the impact of the left orientation is negative. The positive impact from the right orientation is also stronger than the negative impact from the left. Moreover, these core results are robust to alternative measures of political orientation and education investment, alternative estimators that address endogeneity, and the moderation effect of innovation.