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46840 results in Management

Page 1945 of 2342

  • Second Thoughts About Bluffing

  • Thomas Carson
  • Journal:
    Business Ethics Quarterly / Volume 3 / Issue 4 / October 1993
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    23 January 2015, pp. 317-342
    Print publication:
    October 1993

  • It is common for people to misstate their bargaining positions during business negotiations. This paper will focus on cases of the following sort: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $90,000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $80, 000 for the house. This is a lie according to standard definitions of lying—it is a deliberate false statement which is intended to deceive others. I will defend the following two theses:

    a. Appearances to the contrary, this kind of bluffing typically does not constitute lying. (I will argue that standard dictionary definitions of lying are untenable and defend an alternative definition hinted at, but never clearly formulated by, W. D. Ross. On my definition, deliberate false statements about one’s negotiating position would rarely constitute lies in this society.)

    b. It is usually permissible to misstate one’s bargaining position when one has good reason to think that one’s negotiating partner is doing the same and it is usually impermissible to misstate one’s negotiating bargaining if one does not have good reason to think that the other party is misstating her position.

  • Machiavelli's Prince as Ceo

  • Kendall D'Andrade
  • Journal:
    Business Ethics Quarterly / Volume 3 / Issue 4 / October 1993
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    23 January 2015, pp. 395-404
    Print publication:
    October 1993

  • The Machiavellian model is often praised as a realistic description of modern corporate life. My analysis of The Prince follows Rousseau in arguing that the prince can survive and prosper most easily by creating an environment in which almost all the citizens prosper. Far from licensing unrestrained self-aggrandizement, in this model success only comes from providing real value to almost every citizen for the entire period of one's leadership.

    Translation from the early sixteenth to the late twentieth century is far from simple; for example, the CEO is in many ways far less powerful than a Medici prince. The closest approximation is a far less bureaucratic organization with very small units possessing maximum autonomy. Also, deciding who is, and who is not, a citizen is not nearly as straightforward as it was for Machiavelli; it probably includes every stakeholder on whom the corporation has a major impact.

  • Editor's Corner

  • Journal:
    Business History Review / Volume 67 / Issue 3 / Autumn 1993
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 December 2011, pp. 459-461
    Print publication:
    Autumn 1993
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Page 1945 of 2342