This paper presents empirical tests of the constant volatility version of the Heath, Jarrow, and Morton model, which is also the continuous time limit of the Ho and Lee model. Using a generalized method of moments (GMM) test on three years of daily data for Eurodollar futures and futures options, the model can be rejected for most subperiods. Various biases in the fitted option prices relative to the market prices are documented through a regression study. The small sample properties and power of the GMM framework to this setting are also studied through simulations.

New measures of stock return volatility are developed to increase the precision of stock option price estimates. With Bayesian statistical methods, volatility estimates for a given stock are developed using prior information on the cross-sectional patterns in return volatilities for groups of stocks sorted on size, financial leverage, and trading volume. Call option values computed with the Bayesian procedure generally improve prediction accuracy for market prices of call options relative to those computed using implied volatility, standard historical volatility, or even the actual ex post volatility that occurred during each option's life. Although the Bayesian methods produce biased call price estimators, they do reduce the systematic tendency of standard pricing approaches to overprice (underprice) options on high (low) volatility stocks. Little bias improvement is observed with respect to the time to maturity and moneyness of the call options.

This study examines whether earnings changes convey information in bond markets and finds a significant positive (negative) reaction to unexpected earnings increases (decreases). The results are consistent whether earnings announcements precede or follow dividend announcements. Thus, earnings surprises convey information to bond markets and changes in firm value are split among bondholders and stockholders. This is in contrast to evidence from studies examining unexpected dividend announcements where bond price reaction is asymmetric. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that bond excess returns are positively related to earnings surprises.

This paper studies the dynamic investment policies of firms under asymmetric information.Managers make decisions to maximize the wealth of existing shareholders. In equilibrium, the superior firms invest “myopically”, choosing intrinsically lower-valued projects that produce “early” cash flows. The inferior firms follow the socially preferred rule of investing in intrinsically higher-valued projects that produce “late” cash flows. In addition to explaining investment myopia, the model generates numerous predictions regarding announcement effects of equity issues and attempts by firms to stockpile cash, firms' preferences for limits on mandatory disclosure rules, and the effects of managerial entrenchment motives.

Most research on hedging has disregarded both the long-run cointegrating relationship between financial assets and the dynamic nature of the distributions of the assets. This study argues that neglecting these affects the hedging performance of the existing models and proposes an alternative model that accounts for both of them. Using a bivariate error correction model with a GARCH error structure, the risk-minimizing futures hedge ratios for several currencies are estimated. Both within-sample comparisons and out-of-sample comparisons reveal that the proposed model provides greater risk reduction than the conventional models. Furthermore, a dynamic hedging strategy is proposed in which the potential risk reduction is more than enough to offset the transactions costs for most investors.

Grounded upon the late 1970s phrase “institutionalizing ethics into business,” I present a multi-component model and research agenda to enhance our understanding of organizations' efforts to integrate ethics into the daily decision-making process of employees. Three research foci are emphasized: (1) the need to establish consistent categorical frameworks to describe business organizations' efforts in the field, (2) the study of the interrelationships between the various components presented in the model, and (3) the exploration of the linkage between organizational efforts to institutionalize ethics and ethical employee behavior. Research and organizational implications evolving from these research foci are discussed.

This article examines some major aspects of the history of the state-owned, privately operated German National Railway Company under the reparations regime of 1924 to 1932. It explores the dispute that erupted between the Reichsbahn and the government concerning whether the DRG should be used primarily to serve national economic and social ends or to earn a surplus to pay reparations. The controversies that erupted concerning tariffs, motor vehicle competition, and wages are examined against the background of the Reichsbahn's financial performance. The article argues that the political and cultural clashes caused by the introduction of Western management priorities and practices were more significant than the financial burdens that reparations imposed on the Reichsbahn.

In a competitive and morally imperfect world, business people are often faced with serious ethical challenges. Harboring suspicions about the ethics of others, many feel justified in engaging in less-than-ideal conduct to protect their own interests. The most sophisticated moral arguments are unlikely to counteract this behavior. We believe that this morally defensive behavior is responsible, in large part, for much undesirable deception in negotiation. Drawing on recent work in the literature of negotiations, we present some practical guidance on how negotiators might build trust, establish common interests, and secure credibility for their statements, thereby promoting honesty. We also point out the types of social and institutional arrangements, many of which have become commonplace, that work to promote credibility, trust, and honesty in business dealings. Our approach is offered not only as a specific response to the problem of deception in negotiation, but as one model of how research in business ethics might offer constructive advice to practitioners.

—Niccolo Machiavelli

—George Bernard Shaw