The claim that “everybody's doing it’ is not usually taken as a moral justification for an act that is otherwise immoral. Children frequently use this argument on their parents, without success. Business people sometimes try this argument, for instance, in claiming that since everyone else in a given country pays bribes, they are allowed to do so also. Abraham knew better than to use that argument on the Lord. He pleaded that Sodom and Gomorrah be spared if ten just men could be found there; not that anyone was just for doing what all the rest were doing.

This paper traces the historical roots of some of our current preoccupations with the ethics of business. Its central argument is that many of the contemporary criteria that we use to evaluate the ethics of business are not new; rather, they date back several centuries. This paper illustrates this thesis by comparing historical and contemporary discussions of three sets of issues: the relationship between ethics and profits, the relationship between private gain and the public good and the tension between the results of capitalism and the intentions of businessmen.

The fact that these tensions are inherent in the nature of capitalism, if not in human nature itself, does not make our contemporary concerns or standards any less valid. On the contrary, it underlies their significance. Contemporary discussions of business ethics constitute part of an ongoing moral dialogue with both deep secular and religious roots.

Most economists are committed to some version of egoism. After distinguishing among the various sorts of egoistic claims, I cite the empirical literature against psychological egoism and show that attempts to account for this data make these economists’ previous empirical claims tautological. Moreover, the assumption of egoism has undesirable consequences, especially for students; if people believe that others behave egoistically, they are more likely to behave egoistically themselves. As an alternative to egoism I recommend the commitment model of Robert Frank.

The equivalent of egoism at the organizational level is that business firms seek (should seek) to maximize profits. I present arguments to show that a conscious attempt by managers to maximize profits is likely to fail. A committed altruism is more likely to raise profits. I suggest that a firm should take as its primary purpose providing meaningful work for employees.

Despite nonstationarities in the factor betas and factor prices of the Chen, Roll, Ross (1986) multifactor model, investors are rewarded for bearing risks associated with the change in expected inflation and industrial production in non-January months; however, variations in these factors have opposite influences on stock prices. These findings may partially explain why several recent studies fail to detect a significant non-January risk premium in the stock market, but this evidence is only suggestive since theoretical and statistical difficulties prevent precise interpretations of specific pricing relations in the Chen, Roll, Ross model.

Ofer and Natarajan (1987) report negative, statistically significant cumulative average abnormal returns over five years following convertible bond calls. We show that these results are obtained only if returns preceding the call dates are used for market model parameter estimation. Returns preceding calls tend to be positive and unusually large. This means that predicted post-call returns, based on pre-call parameter estimates, are biased upward. Consequently, the corresponding abnormal returns are biased downward. We also discuss a corrected test statistic. We conclude that the evidence does not indicate market inefficiency in the stock price reaction to convertible calls.