In the first of two articles, Professors Aduddell and Cain introduce the complex relations between a dynamic meatpacking industry and a government committed, in uncertain degree, to the philosophy of antitrust. From its earliest beginnings as an industry in the 1830s, meatpacking has experienced constantly changing parameters of technology, supply, demand, and public policy. Matters reached the first of several climaxes a few years after the new and naive Federal Trade Commission was established. Admittedly the dominant factor in a highly integrated meat industry, the largest companies were diversifying into non-meat food products, giving rise to the charge that they proposed to “monopolize” the entire food industry. The outcome was a consent decree in 1920 that, in confirming the large companies in their domination of meatpacking in return for their withdrawal from non-meat foods, revealed a government with a very weak case against an industry that it had made the cynosure of 120 million Americans. True to the familiar pattern of antitrust settlements, the dynamics of technology in transportation and marketing thereupon proceeded to render the decree meaningless. The second article, bringing the subject down to recent times, will appear in the Autumn issue.

Historians of the New South will find in Professor Killick's essay, based on the business archives of an important fin-de-siécle and early-twentieth-century cotton marketing enterprise, further powerful proof that the real story can only come from informed, sympathetic studies of what private men of affairs were accomplishing behind the dust storm of political demagogy that marked most public utterances, North and South, on southern problems in this era. Real entrepreneurship sprang up to give the marketing of the cotton crop a directness and an efficiency that ineffectual antebellum southern leaders had only dreamed of. This torch of enterprise was successfully passed, moreover, from a dying family firm to a more modern corporate organization, headed by even more skilled marketers who had learned well the lessons of their predecessors and were well prepared to flourish in the vastly changed post-1929 world. The stereotype of the prolonged backwardness of the South after 1877 is further discredited in this essay, which, significantly, is written from the far side of the Atlantic, where marketing of the cotton crop was always the most important aspect of its history.

In recent years a major controversy has formed in the finance literature regarding the empirical evidence of the informational content of dividends. Despite considerable support for the position of dividend nontriviality by various studies, the work by Watts [13] represents a formidable challenge. Because of the close proximity of the firm's earnings and dividend announcement dates, the major issue of the dispute has centered on the identification and control of contemporaneous earnings information. In an attempt to settle this controversy, the present study evaluates and extends Watts' methodology.

In the last few years, several innovations have appeared in mortgage finance which are designed to improve the flow of funds into mortgage lending. Among this group, The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) remains the intermediary which handles the largest share of most mortgage lenders' placements. As a private corporation chartered by Congress and owned by stockholders, FNMA provides a national secondary market facility for government-backed (FHA/VA) and conventional mortgages. Through its secondary market operations, FNMA furnishes a source of liquidity for mortgage lenders with the major portion of this support provided through the Free Market System (FMS) auctions. Through its issuance of forward purchase commitments, the FNMA assures lenders of a permanent investor (at a set yield) for specified periods of time, regardless of changing money market and housing conditions.

In this paper prices of corporate bonds are decomposed into elements associated with (1) the pure price of time, (2) the default risk of the agency rating class to which the bond is assigned, and (3) the unique risk and ancillary features of the bond itself.