The API metric, as initially formulated by Ball and Brown [1], has been used to examine the relationship between stock prices and accounting numbers. Its use in this manner has raised at least three difficulties: (1) the metric does not utilize all of the information portentially available from accounting numbers, (2) the statistical significance of the API metric and of differences between API's has not always been satisfactorily considered, and (3) the meaning of the metric has been questioned. This paper will attempt to resolve these difficulties by reformulating the API approach. Two nonparametric statistical procedures are considered, both of which provide a test of the statistical significance of the relationship between accounting income numbers and stock prices. The first procedure is particularly appropriate when alternative accounting income numbers are considered. Both procedures provide a conventional unambiguous interpretation of the results.

The purpose of this paper has been to empirically test Stone's Two-Index Model. The results are mixed, but generally favor the model. Adding a bond index term for the bank sample only marginally improves the model's explanatory power although the index is more important than the equity index. The lack of importance of the bond index for banks is not surprising upon further consideration, however. Banks and their earnings should be more sensitive to short-term rather than long-term rates, and the index reflects primarily long-term rates. To the extent that short- and long-term rates moved in different directions during the sample period, negative correlation is introduced between bank's returns and the index.

The bond index improves in performance for the 30 Dow Jones firms and contributes to the explanatory power of the model in 80 percent of the cases. There is some instability in signs and, contrary to Stone's speculations, omission of the bond index does not bias the equity beta estimates.

Finally, we caution the reader against generalizing about the long-run value of the two-index model. The short time period used here does not allow us to say anything about the relationship between interest rate movements and the stability of beta. Moreover, during the 1969–1972 period the returns on the bond and equity indexes did not behave as Capital Market Theory would predict. The average monthly return on the bond portfolio was .5 percent and the average return on the equity portfolio was .2 percent. Our findings must, therefore, be interpreted with care, but overall the introduction of interest rate effects into the single-index model looks promising.

A student of financial theory must always assume that managers will follow a course of action that will lead to a higher value of the firm rather than a lower value, given a choice between two courses of action. Yet, Lewellen and Racette (hereafter LR) in a recent paper [1] comparing the sale of convertible debentures with the sale of straight debt assumed that managers will behave in a way that will lead to submaximal firm value. The purpose of this paper is to correct the LR error.

In derivations of the mean-variance model of portfolio selection, authors from Markowitz [6 and 7] and Tobin [11] to Merton [8] and Black [1] rely on the inverse of the matrix of variances and covariances for the returns on risky securities. Unfortunately, as is shown in this paper, such an inverse does not exist when risk-free combinations can be formed from the risky securities. Accordingly, the general validity of the mean-variance model is challenged by the existence of opportunities for hedging, including those fostered by short sales and the rapidly expanding markets for warrants, options, and futures. Fortunately, the mean-variance model is tractable even when the conventional methods for deriving it fail. Alternative solution procedures presented in this paper are valid with or without riskless securities and with either singular or nonsingular variance-covariance matrices. The important properties of the mean-variance model are shown to extend for the previously omitted cases. In particular, the frontier of mean-variance combinations is always well-defined, is always strictly convex, and (the efficient portion of the frontier) is always positively sloped. In addition, the frontier of mean-variance combinations always can be expressed in terms of a pair of mutual funds which are determined on purely technical grounds.

In equilibrium, each new capital asset must be priced properly relative to other assets. If an investor can also buy and sell assets in his portfolio costlessly and quickly, then the new asset will be accepted immediately and fully into the market and it will immediately behave as though it were a seasoned or previously available asset. However, it is often argued that recently issued bonds and seasoned or fully distributed bonds behave differently due to the frictions and risks associated with distributing a new security in the market. And it is also argued that recently issued bonds undergo a behavioral transformation as they become seasoned bonds. According to this argument there are significant empirical behavioral differences between recently issued bonds and seasoned bonds [4,5,7,9,13]. These differences disappear as the market gradually absorbs the new bond issue and the bond becomes “seasoned.”

The work of Black and Scholes [2] and Merton [4] suggests that analysis of hedged positions in a continuous time random walk model yields powerful insights into the valuation of financial securities. The present paper extends this methodology in a straightforward fashion to foreign exchange transactions. By adopting the device of hedging in a secondary market for forward currency contracts against a long position in spot currency, a simple statement of boundary conditions for the forward position can be detailed. This allows a direct solution of the continuous time valuation problem that yields the interest rate parity theory.

The theory on the relationship between real and nominal interest rates is based on the well-known Fisher equation:

where: i = nominal interest rate;

r = real interest rate;

λ = percentage change in price level: P /P0 - 1 where P and P0 denote end-of-period and current levels of some aggregate price index, respectively.

A common dilemma faced by investors and portfolio managers is the tradeoff preference between risk and return. The general consensus and convention in finance and economics is that, in the aggregate, investors do not seek risk for its own sake. If so, it is reasonable to assume that returns on individual common stocks vary according to their risk. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to examine the ex post risk and return experience of various financial assets. This and related work have been treated by Sharpe [22] and by others. While some of these are studies of individual common stocks, the majority involves the ex post risk-return relationships of portfolios managed by institutional or professional investors. Although the conclusions are not totally consistent concerning the shape of the risk-return function, there is agreement that a generally positive relationship exists between risk and expected return. To date, little empiricism has been directed specifically to the ex ante risk-return preferences of individual common-stock investors. This paper takes a step in this direction by analyzing the ex ante risk-return preferences and expectations of individual common-stock investors. The purpose is two-fold: (1) to provide positive (as opposed to normative) evidence on the nature of the relationship between acceptable risk levels and expected annual rates of return; and (2) to examine the nature of this relationship between risk and the components of total return, income from dividends and capital appreciation.

In his recent paper in this Journal, Miller [3] proposed, following Adler's results [1], that “the investor exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion with respect to expected wealth if, as increased holding σ constant, the slope of the indifference loci decreases” [3, p. 301]. He further attempted to have shown that in general the sign of () is the same as the sign of r'(W) (the derivative of the absolute risk aversion measure), but this is not proved.

The broad import of the evidence is that the application and qualification by a firm for listing on one of the two major American securities exchanges did, at least during the years encompassed by our investigation, constitute an event with which were associated abnormal positive investment returns on the shares involved. Even though a portion of those returns seem subsequently to have been surrendered, the initial net effect from application through listing date was quite substantial, and the later correction thereto was much more modest. The average combined impact visible in Table 3 during the six-month period beginning with the listing application, for example, was a net positive annualized return approximately 17 percent above that enjoyed concurrently by the general run of comparable-systematic-risk securities in the market. The explicit consideration of such risk distinguishes the present investigation from earlier studies in the area [7] [8] [10] [12] [13] [18].

On balance, then, it appears not unreasonable to conclude that listing did indeed “have value” for the companies examined. While one could argue that it was, intrinsically, the corporate developments (and the dissemination of the news thereof) which led to listing that were the real sources of value, the observed concentration of excess returns in the close proximity of the various application and listing dates would suggest that those actions provided useful market signals which did, in themselves, have a detectable favorable payoff—perhaps if only by way of accelerating the investment community's appreciation of the improvement in the applying firm's underlying operating circumstances. We interpret the evidence as supportive of that hypothesis.

The implications of the same evidence for questions of market efficiency, however, are somewhat more ambiguous. There would seem, as noted, to be in the data indications of certain possible information-response time lags that are not totally consistent with efficiency; and there is an apparent systematic initial price overreaction to application-cum-listing which is later remedied. Transactions costs, on the other hand, have not been considered here, and these clearly would impede the adjustment process by raising the threshold for investor action. Despite some cause for suspicion, therefore, a definitive judgment about efficiency must await further investigation.

Professor Schwartz's [6] attempt to provide an economic model of trade credit is to be applauded. I am in complete accord with his statement [6, p. 656] that “the aggregate importance of trade credit and the economic effects generated by changes in trade credit flows suggest that greater attention should be given to this source of funds.” For too long, thorough qualitative and quantitative analyses applied to the phenomenon of trade credit have been somewhat neglected. In his attempt to remedy this situation, Schwartz is to be complimented.

Published scholarly research is asserted to be a major criteria used to judge or assess the quality of a university's faculty. This assertion has been supported in many of the academic disciplines by comparing peer ratings of graduate programs and the research productivity of the faculty of those programs. In the economics area, John J. Siegfried [ 7] found a significant relationship between peer ratings of economics departments, using the ratings of the first American Council on Education study by Cartter, and the number of available pages contributed by the department to the leading economic academic journals. A recent study by Klemkosky and Tuttle [6] found the same relationship between an academic institution's published research productivity and the quality of the institution's graduate finance programs as rated by peers, using the survey results of Brooker and Shinoda [3] to determine peer ratings. The importance of published research in turn is recognized by many academic institutions since the relative quality and quantity of published research is one of the major criteria used in making faculty promotion and tenure decisions.

The inception of modern portfolio theory dates from Markowitz's pioneering article [7] and subsequent book [8]. Yet despite the early development of a full theory of portfolio management, this theory has rarely been implemented. One problem arises from the difficulty in generating inputs to the general portfolio model. Index models and simple structures for correlation relationships, which go a long way towards solving this problem, have been developed. Yet the time and cost of solving actual portfolio problems (involving the solution of a quadratic programming problem) and more importantly the difficulty of educating portfolio managers to relate to risk return trade-offs in terms of covariances has virtually brought the application of portfolio theory to a halt.

In this paper we have extended the Bierman-Hass model to include the effect of a second parameter, the terms of settlement in the event of default. The addition of this second factor was found to not alter the independence between a bond's risk differential and its maturity. Our analysis of the required risk differential for various borrower credit characteristics demonstrates the tradeoff between p and γ. Throughout, we have assumed the loan size does not affect p or γ.

The object of the present study was to test the random-walk model, by runs analysis and spectral densities, against representative stock market indexes of the Bombay, New York, and London Stock Exchanges. The three indexes examined were the Bombay Variable Dividend Industrial Share Index (BVDISI), consisting of 603 industrial stocks, the New York Standard and Poor's 425 Common Stock Index (S & P 425), and the London Financial Times-Actuaries 500 Stock Index (London F.T.-A.). The test period covered 132 monthly observations for each index for the 11-year period 1963–1973.

The general characteristics of the London F.T.-A. were found to be slightly different from the other two indexes studied. The first difference series the London F.T.-A. has higher mean and variance than BVDISI and S & P 425. However, the first differences of the log indexes did not show any significant differences. In this study, no effort was made to explain any inconsistencies between the London F.T.-A. and the other indexes, although previous studies [4, 12, 13, 20] have attributed such differences partly to institutional The behavior of the BVDISI is statistically indistinguishable from the London F.T.-A. and S & P 425 in terms of the tests of this paper. In runs analysis of consecutive price changes of the same sign, the study confirmed that the expected number of runs and observed number of runs are very close each other. For all the indexes, the actual and expected distribution of length turns out to be extremely similar, with probability equal to 0.5 rise or fall.

Further, the spectral densities, estimated for the first difference (raw and log transformed) of each index, confirmed the randomness of the and no systematic cyclical component or periodicity was present. Based tests, it is evident that stocks on the Bombay Stock Exchange obey a random walk and are equivalent in this sense to the behavior of stock prices in markets of advanced industrialized countries examined in this article.

Herbert Hoover's seven years as Secretary of Commerce raised that department to a level of prestige and influence it has not known since. In the prosperity of the 1920s, real wages rose rapidly, the wage-earners' standard of living began to resemble that of white-collar groups, and all that remained, it seemed, was to replace the traditional antagonism between employer and worker with a system that would give the latter a voice in plant decisions. In this climate, “welfare capitalism” and company unions, encouraged by Hoover's department, flourished for a time. Professor Zieger shows that Hoover never realized that the wage-earner could have no effective representation through company-sponsored schemes. By the late 1920s, some academic experts posited the virtual demise of the labor movement unless it found a means of transcending the limitations that the circumstances of the New Era and its own weaknesses imposed.