Evaluating investments by discounting anticipated future benefits at an exogenously determined risk-adjusted discount rate (hereafter referred to as the RADR approach) is well accepted in the canon of finance. If benefits (Dt) are to be received for T periods and if k, the discount rate, is constant over each of the t periods, then the discrete time net present value (NPV) is defined as:

A positive NPV characterizes a desirable investment.

In a series of recent articles ([2], [3], [4], [5]) R. B. Porter and his associates have conducted empirical comparisons of the Mean-Variance (EV) and Stochastic Dominance portfolio choice criteria. The basic methodology of all these studies was first to compute the set of EV-efficient portfolios by an optimizing algorithm, then to find through heuristic methods “stochastically dominant” portfolios, and finally to compare the two. A major finding of these studies was that most EV-efficient portfolios survived the second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) test against the randomly generated portfolios. The purpose of this note is to show that, for all cases of practical interest, a portion of the EV frontier is a subset of the SSD-efficient set. In other words, we offer here an exact theoretical justification of some empirical results of the aforementioned studies.

The capital asset pricing model specifies that relative risk is a sufficient descriptor of security risk. This result holds under both the Sharpe-Lintner version,

and the more general Black version of the model,

where

= expected rate of return on asset i,

Rf = riskless rate of interest,

= expected return on the market portfolio,

= expected return on any “zero-beta” asset or portfolio of such assests, and

= relative risk of asset i in the market portfolio of assests.

Indexes are frequently used for a basis of comparison of the performance of different types of assets, such as mutual funds and common stocks. Sharpe [6] studied the performance of mutual funds over the period 1944 to 1963 and compared their performance to the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) using the capital-asset pricing model. For this period he concluded that mutual funds were relatively inferior investments. Joy and Porter [2], using the stochastic dominance approach, reached conclusions similar to those of Sharpe for the 1954–1963 period.

After Markowitz [14, p. 100] and Sharpe [19, 20] suggested estimating the beta systematic risk coefficient for market assets, finance professors, stock brokers, investment managers, and others began expending large quantities of resources each year on estimating betas. Unfortunately however, it appears that the ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions used in nearly every instance may be inappropriate. This paper suggests that many stocks' beta coefficients move randomly through time rather than remain stable as the OLS model presumes.

In response to the many issues raised by Altman and Eisenbeis (A&E) [2], we will use their three-part outline. Before turning to their comments, however, we would like to take this opportunity to correct a typo in footnote 10 from our original paper [4]. The denominator of the formula is incorrect as shown, and should be .

The recent world-wide increase in consumer prices has created an intense interest in inflation on the part of both the academic and the financial communities. For example, in his American Financial Association presidential address, Professor Lintner [4, p. 259] states “few matters are of more serious concern to students of finance and to members of the financial community than the impacts of inflation on our financial institutions and markets and its implication for investment policy.”

This study presents theory and some exploratory empirical work on several separate strands of monetarism in an international context and reports the results of tests of the two interrelated hypotheses: (a) the United States' monetary expansion was responsible forthe exportation of inflation to the rest of the world during the period of generally fixed exchange rates that lasted from the end of World War II until August 1971 (followed by the Smithsonian revaluations and generalized floating in March 1973), and (b) foreign nations could not control their money supplies, even in the short run, to prevent importing inflation. Succinctly stated, the monetarist approach to macroeconomic phenomena holds that money is preeminent in determining the short-run shocks to real output and the long-run price level of an economy. However, received theory is simply not clear as to whose money is most important in an international context. Is it the domestic money stock which is kept relativelyindependent of foreign forces under fixed exchange rates through astute central bank policy, at least in the short run? Is it the rest of the world money stock which, under fixed exchange rates, is a close substitute for domestic money? Or is it the money stock of the so-called world's banker, the United States, which drives foreign economies? We address these issues and others in our empirical analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the performance of propertyliability insurance companies' stock portfolios from 1952 to 1968, and to show how that performance compared to the general stock market and investment company performance.

Two methods for deriving efficient sets involve either the Markowitz [3] approach, where every security can be viewed as being related to an index unique to itself, or the Sharpe [4] single-index model, where every security is related to the same index. Given the extreme differences between these models, Cohen and Pogue [1] developed two intermediate models. They found that the efficient set derived from the Sharpe single-index model came closer to approximating the Markowitz model's efficient set than their models when empirically tested on a sample of common stocks. Subsequently a similar test was performed by Wallingford [6] which yielded contradictory conclusions.

In a recent article appearing in this journal [2] Jonathan Ingersoll developed a normative multidimensional security pricing model for the individual investor in which he corrected errors in an earlier attempt by William Jean [3] [4] [5] at developing such a model. The purpose of this correction is to clarify and correct certain parts of Ingersoll's correction of Jean's work.

As the careers of men like J. P. Morgan and Andrew Carnegie illustrate so well, one of the most important elements of entrepreneurship is the ability to select talented lieutenants. This aspect of John D. Rockefeller's career is less well known, particularly in respect to his private investments. Dr. Fell takes one of Rockefeller's minor projects and demonstrates that the sagacity and perseverance of a lieutenant, Frederick T. Gates, meant the difference between a near-total loss and a remarkably profitable investment.

Introduction of the multidivisional enterprise, which has generally replaced the functional or departmental form of organization in the twentieth century, required management accounting techniques that provided both divisional and top management with data with which to evaluate individual managers' performance, company-wide performance, and future company policy. Professor Johnson discusses the development of these controls at General Motors, the results obtained with them in practice, and their alleged shortcomings, especially in respect to division managers' attitudes towards constructive decisions that might tend to limit in the short run the rate of return on the investment entrusted to them. He concludes with some observations on the influence that organization has had on corporate goals.

Of the myriad end products of the steel industry, none played a more strategic role in the evolution of the modern, vertically integrated enterprise than barbed wire. A unique solution to America's unique agricultural problem, the product attracted numerous manufacturers in the 1870s and 1880s. Profit margins, despite efforts to limit production and fix prices by means of pools, declined steadily, and firms that were not integrated backward into the production of rods (from which wire is drawn) had difficulty competing. Excess capacity and depressed prices convinced industry leaders like John W. Gates, Isaac L. Ellwood, and Charles F. Washburn that what was needed was a modern, fully integrated corporate holding company embracing every barbed wire manufacturer of consequence. The result was the formation of American Steel & Wire Co. in 1899 which, two years later, became an important component of the U.S. Steel Corporation.