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Throughout the book we have argued that SCOs are as much shaped by historically variable contexts as they in turn shape this context in interaction with other SCOs. Recognising SCOs as co-creators of social change invites us to consider together temporality, interaction, and the variety of forms of SCOs, and to do so within the broader historically variable context. The factors that allow SCOs and SCMs to secure social change vary across time and place. Thinking in this way alerts us to the magnitude and complexity of disentangling SCO outcomes – on each other, on SCMs, on policy, on legislation, on institutions and on culture as well as in relation to broader social, economic, cultural, and technological contexts at multiple (local, national, and international) levels over time. We therefore stress the value of our holistic approach, which encourages us to think realistically about the very real challenges of accurately tracing the outcomes of SCOs back to the source or sources from which they originated.
It is, nonetheless, important to recognise how an outcome in one sphere (for example, cultural or biographical) might set on course some chain reactions in different spheres (for example, political or material). Indeed, this is probably one reason why existing work on the outcomes of SCOs is currently unclear about the precise mechanisms through which outcomes are secured. This is part of the beauty of our approach: a simple, linear, theory of ‘organising for social change’ would do injustice to the multiple processes at play within and among SCOs and their broader historically variable context. A holistic account of the outcomes of organising for change must recognise how individual, SCO-sector, socio-cultural, and socio-political outcomes come to shape one another in usually unpredictable ways.
Throughout this book we have examined varieties of SCO and a range of intersecting classes of SCMs. What are the lessons learned and what are the implications of our intervention? In this, our concluding, chapter we first highlight the relevance of our work to the circumstances we find ourselves in at the beginning of the 2020s. Then we discuss the three key themes that our book raises about the role of SCOs and SCMs in social change processes.
Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.
The first two decades of the 21st century have been shaped by multiple intersecting financial, health, and environmental crises, and rapid social change. The financial crisis of 2008 generated economic and fiscal consequences that resulted in unemployment and austerity measures. The COVID-19 pandemic, which began at the end of 2019, reshaped our societies dramatically and revealed the challenges of dealing with a pandemic within national health systems already under strain. The ongoing environmental and climate crises threaten the homes and livelihoods of many, particularly in the Global South, but also in the Global North, and have huge ramifications on how societies across the world organise their economies and citizens live their lives. These crises have intensified global economic, racial, and gender inequalities and thus must be analysed from an intersectional perspective (Crenshaw, 1991). Together, these intersecting crises have resulted in a wide range of mobilisations, from large-scale protests on the streets to self-help and DIY (do it yourself) mobilisations, which are less visible. This book is about the organisations and people that are responding to crises and seeking to bring about as well as resist social change. We call these organisations social change organisations (SCOs) and the people engaged in them social change makers (SCMs).
We argue that focusing on SCOs and SCMs in a historical perspective contributes to the development of a theory of social change that takes into account structure and agency. SCOs and SCMs are constrained by the contexts in which they are active, but at the same time they are contributing to the transformation of these contexts – more often incrementally than rapidly. Our approach goes beyond models of social change that focus on the dynamics between incumbents and challengers (McAdam et al, 2001; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). We argue that it is important to broaden the perspective on efforts to bring about change beyond contentious politics (various forms of violent or non-violent protest) by paying more attention to insider activism and prefigurative politics. Insider activism refers to social change making that seeks to pressure institutions to change (or resist change) in more formal contexts than contentious politics (Pettinicchio, 2012).
Organising is politics made durable. From co-operatives to corporations, Occupy to Meta, states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), organisations shape our lives. They shape the possible futures of governance, policy making and social change, and hence are central to understanding how human beings can deal with the challenges that face us, whether that be pandemics, populism or climate change. This book series publishes work that explores how politics happens within and because of organisations and organising. We want to explore how activism is organised and how activists change organisations. We are also interested in the forms of resistance to activism, in the ways that powerful interests contest and reframe demands for change. These are questions of huge relevance to scholars in sociology, politics, geography, management and beyond, and are becoming ever more important as demands for impact and engagement change the way that academics imagine their work. They are also important to anyone who wants to understand more about the theory and practice of organising, not just the abstracted ideologies of capitalism taught in business schools.
Our books offer critical examinations of organisations as sites of or targets for activism; and we will also assume that our authors, and hopefully our readers, are themselves agents of change. Titles may focus on specific industries or fields, or they may be arranged around particular themes or challenges. Our topics might include the alternative economy; surveillance, whistleblowing and human rights; digital politics; religious groups; social movements; NGOs; feminism and anarchist organisation; action research and co-production; activism and the neo-liberal university, and any other subjects that are relevant and topical.
‘Organisations and Activism’ is also a multidisciplinary series. Contributions from all and any relevant academic fields will be welcomed. The series is international in outlook, and proposals from outside the English-speaking global north are particularly welcome.
This book, the fourth in our series so far, speaks directly to a concern with how ‘social change organisations’ and ‘social change makers’ can incubate and solidify new forms of social relations. The authors generously define social change organisations as a ‘broad range of organisations that work to bring about or resist social change through any combination of service provision, advocacy and protest.’
Although the notion of measuring the performance of news stories is not a new phenomenon, the advent of online analytic tools has redefined the whole terrain of the sociology of online news production and distribution. This chapter, which draws from an ongoing cross-national comparative study of Zimbabwean, Kenyan, and South African newsrooms, focuses on the use and role of analytics in news production and distribution. It investigates how analytics tools are used in editorial decision-making and advertising negotiations. Based on structured and unstructured interviews with editors and journalists working for selected newsrooms in East and Southern Africa, the chapter examines how the use of analytics is reshaping the evaluation of the impact, reach, and relevance of news stories and the performance of individual journalists. Our study shows that the deployment of analytics tools has altered how news organisations in different parts of Africa monitor, track, engage in digital listening, and interact with their audiences, thereby spawning a new phenomenon we call ‘analytics-driven journalism.’ We argue that newsrooms in different parts of the continent are, to varying degrees, now more concerned about newsroom metrics and engagement rates at the expense of the broader public interest dimension of journalism
Literature suggests that the mass permeation of new digital technologies has significantly shaped news production, distribution, and consumption practices across the globe (see, for instance, Moyo 2009; Mare 2014; Mavhungu and Mabweazara 2014; Cherubini and Nielsen 2016; Beer 2016; Graves, Kelly, and Gluck 2010; Bunce 2015). These changes have facilitated the gathering of new forms of information about media audiences. At the level of news production, news has been transformed into an industrialised and measured product (Carlson 2017).
During the first half of 2020, the difference in savings from mortgage refinancing between high- and low-income borrowers was 10 times higher than before. This was the result of two factors: high-income borrowers increased their refinancing activity more than otherwise comparable low-income borrowers and, conditional on refinancing, they captured slightly larger improvements in interest rates. Refinancing inequality increases with the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and is characterized by an underrepresentation of low-income borrowers in the pool of applications. We estimate a difference of $5 billion in savings between the top income quintile and the rest of the market.
There are differing schools of thought on the impact of technological revolution on employment, and work(ers). Campa (2019) identifies two main schools of thought. On the one hand there are those who emphasise the propensity of new technologies, especially automation, to generate technological unemployment. On the other, there are those who deny or minimise technological unemployment. The case in point, in the latter category, is the ‘World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work’ by the World Bank (2019). The report argues that workers must adapt and acquire new skills, and social protection must be extended to all. If the tide comes in, the report seems to be saying, you must learn to swim.
We would agree with Anner, Pons-Vignon and Rani (2019) in their critique of the World Bank's report when they argue that how technology is used is shaped by power relations. If workers are given a voice and government actively supports workers’ engagement, technology has the potential to play a positive role in the future of work. The authors challenge the idea that technology is an exogenous factor and reject technological determinism.
The key argument in this chapter is that technology is a product of human labour and if well-organised and strong enough, labour can shape its direction, impact and results. Thus, this chapter adopts an approach similar to Anner, Pons-Vignon and Rani (2019), but uses the automotive manufacturing sector in South Africa as an empirical case to highlight the contradictions of technological revolution in production on employment/work(ers). Paus (2018) outlines important contributions using the same line of reasoning by challenging the deterministic dismissal or trivialisation of the impact of technological change on employment/work(ers) on the one hand, and the dystopic, technological unemployment future on the other.
In the wake of the digital era, knowledge society and 4IR, the possibilities provided by digital technologies in the arena of education and skills development are very broad, and one of its key attributes is its potential to overcome time and resource constraints through flexible and shorter learning pathways (The Global Commission on the Future of Work, 2019). The opportunities now include access to wide-reaching quality education that is affected by teachers who have the relevant skills and digital learning competencies and lastly, whose competencies, proficiencies and mentorship cannot be replaced by education technologies (The Global Commission on the Future of Work, 2019).
For ages, the term ‘digital divide’ had been used in academic environments to articulate the social inequality that existed between people who have access and those who lack access to information and communications technology (ICT) (Ritzhaupt et al., 2013). Ritzhaupt et al, (2013) documented that numerous components are interrelated to the digital divide. Over the years, it has become multifaceted and some of these dimensions include an individual's access to computers, their computer usage, and related skill. Their research further declared that the term ‘digital divide’ is no longer only relevant to physical access to technology and digital tools, but also includes whether people have the necessary information and communications technology (ICT) skills (Ritzhaupt et al., 2013). In a study conducted by Kajee and Balfour (2011), the authors marked the digital divide as a legacy of South Africa's past as a result of the apartheid system, however, South Africa can be seen as one of the most information-integrated societies within sub-Saharan Africa (Bornman, 2015).
South Africa is a country characterised by a growing digital divide in the 4IR caused by legacy issues of apartheid, and this has an impact on the future of the residents in terms of the future of work in this digital economy (UNDP, 2019). High poverty at 40% and 29% unemployment (Stats SA, 2020) illustrates the constraints currently faced by South Africa within a spiralling rate of change of technology in the global context which makes it a much more complex exercise to ensure that the necessary measures are in place to upskill citizens to participate meaningfully in the new digital economy (UNDP, 2019; Stone, 2020).
A Los Angeles-based author, Brian Merchant, published a book on the activities of Foxconn, a Chinese company that assembles Apple's iPhones in Shenzhen. Workers in the plant in which highly sophisticated iPhones are produced were so unhappy about their working and living conditions that in 2010, incidents of suicide began to be widespread (Merchant, 2017). Last year, in Durban, an engineering plant shop steward was taken to a warehouse and shown brand-new robots. The manager pointed at the robots and said mockingly:
Here are NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa) members who do not get tired. These members don't go on strike (Interviewee 1, telephonic interview).
Human stories like these tend to be ignored when scholars present grand narratives about the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) at conferences and in seminars and workshops. As an attempt to catch up with the 4IR, in April 2019, the South African government launched the WEF-supported Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution—an institution for conducting and coordinating research on artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, the Internet of Things (IoT), blockchain, distribution ledge technology, and precision medicine (Campbell, 16 April 2019, Engineering News).
This chapter will examine the extent to which current developments in the South African banking industry, driven primarily but not solely by the collection of technological developments commonly referred to as the 4IR, are indicative of a just transition. It will then explore the systemic conditions which would need to be in place to ensure that as new technologies are adopted on an ever-broader scale, labour benefits from technological innovation. This can be contrasted with a scenario, becoming ever more likely and in certain instances being realised, where labour bears the brunt of the cost associated with the adoption and application of new technologies in banking as well as other industries. The case for avoiding such a state of affairs and instead proactively working towards what can be termed an ‘accelerated just transition’ is indeed compelling. Not only due to the potential benefits, which could accrue to labour due to the application of new technologies (such as increased productivity, reduced working hours and improved working conditions) but also in light of the already high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality in South Africa.
The cost borne by labour should therefore be minimised, completely negated, or ideally labour and capital should both benefit in equal measure from the so-called 4IR. There are, however, reasons to doubt, especially considering the historical trajectory of the South African banking industry, whether this second scenario where labour and capital equally benefit from the 4IR, is likely to materialise in the foreseeable future. One of the central premises of this chapter is however, simply, that we cannot determine an uncertain and complex future.
This chapter presents the driving forces for new jobs and skills for the future. The chapter also outlines the contribution of TVET knowledge and skills to digital literacy from basics to advanced levels. The implication of digital literacy for the 4IR is highlighted. The empirical part of this chapter presents results based on the investigation done at the vocational education and training practices at three TVET colleges in one province in South Africa. The study focused on vocational pedagogic and didactic practices; workshop material and equipment for practical training; work-integrated learning, and integration of theory and practice in vocational subjects. This investigation is a case study to gauge the extent of readiness of some TVET colleges for the 4IR. The methodology of collecting data included questionnaires, interviews, and observation. The participants of the study were students and lecturers. Based on this data, the paper determines the extent of the readiness of TVET as well as CET colleges in the country. This chapter recommends measures to position the TVET and CET colleges for the 4IR.
It is no secret that South African youth are facing massive challenges in terms of their education, employment, and career growth. In the third quarter of 2019, the South African unemployment rate had increased to 29 percent as compared to 26.5 percent in the first quarter of 2017. Youth unemployment has been inordinately high for many years in South Africa and is one of the country's major socio-economic challenges (Plagerson, Patel, Hochfeld & Ulriksen 2018). International comparisons regularly affirm that South Africa's unemployment rate is among the highest in the world. In 2013, the youth unemployment rate was 63 percent of the youth labour force (3.2 million individuals).
The world appears to be overcome with a new wave of what Harvey termed ‘capital accumulation by dispossession,’ this time under the auspices of the 4IR embodied in modernity's rhetoric of ‘progress’ and new opportunities for capitalist economic growth. In this frenzy, the implications of social relations for both human nature and nature from the first industrial revolution are once again overlooked in the political agendas of those seeking ongoing forms of capital accumulation.
Harvey (2004) reminds us that Marx's dialectical methods throughout the history of capitalism revealed that market liberalisation and capitalism's innovation, in order to maintain itself, produce greater levels of social inequality. According to Harvey, imperialism has always found new ways of capital accumulation through dispossession because if over-accumulated capital does not or cannot move, then it stands to be devalued directly. He offers the following summary:
Capital necessarily creates a physical landscape in its own image at one point in time only to have to destroy it at some later point in time as it pursues geographical expansions and temporal displacements as solutions to the crises of overaccumulation to which it is regularly prone. This is the history of creative destruction (with all manner of deleterious social and environmental consequences) written into the evolution of the physical and social landscape of capitalism (Harvey, 2004: p66).
This chapter on 4IR and energy transitions serves to interrogate the assumptions and claims of current renewable energy transitions to mitigate climate change, create more energy efficiency, and improve the socio-economic well-being in the quest for a ‘low-carbon society.’