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From European integration to domestic politics to the development of the global economy, technocracy and private ordering have shaped economic behaviour. Such transformative private-driven forces of economic activity flourished through the promulgation of voluntary standards. In view of the ever-increasing powers that are transferred to private actors and their relative power as a de facto pillar of global regulatory making, it is surprising that their dominance remains largely unaffected by regulatory shocks that they partly cause. Rather, in practice, crises (broadly defined as disruptive disturbances) appear to empower such forces or generate new ones, whereas existing checks and balances fail their initial purpose. In emphasising the role of the innate traits, fabric of interactions and dynamics in times of crises within private rule-making bodies, the present article analyses the foundations for a new, evidence-based theory to explain the resilience of private collective action and establishes a research agenda.
Standards are valuable not only to their users but also to the organizations that develop and promote them. It is simplistic to only view the economic function of standards from the standpoint of its use cases. We should also recognize and examine how the setting of standards contributes to the empowerment of private standard-setting organizations and their advocacy agenda. This chapter analyzes the standard-setting activities of the Institute of International Finance and argues that those activities are an important factor that accounts for its continued existence and relevance.
Studies inspired by the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach suggest that in coordinated market economies, some employer associations support public social policies to encourage the workforce to invest in company and industry-specific skills (VoC thesis). Yet the VoC thesis remains disputed. We present and assess an alternative thesis that builds on employers’ interest in the protection of labor supply (labor supply thesis). We test the labor supply thesis using a systematic content analysis of 370 press releases issued from 2002 to 2017 and find evidence of moderate employer support for more labor-activating social policies and less labor-protective social policies. Moreover, the analysis shows a decline in preference heterogeneity, with the positions of the four German employer associations converging toward the end of the period analyzed. Our findings have theoretical and methodological implications: First, they point to the relevance of labor supply as a source of employers’ social policy preferences. Second, they point to the need for a more systematic measurement of employer policy positions to be able to compare positions accurately.
This chapter focuses on a novel transnational governance initiative which was developed after the 2013 Rana Plaza crisis: the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety. We focus on one particularly novel aspect of the Accord, which is the nature of the collective action created through the collaboration of over 200 signatory brands with global labour actors. We first identify the institutional design features including transnational co-determination, industry-wide, pre-competitive collaboration, legally enforceable commitment, developing worker voice, leverage through collective action, accountability through collective oversight, pooling of resources and, finally, the highly focused approach. While successful in improving safety in the industry, we also highlight the political nature of collective private regulation and the political backlash from national actors which ultimately ended its regulatory power.
Transnational private regulation (TPR) is gradually expanding beyond regulatory areas traditionally associated with private rules such as technical standardization, finance in domains such as trade in derivatives and payment systems, or the field of sports. Private rules are increasingly encroaching upon areas traditionally considered as the preserve of State regulation such as sustainability, food safety, and human rights. The relative importance of private regulation varies across domains. In some instances, such as in the domain of sustainability, or food safety, private regulators fiercely compete for acceptance and uptake by the market and the State. In fields such as finance, on the other hand, private regulation is at times the preserve of a strong “monopolist” wielding considerable power and influence.
The chapter studies the impact that human rights due diligence (HRDD) has on voluntary sustainability standards (VSS). This chapter illustrates isomorphic pressures among VSS that stem both from HRDD and benchmarking initiatives enrolling HRDD to advance social and environmental objectives. Private schemes extend key requirements to non-certified volumes and firms to account for human rights responsibilities of entities at different levels of the value chain. This allows schemes to better fit in firms’ HRDD systems as they cover risks for more value chain entities. VSS themselves enact enhanced due diligence accounting for their own HRDD responsibilities vis-à-vis impact generated by members and certified firms. By strengthening efforts in the provision of collaborative tools between firms at different levels in the value chain, VSS’ function is partially re-aligning, testifying to their resilience at a juncture in which they face criticism and competitive pressures from other private tools. VSS also exercise non-regulatory activities such as offering fora for engagement, remediation and sharing costs of social and environmental compliance.
The 'informal' economy - economic activity and income outside government regulation, taxation and observation - is difficult to quantify. Recent estimates suggest it accounts, in OECD countries, for around 13% of national income (in the UK, the equivalent of £150 billion) and in developing nations it can make up as much as three-quarters of all non-agricultural employment. Whatever the exact figures, it is clear that the informal economy plays a significant role in national incomes and affects a large share of the global workforce.
Colin C. Williams provides an authoritative introduction to the topic, explaining what the informal economy is and how it can best be measured. Taking a global perspective, he examines its characteristics in developed, developing and transitional economies, and looks at its role as a driver of economic growth. The theoretical underpinnings are explored, from conceptual origins in the development models of the 1950s, through to present-day discussions, which question whether a formalised economy is always the ideal.
The book considers the economic motivations of the informal economy workforce, which may include tax evasion, circumventing regulations and maintaining state benefits, and assesses the different policy options available to governments to combat them, whether a punitive policy of deterrence, or one of accommodation that recognises the value of the sector in generating income and in meeting the needs of poor consumers.
The book provides a masterly summation of the published research on the informal economy and an expert assessment of the key areas for research going forward.
Why are politicians selective in granting investment incentives to foreign direct investment (FDI) projects? One understudied reason is that politicians want to minimize backlash from voters. In this article, I present the first study to systematically analyze voter preferences toward investment incentives. I theorize that voters should be more likely to support investment incentives for FDI projects that they perceive as “high quality”—that is, projects that voters perceive to be highly effective in improving the living standards of their communities. As a result, I expect that politicians who support low-quality FDI projects with incentives will lose voter support. A factorial survey experiment in the United States provides evidence in favor of this argument. Voters reward politicians only if they provide investment incentives to high-quality projects. An additional conjoint survey experiment highlights the importance of project characteristics that indicate high quality in increasing the approval of investment incentives. To demonstrate the external validity of these experimental results, I present descriptive evidence that illustrates the consistencies between the determinants of investment incentives for FDI projects and voter preferences.
During the 1930s, the British government in Palestine introduced new regulation for the country’s banking sector. This regulation brought about a sharp decline in the number of banks and consolidated the large banks’ position in the country. Contrary to prior accounts of the subject, which view the regulation as a welcome governmental response to an unstable banking sector, in this article I argue that the main forces behind the regulation were the British Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial, and Overseas) and the Zionist Anglo-Palestine Bank. Based on governmental reports and internal banking correspondence, I show how, despite the opposition of local credit institutions, these two large banks successfully pushed for regulations that benefited them at the expense of their smaller competitors. The regulation of Palestine’s banking sector is therefore a case study of regulatory capture in the context of the British Empire.
There are a variety of reasons underlying the remarkable development of science and technology (S&T), and innovation in post-1978 China. This book seeks to achieve an understanding of such development from an institutional or a political economy perspective. Departing from the literature of S&T and innovation studies that treats innovation as a market or enterprise's behavior in Schumpeter's sense, Sun and Cao argue that it involves politics, institutions, and the role of the state. In particular, they examine how the Chinese state has played its visible role in making innovation policies, allocating funding for R&D programs, making efforts to attract talent, and organizing critical S&T programs. This book appeals to scholars in S&T and innovation policy, political economy, innovation governance, and China studies as well as policymakers and business executives.
Business corporations interact with household units and government agencies to make investments in productive capabilities required to generate innovative goods and services. When they work harmoniously, these three types of organizations constitute 'the investment triad'. The Biden administration's Build Back Better agenda to restore sustainable prosperity in the United States has focused on investment in productive capabilities by government agencies and household units. Largely absent from the Biden agenda have been policy initiatives to ensure that, given government and household investment in productive capabilities, the governance of major U.S. business corporations supports investment in innovation. This Element explains how corporate financialization, manifested by predatory value extraction in the name of 'maximizing shareholder value', undermines investment in innovation in the United States. It concludes by outlining a policy framework, beginning with a ban on stock buybacks, that confronts predatory value extraction and puts in place social institutions that support sustainable prosperity.
Research on interorganisational collaboration is longstanding however the role leadership plays in such collaborations is often neglected. Using grounded theory, we present a process model of ‘leadership by cavea’ whereby the relationships across organisations involved in a collaborative project were structured according to hierarchies of privilege, determined by the inherent power of ‘bonding’ social capital. While it emerged that cultural capital was a more valuable resource, this was recognised too late in the leadership process for it to make a necessary contribution. Our findings demonstrate that when seeking to practice collaborative leadership across organisations, individuals and the organisations they represent must be aware of the power they hold and wield, even needing to share or relinquish power to ensure that hierarchies of privilege do not hinder efforts to achieve mutual goals.
While most literature on federal climate change policies has focused on failures to adopt broad policies, this article describes and explains successes in two important sectors. Regulations to improve the fuel economy of motor vehicles and efficiency standards for appliances and equipment have produced substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, although they largely have other goals and hence can be considered implicit climate policies. We synthesize the existing literature with our analyses of case studies to offer three explanations for the adoption of effective policies in these two sectors. First, the policies delivered politically popular co-benefits, such as reducing consumers’ energy bills, enhancing energy security, and promoting public health. Second, they gained business acceptance because they were narrow in their scope, avoided long-term economic costs, and helped industry cope with state-level regulations; industry often strategically tried to influence these policies rather than resist them. Third, the legislation that initiated and expanded these policies received bipartisan support, which was aided by co-benefits and business acceptance; more recently, these laws have been strengthened through the actions of Democratic administrations. We conclude by comparing these policy areas to the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.
There is currently disagreement in the international sports world about whether Russian and Belarusian athletes should be admitted to international competitions. While initially proposing to ban these athletes, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is now recommending that sports federations readmit Russian and Belarusian athletes under certain conditions. The IOC believes that this is unavoidable in order to respect human rights. Sports federations are invoking their autonomy on this issue, with some following the IOC’s advice, some maintaining a ban, and others allowing unconditional participation. This piece seeks to correct the IOC’s interpretation of the applicable human rights standard. It asserts that sporting bodies must respect human rights, and that the principles of autonomy and neutrality of sport must be considered in light of internationally recognised human rights standards. If these are used as a yardstick, it becomes clear that collective exclusion can be justified in the extreme case of a war of aggression.
This article compares the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ex ante cost analysis of its 1995 Large Municipal Waste Combustor (MWC): New Source Performance Standards and Emissions Guidelines rule to an ex post assessment of its cost. Unlike many retrospective cost analyses, where ex post assessments are limited due to lack of data on compliance costs, this case study is unique because we located and used plant-level survey data from the U.S. Department of Energy and Governmental Advisory Associates in a comparison of ex ante and ex post costs of individual MWCs. We find the ex post capital expenditures for nitrogen oxide control systems are typically lower than the EPA ex ante estimates, while the ex post capital expenditures for mercury control systems tend to be higher than the EPA ex ante estimates. Finally, while we find a few outliers, the average ratio of ex post to ex ante capital expenditures for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide emissions control is near unity.
This paper conducts a benefit–cost analysis of expanding agricultural research and development (R&D) in the Global South. We extend a recent modeling exercise that used IFPRI’s IMPACT model to estimate the investments required to reduce the global prevalence of hunger below 5%. After 35 years, the increased funding is estimated to increase agricultural output by 10%, reduce the prevalence of hunger by 35%, reduce food prices by 16%, and increase per capita incomes by 4% relative to a counterfactual where funding continues to rise on historical trends. Using an 8% discount rate, the net present value of the costs of agricultural R&D are estimated at $61 billion for the next 35 years, while the net present benefits in terms of net economic surplus (the sum of consumer and producer surplus) are estimated at $2.1 trillion. The central estimate of the benefit–cost ratio (BCR) is 33, consistent with previous research documenting high average returns to agricultural research and development. The central BCR reported in this study places the intervention at the 91st percentile of all previous Copenhagen Consensus BCRs in agriculture, and 87th percentile for all BCRs regardless of sector. Agricultural R&D is likely one of the best uses of resources for the remainder of the Sustainable Development Goals and decades beyond.
Much business ethics and corporate social responsibility literature suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that firms ought to engage in activities that can be characterized as philanthropy, namely, expending resources beyond what is required by law and market norms to promote others’ welfare at the expense of firm profits. However, this literature has struggled to provide a normative framework for evaluating corporate philanthropy, although scholars have noted that such expenditures can potentially remedy market failures and provide public goods more efficiently. I articulate two specific rationales that can justify corporate philanthropy based on considerations of welfare economics: 1) firms making strategic but high-risk investments in activities that are likely to generate positive externalities even if they prove unprofitable and 2) firms possessing a strong comparative advantage in their ability to address a social problem at lower social cost. Moreover, these rationales can be evaluated by a concept I develop called the philanthropy multiplier, indicating the ratio of net positive externalities to net costs. I suggest that firms consider publicizing their philanthropy multipliers, and I discuss theoretical and practical implications.
This article aims to explain the considerable state ownership in listed companies in Norway (SOiN) at present. The extant literature has pointed to alleged national idiosyncrasies to explain this special feature of Norwegian capitalism. The main contribution of this article is a comparative perspective. It shows that most European countries have pursued selective protectionism (i.e., to secure national ownership in key companies). It also shows that financial capital was not crucial for selective protectionism. On this background, the article discusses why state ownership became the mode of selective protectionism in Norway. It argues that the main reason is that large private (often multinational) companies did not develop in the wake of the second Industrial Revolution. Another key reason is that a specific hybrid ownership model that was developed after 1945 became an available institutional solution for securing national ownership after 1990. A common ground and a compromise were found on this model, based both on trust and distrust toward the state: a trust in that the state could operate as a passive and private owner, and a corresponding distrust in the state as an active industrialist and owner.