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Central to our argument is that “representation gaps” may be filled to some extent by alliances being built by actors at different points in the supply chain and based on the two different logics of representation: representation as structure and representation as claim. Using the Accord as the empirical context, Chapter 5 analyses how and when representation as claim and representation as structure can become complementary: labour rights NGOs can use their power to agitate and mobilise in ways that empower trade unions to negotiate with global brands, while trade unions provide the legitimacy and access to negotiation with global brands. This complementarity is illustrated by the Bangladesh Accord. The Accord emerged as a negotiated and legally binding agreement between Global Union Federations, NGOs and over 200 brands, providing an unprecedented mechanism of transnational co-determination at the supply chain level between representatives of labour and capital.
This Chapter brings together key themes running through the book. Its central argument is that the Rana Plaza disaster initiated a number of responses which had at their centre the aim of building institutions for worker representation across global supply chains: transnational industrial democracy. However, to adapt to the political and economic context of global supply chains, this was very much a market driven form of democracy. The chapter goes on to highlight the key features of this approach, as well as its structural limitations. We conclude by highlighting that key lessons can be drawn to inform future initiatives to develop worker representation in supply chains.
How can a firm apply the appropriate interaction between exploration and exploitation with the goal of either radical or incremental innovation? In this study, we seek to answer this puzzling question by reframing exploitation and exploration as a duality of learning (i.e., two modes that are partial complementary for synergy as well as partial conflicting for tradeoff). Specifically, rather than assuming either a positive or negative interaction between exploration and exploitation as prior literature has done, our study highlights a novel pattern of inverted U-shaped interaction between exploration and exploitation for both radical and incremental innovations. With a Chinese sample of 508 firms, our empirical evidence supports our prediction of two patterns of inverted U-shaped interaction of exploration and exploitation. Such unique findings showcase the unique value of reframing paradox into duality from the meta-perspective of yin-yang balancing to shed new light on organizational ambidexterity and innovation management.
The Rana Plaza disaster did not happen as an isolated incident: it was just the latest and largest of a series of fatal incidents in the Bangladesh garments sector. This chapter seeks to locate why such deadly events were associated with the Bangladeshi sector and identifies the key obstacles to achieving meaningful worker representation. In addition, the chapter outlines the empirical context for the remainder of the book by outlining the key features of both the Bangladesh Accord for Fire and Building Safety and the JETI workplace social dialogue project.
Chapter 3 focuses on the challenges and opportunities of transnational worker representation and their consequences for the development of more democratic governance institutions. We examine these from two key theoretical perspectives. Starting from the notion of associational democracy, we differentiate between two logics of democratic representation: representation as claim versus representation as structure. The first approach is associated with a discursive or communicative model of transnational democracy as put forward by political theorists. Rather than thinking of representation in terms of representative structures, representation becomes the dynamic and ongoing process of making “representative claims” that reflect certain discourses, categories, concepts, judgments, dispositions, and capabilities. In contrast, structural ideas of representation are grounded in industrial democracy. Here, constituents of an organic political unit defined by voluntary membership, such as a trade union, authorise their representatives to deliberate, negotiate or bargain on behalf of members. We develop their theoretical grounding in structuralist and post-structuralist thinking, and question to what extend these approaches may be reconciled with each other to advance prospects for transnational worker representation.
The power of the digital platforms and the increasing scope of their control over individuals and institutions have begun to generate societal concern. However, the ways in which digital platforms exercise power and organize immaturity—defined as the erosion of the individual’s capacity for public use of reason—have not yet been theorized sufficiently. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capitals, and habitus, we take a sociosymbolic perspective on platforms’ power dynamics, characterizing the digital habitus and identifying specific forms of platform power and counterpower accumulation. We make two main contributions. First, we expand the concept of organized immaturity by adopting a sociological perspective, from which we develop a novel sociosymbolic view of platforms’ power dynamics. Our framework explains fundamental aspects of immaturity, such as self-infliction and emergence. Second, we contribute to the platform literature by developing a three-phase model of platform power dynamics over time.
The supply chain model has become the dominant mode of production in the globalised economy. While much attention has been placed on the downwards economic pressures of the model, little attention has been placed on the consequences for democratic participation. This chapter casts light on this area by examining how the supply chain model undermines democracy at work. It also raises the fundamental question of whether and how existing governance structures can be democratised, or whether and how new democratic institutions can be created that extend democratic underpinnings to globally expanding supply chains? Drawing on this we highlight that two distinct approaches to supply chain labour governance have emerged: one based on focussing on production relations and collective bargaining, and the other based on consumption relations and a CSR approach by brands. These approaches raise important questions that are central themes of the book such as what is the relationship between the representation of worker interests and consumer interests; who has the “right” to raise concerns about labour conditions in global supply chains; and can these contrasting approaches prove complementary?
Globalisation has placed democratic institutions under severe pressure as economic actors seek to take advantage of the disjuncture between national political governance and transnational economic activity. This chapter provides an introduction and overview as to the key themes to be addressed in the book. In particular, we highlight the debate between different approaches to democratic representation and associational democracy which is the theoretical framing for the remainder of the book: representation as claim versus representation as structure.
While much attention has been paid to creating deliberative and representational institutions at the transnational level, little focus has been placed on the creation of representative structures at the workplace level. Chapter 8 explores mechanisms of developing transnational industrial democracy at the workplace level. Efforts aimed at promoting worker representation such as the creation of democratically elected occupational safety and health committees under the Accord. We focus in particular on the workplace social dialogue programme by the Joint Ethical Trading Initiatives (JETI). Workplace social dialogue provides a potentially promising mechanism for enabling worker voice in a context of toxic industrial relations. We examine the enabling roles which brand played in developing dialogue at their supplier factories but also unveil the resultant tensions their involvement exposed in their relationship to factories and workers.
Chapter 6 explores in greater detail why transnational industrial democracy yields a different approach to labour governance by presenting a structured comparison between the Bangladesh Accord for Fire and Building Safety (the Accord) and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (the Alliance). The latter was a parallel initiative set by 29 mainly North American retailers and operated as an alternative to the Accord, but was more firmly rooted in a CSR approach. Private governance as a whole has been characterised by competition between overlapping initiatives which often claim to have the same objectives but differ in their institutional design and governance. The Accord and the Alliance reflect these differences. By considering differences and similarities in the design and implementation of these two competing initiatives, this chapter demonstrates how differences in institutional design and governance translate into distinct emphases in implementation. In particular, we find that the inclusion of worker representatives in the design of transnational governance structures leads to the recognition of divergent interests and hence to a more rigorous model of transnational labour governance.