We evaluate the cross-sectional predictive ability of a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function, or Taylor rule, in both statistical and economic terms. We find that investors require a premium for holding currency portfolios with high implied interest rates while currency portfolios with low implied rates offer negative currency excess returns. Our forward-looking Taylor rule signals are orthogonal to current nominal interest rates and disconnected from carry trade portfolios and other currency investment strategies. The profitability of the Taylor rule portfolio spread is mainly driven by inflation forecasts rather than the output gap and is robust to data snooping and a wide range of robustness checks.

The paper proposes that industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology will benefit greatly from expanding our research focus from predominantly individual differences to studying organizational differences. We argue here that an increased organizational frame of reference on variables of interest to I-O psychology (e.g., selection, job design, performance management (PM), work motivation) is important because it will enhance our understanding of organizational behavior and make I-O research more effective in practice. After noting some organizational-level research already being done, several examples are provided for how an organizational mindset and methods can provide new insights into traditional areas of I-O effort. Also discussed is how methodological issues that may have constrained the study of organizational differences in the past and the potential new issues such research may yield can be addressed. We conclude that the future maintenance and enhancement of the I-O psychology brand as a science–practice profession requires enhanced attention to the organization level of analysis as our frame of reference for research.

We document that a significant number of insiders violate the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting requirements by filing open market transactions after the legally required deadline. Prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), 29% of transactions fell outside the required reporting window. Following SOX, 8% are delinquent. Violations cluster in periods of high information asymmetry, incentivizing insiders to keep trades private and earn abnormal returns. Collectively, these findings suggest that a subgroup of insiders personally benefit from violating SEC disclosure requirements. Evidence also suggests that blockholders provide governance for violations. Guilty insiders experience a reduction in board seats and an increased likelihood of turnover.

We document that firms that expect their CEOs’ compensation to exceed the median CEO compensation of their Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) peers influence ISS to revise these peer sets. Controlling for changes in firm characteristics that ISS uses to select peers, we find that ISS applies an abnormally high turnover rate in the members of these peer sets and increases the representation of focal firms’ chosen peers. This turnover results in increases in the medians of the ISS peers’ CEO compensation and size. We find that these firms underperform and conclude that they attempt to camouflage high CEO pay to mitigate outrage costs.

Using debt crowdfunding data, we investigate whether borrowers’ writing style is associated with an online lender and borrower behaviors, whether the information contained in linguistic style can mitigate information asymmetry in peer-to-peer markets, and whether online investors correctly interpret the economic value of written texts. Peer-to-peer lenders bid more aggressively, are more likely to fund, and charge lower rates to online borrowers whose writing is more readable, more positive, and contains fewer deception cues. Moreover, such borrowers are less likely to default. Online investors, however, fail to fully account for the information contained in borrowers’ writing.

We document a novel strategic motive for family business groups to utilize their internal capital markets (ICMs) during financial crises. We find that crisis-period group ICM activity is targeted toward exerting product market dominance over standalone rivals. Groups make significant post-crisis gains in market share that are concentrated among affiliates (and industry segments within affiliates) operating in highly competitive product markets, where capturing such gains is difficult in normal times. These patterns are observed only in emerging markets, suggesting that ICMs enable groups to exploit crises to realize long-term competitive advantages only when rivals face chronic financing frictions.