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Innovations are definitely to a large degree happening as a result of impacts from the top management of various shipping organizations. Several shipowners have come to be known for their commitments to innovation – implicit as well as explicit. The materials reported in this chapter are archival.
This chapter discusses the fundamental role of shipping research when it comes to “redefining” freight rates, as well as key decision-making processes. Cognitive limits are becoming increasingly important, and these “shape” innovations, including when it comes to buying or selling ships.
This chapter provides a status report of the shipping industry, including major structural changes, and key innovations so far. The chapter provides a natural extension of the introduction, and should be seen together with this.
This introductory chapter discusses major changes in the shipping industry, traditionally rather conservative and static, but now increasingly characterized by fundamental innovations and dynamism. Several of the drivers for these key innovations are discussed, such as technological advances, changes in legal requirements, effects from climate change, as well as economic pressures to become even more efficient.
Firms can become less innovative following a sudden cash “inflow.” Specifically, multinational firms that were eligible to repatriate (and indeed repatriated) cash to the United States under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) generate less valuable patents than otherwise similar firms. They also explore more. This effect only exists among firms in less competitive industries, firms with lower institutional ownership (IO), and firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs); this effect is mainly driven by the reduction in the value of U.S.-originated patents. Our evidence suggests that, without appropriate governance, a cash windfall may lead managers to engage in riskier innovation strategy, which can destroy value.
We develop a stakeholder framework that examines how firms respond to the conflicting demands that arise from governments and investors in the context of corporate philanthropic giving. We argue that firms that experience such conflict exhibit a decoupling response in philanthropic giving. Furthermore, we identify the boundary conditions of the relationship between the conflicting pressures and the decoupling response. Drawing on stakeholder salience literature, we argue that this relationship will be weakened when CEOs perceive government demands as more salient (such as those with a communist ideology) and when CEOs are less sensitive to investor claims (such as those with fewer career concerns). We find empirical support for our arguments using a sample of 8,857 Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2015. Our study contributes to the literature on stakeholder theory, decoupling, and corporate philanthropy.
This study investigates the effects of employees' perceived values-congruence within an organisation affect employees' beliefs about organisational change. Specifically, we investigated the effects employees' perceived values-congruence with their organisation, supervisor and colleagues had on beliefs about an organisational change implementation and tested whether these relationships were mediated by employees' felt trust and perceptions of the quality of their organisations' communication, as suggested by the literature. Data from 251 respondents who had undergone an organisational change within the last 6 months were analysed. Support was found for the influence all three types of perceived values-congruence (i.e. congruence with their organisation, supervisor and colleagues) had on change-related beliefs and strong support was found for the mediation role played by trust and the quality of communication.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is becoming increasingly important for modern corporations. Focusing on voluntary CSR disclosure and drawing on upper echelons theory, we propose that voluntary CSR disclosure is the manifestation of managerial preferences (e.g., managers’ professional ethical values and standards). Specifically, we argue that top executives with an academic background tend to have higher professional and ethical standards than their non-academic counterparts. These standards lead them to act with self-restraint and to perceive CSR disclosure as an opportunity rather than a threat. Compared with non-academic executives, therefore, top executives with an academic background provide stakeholders with more CSR information. Based on a sample of publicly listed firms in China, we find a significant difference in voluntary CSR disclosure between firms led by academic executives and firms without academic top executives. This difference is smaller for firms that are state-owned, firms that are audited by large audit firms, and firms with greater analyst coverage. We contribute to the literature on CSR voluntary disclosure by providing an in-depth analysis of the effects of top management teams’ academic backgrounds.
The literature examining analyst activity assumes that access to management is valued by analysts and their employers. We propose a readily observable measure of access: How often an analyst is invited to be among the first to ask questions in the Q&A session of an earnings conference call. These “early participants” are more successful in the labor market than peers from the same brokerage when their brokerages close. Our results show that access is valued by both sell-side and buy-side employers and reflects connectivity to management as well as analyst skill dimensions not captured in traditional measures of performance.
This introductory chapter offers an overview of the entire book on the management transformation of Huawei. Huawei is now China’s most prominent multinational company and a leader in 5G mobile telephone technology, which will be rolled out across the world in the next few years. What makes Huawei interesting is its rate of growth and the level of detail in which we can observe not only the creation of routines but also the breaking of routines across most the major functional areas (management, product development, HR, supply chain, finance, R&D, intellectual property, and international). This makes Huawei an ideal case to advance the theory of routines and dynamic capabilities to change routines. Hence the book will particularly appeal to academics in the field of strategy, management, and business history.
The chapter discusses the crucial role that top management team played at Huawei to initiate, implement, and routinize organizational transformation. Huawei’s leadership always had a strong long-term orientation and it tried to strike a careful balance between dynamics and stability. It also relied very heavily on Western consulting firms to transfer best practice to Huawei. The chapter also documents Huawei’s constant structural transformation of the top management team since 1998 with the expansion of the firm. Huawei maintained strategic consistency by creating a new executive management team structure 2003 that relieved an overburdened CEO position through a more collective decision making process and later in 2011 by instituting a rotating CEO arrangement. A number of lessons from Huawei’s experience are identified that provide guidance for firms to facilitate organization transformation as they rise and face more global competition.
Most companies discover that management practices that work on a smaller scale no longer work when the company grows substantially. This is also true for the product development process. As Huawei grew, the firm experienced problems in terms of higher product failure rates, longer development cycles and increased R&D costs. It then turned to the consulting services of IBM to upgrade its product development processes to a larger scale. The integrated product development (IPD) system implemented at Huawei was copied from IBM’s practices. IPD’s central idea is that companies must expand cross-functional teams to perform product development and use standard processes and templates to guide those development activities. IBM promoted the IPD system by providing consulting services to other firms. However, most of them failed during implementation, and only a few of them actually benefited from the IPD system; Huawei was one of them. The IPD transformation completely changed Huawei’s product developing system and helped the company overcome its problems in developing products on a larger scale. The IPD transformation was a turning point for Huawei in becoming a world-class company. This chapter explains how the IPD system helped Huawei solve its management problems and why Huawei was successful in IPD transformation when many other companies were not.
This chapter offers concluding thoughts on the entire Huawei study – the totality chapters and commentaries. It offers comparative perspective by placing the firm in the larger context of corporations in China and to some extent in other countries. The comparison with many other firms throughout the entire book reveals that Huawei is among a select number of firms that are able grow at very high rates by continuously transforming themselves. Consistently investing at least 10 percent of sales starting on R&D at least since 1998 was an important ingredient of this growth. But the importation of western best practice routines and the steering of this process by the Huawei founder and the top management team underlie this ability to grow. Huawei stands out among many Chinese companies that internationalize by relying solely on organic growth rather than on growth through acquisitions. Huawei is also different from state-owned companies (SOEs) that dominate a number of sectors in the Chinese economy in that Huawei motivated a large fraction of employees by giving them shares in a profit-sharing plan so that hard working employees could make a substantial amount of money. Building all chapters, we provide advance management theory by articulating in detail the meta-routines that underpin Huawei’s dynamic capabilities. Finally, we discuss the challenges to future growth of the firm, including geopolitical cross-currents the firm currently finds itself in.
Internationalization plays an important role in Huawei’s transformation from a fledgling Chinese start-up to a powerful multinational company. Huawei’s internationalization is characterized by repeated failures, difficult struggles and unceasing learning by doing. In this chapter, we divide the whole internationalization process of Huawei into three stages based on the different challenges at each stage. They are (1) overcoming the liability of foreignness, (2) managing complexity to achieve synergy from a global perspective, and (3) changing from a latecomer mindset to that of a global leader. For each stage, we summarize and discuss how Huawei adopts routinization and de-routinization strategies to efficiently overcome different challenges. The managerial implications derived from Huawei’s internationalization will be useful for other multinational firms.