The past decade has seen a resurgence of interest in understanding Indian business history. A number of business history books have been published in the academic and nonacademic press. Special issues on India have appeared in leading field journals, more management schools in India and outside are engaging with the field, internship and fellowship opportunities have been initiated, and business archives have sprung up. This article documents these recent trends, examines the emerging scholarship, and identifies gaps that need to be addressed in the future.

We examine the efficiency of using individual stocks or portfolios as base assets to test asset pricing models using cross-sectional data. The literature has argued that creating portfolios reduces idiosyncratic volatility and allows more precise estimates of factor loadings, and consequently risk premia. We show analytically and empirically that smaller standard errors of portfolio beta estimates do not lead to smaller standard errors of cross-sectional coefficient estimates. Factor risk premia standard errors are determined by the cross-sectional distributions of factor loadings and residual risk. Portfolios destroy information by shrinking the dispersion of betas, leading to larger standard errors.

This study investigates the implications of cross-country differences in banking regulation and supervision for the international subsidiary locations and risk of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that BHCs are more likely to operate subsidiaries in countries with weaker regulation and supervision and that such location decisions are associated with elevated BHC risk and higher contribution to systemic risk. The quality of BHCs’ internal controls and risk management plays an important role in these location choices and risk outcomes. Overall, our study suggests that U.S. banking organizations engage in cross-country regulatory arbitrage, with potentially adverse consequences.

Adam Tooze's Crashed is arguably the first historical narrative of the financial crisis. It is an ambitious account of the crisis and its global economic, financial, political, and geopolitical causes and implications. Crashed is organized chronologically in four parts—the “Gathering Storm,” “The Global Crisis,” “Eurozone,” and “Aftershocks”—and focuses more on the macrolevel structures, processes, and decisions than on the microlevel and the people suffering from the crisis. Except, that is, in aggregate numbers and a few empathic comments such as this: “As house prices fell, equity dwindled, and the hardest hit slid into negative equity. Families scrambled to slash spending and pay down credit card and other short-term debt. The result was a smothering recession in consumer demand” (p. 143).

This paper examines one type of negative work behaviour, work harassment, using two theoretical frameworks: Social Exchange Theory (SET) and Similarity-Attraction (SA). SET explains work harassment as a product of poor management practices, whereas using SA theory explains it as a result of the growing normalisation of high workloads. The study undertakes latent mean and path model comparison analysis using structural equation modelling of data from 189 nurses in the UK and 401 nurses in the USA. The findings indicate a good model fit showing a significant path from Leader Member Exchange (LMX) to work harassment, wellbeing and subsequent turnover intentions, with LMX fully mediating the path from LMX to wellbeing for UK nurses, but only partially mediating the same path for nurses in the USA. The findings suggest SET provides a better explanation for work harassment for UK nurses, whereas SA theory better explains the US nurse experience.

We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.