Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Browse subjects
  3. Management
  4. Content listing

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

46838 results in Management

Page 677 of 2342

  • 7 - Cartel Enforcement: Sanctions and Leniency

  • from Part II - Opening the ‘Black Box’: the Case of Cartels
  • Florence Thépot, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
    Published online:
    01 February 2019
    Print publication:
    14 February 2019, pp 158-195

  • Summary

    Chapter 8 explains that corporate compliance programmes, operating at the heart of corporate governance, should form part of the cartel enforcement toolbox. It advocates the need to supplement the existing sanction-based enforcement with a self-regulation approach. Despite the availabilities of harsh penalties, detection and prevention remains one of the greatest challenge of cartel enforcement. Greater onus on prevention via the use of compliance programmes could leverage the effectiveness of traditional enforcement tools. Competition authorities should then provide incentives for the voluntary implementation of effective programmes. Giving credit to effective compliance programmes seems possible and desirable in the context of an investigation. Upon provision of tangible evidence of adequate compliance efforts, a company should benefit from a reduction in the level of the fine, assessed on a case-by-case basis. Competition authorities should also engage further with the development of certification and standards that would facilitate the strategic use of compliance programmes by companies with third-parties. Cartel enforcement would benefit from the informational advantage that companies have in preventing and detecting cartels internally. In addition, compliance programmes could be required from leniency recipients, whereby detection of existing cartels could be achieved together with prevention of future infringements.

  • 6 - Corporate Governance Insights into Cartels

  • from Part II - Opening the ‘Black Box’: the Case of Cartels
  • Florence Thépot, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
    Published online:
    01 February 2019
    Print publication:
    14 February 2019, pp 135-157

  • Summary

    Part II provides a distinctive analysis of the issue of cartels that remains one of the greatest challenge of competition law enforcement. Cartels are first and foremost the products of individual and organisation-specific factors. This chapter explains that the agency relationship, featuring issues of imperfect information and opportunistic behaviour, approximates adequately the complexity of the internal drivers to collusion. Collusive behaviour is thus defined as a specification of the agency problem that characterises the separation of ownership a control functions in modern firms. Collusive practices may then stem from hidden managerial actions, the legal consequences of which may harm shareholders' interests. The practical implication is that mechanisms of corporate governance, which seek to address the agency problem, are closely related to the collusive narrative. Wrongly designed compensation schemes, or poor internal monitoring may explain participation of firms in cartels. In addition, an analysis of corporate governance systems may shed some light on additional driving forces of cartels. This chapter provides the necessary inquiry into internal drivers that may have been missing from the economic analysis of collusion. As such, this chapter opens the ‘black box’ of the firm disentangling internal dynamics that are fundamental to the study of cartels.

  • 4 - The Single Entity Doctrine in Vertical Relationships

  • from Part I - The Conception of the Firm
  • Florence Thépot, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
    Published online:
    01 February 2019
    Print publication:
    14 February 2019, pp 47-77

  • Summary

    This chapter discusses the adequacy of the single entity doctrine in complex horizontal relationships, by which competitors are tied both by a market and a corporate relation. One critical implication is that agreements between competitors and their (lawfully formed) joint venture may be exempted from further scrutiny. In such cases, the single entity doctrine, if applied consistently with the principles of the theory of the firm, adequately captures anticompetitive effects of corporate arrangements. The competitive effects of other arrangements, however, may fall short of antitrust scrutiny. In the EU and in the US, concern was raised over possible anticompetitive effects of financial ownership links which may be unchallenged. Interlocking directorates, created by directors sitting on the board of several companies, can also create uncontrolled anticompetitive risks. In the EU an enforcement gap exists because structural links do not fit into the firm/market paradigm underlying the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Merger Control. In the US, Sections 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act have substantive reach over partial acquisitions and interlocking directorates irrespective of such paradigm. Capturing anticompetitive effects of structural links may require adjustment of the substantive reach of competition law vis-à-vis, and greater insights into, corporate governance.

  • Presence and influence in lobbying: Evidence from Dodd-Frank

  • Pamela Ban, Hye Young You
  • Journal:
    Business and Politics / Volume 21 / Issue 2 / June 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 February 2019, pp. 267-295
    • Article
      • You have access
    • PDF
    • HTML
    • Export citation

  • Interest groups face many choices when lobbying: when, who, and how to lobby. We study interest group lobbying across two stages of regulatory policymaking: the congressional and agency rulemaking stages. We investigate how the Securities and Exchange Commission responds to interest groups at the end of these stages using a new, comprehensive lobbying dataset on the Dodd-Frank Act. Our approach examines citations in the SEC's final rules which reference and acknowledge the lobbying activities of specific interest groups. We find that more than 2,900 organizations engaged in different types of lobbying activities either during the congressional bill stage, the agency rulemaking stage, or both. Meetings with the SEC and hiring former SEC employees are strongly associated with the citation of an organization in a final rule. Comments submitted by trade associations and members of Congress are cited more in a final rule compared to other organizations. While there is more variety in the types of organizations who lobby the bureaucracy than those who lobby Congress, presence does not necessarily lead to recognition or influence.

Page 677 of 2342