We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases the provision of a key banking service: liquidity creation. Although theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on liquidity creation, we find that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation. Consistent with a subset of models emphasizing that banks pushed toward insolvency reduce risk-taking activities, we discover that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation more among banks with less risk-absorbing capacity (e.g., less profitable banks).

We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.

We study consumption and investment decisions given realistic time-varying constraints on borrowing. We first consider the case where borrowing is constrained by a maximum debt-to-income ratio. We then consider collateral borrowing with a maximum loan-to-value ratio. The resulting implications for optimal policies differ considerably from those obtained in the existing literature based on fixed borrowing limits but are consistent with those documented in the empirical literature.

We propose a single-factor asset pricing model based on an indicator function of consumption growth being less than its endogenous certainty equivalent. This certainty equivalent is derived from generalized disappointment-aversion preferences, and it is located approximately 1 standard deviation below the conditional mean of consumption growth. Our single-factor model can explain the cross section of expected returns for size, value, reversal, profitability, and investment portfolios at least as well as the Fama–French multifactor models. Our results show strong empirical support for asymmetric preferences and question the effectiveness of the smooth utility framework, which is traditionally used in consumption-based asset pricing.

We compare major factor models and find that the Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) 4-factor model is the overall winner in the time-series domain. The Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor model takes second place and the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model and the Barillas and Shanken (2018) 6-factor model jointly take third place. The pairwise cross-sectional R2 and the multiple model comparison tests show that the Hou et al. (2015) q-factor model, the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor and 4-factor models, and the Barillas and Shanken (2018) 6-factor model take equal first place in the horse race.

We proxy for board members’ opinions and values using directors’ ancestral origins and show that diversity has costs and benefits, leading to high performance volatility. Consistent with the idea that diverse groups experiment more, firms with ancestrally diverse boards have more numerous and more cited patents. In addition, their strategies conform less to those of the industry peers. However, firms with greater ancestral diversity also have more board meetings and make less predictable decisions. These findings suggest that diversity may lead to inefficiencies in the decision-making process and conflicts in the boardroom.

I report evidence that shareholders holding a combined 15% of shares are inattentive or partially inattentive when confronted with the decision to receive cash or stock for their shares in acquisitions. The average cost of such inattention is 2%, and it increases to 6% for the tertile of transactions with the greatest difference between the cash and stock values. Most interestingly, I show that inattention affects stock prices because attentive shareholders bid up the stock price in anticipation of a wealth transfer from inattentive shareholders.

Using mergers as shocks to fund size, I analyze the return-to-scale property of mutual funds. I find that acquiring funds’ performance deteriorates after experiencing a positive shock in size resulting from mergers, and liquidity plays an important role in the negative relationship between size and performance. I also find that the decline in performance is not due to higher performance prior to the merger, nor driven by higher integration costs after the event. These findings are consistent with mutual funds having decreasing returns to scale and thus provide empirical evidence that supports the theoretical model of Berk and Green (2004).

The intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) predicts that an unobservable factor capturing changes in expected market returns should be priced in the cross section. My Bayesian framework accounts for uncertainty in the intertemporal risk factor and gauges the effects of prior information about investment opportunities on model inferences. Whereas an uninformative prior specification produces weak evidence that intertemporal risk is priced, incorporating prior information about market-return predictability generates a large space of ex ante reasonable priors in which the estimated intertemporal risk factor is positively priced. Overall, the cross-sectional tests reject the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and indicate support for the ICAPM.

We investigate the strict-exogeneity assumption, a necessary condition for estimator consistency in many finance panel-data applications. We outline tests for strict exogeneity in both traditional (non–instrumental variable (IV)) and IV settings. When we apply these tests in common traditional finance panel regressions, we find that the strict-exogeneity assumption is often strongly rejected, suggesting large inference errors. We test for strict exogeneity in specific finance panel-data IV settings and illustrate the potential for these tests to help confirm, or rule out, the validity of common panel-data IV estimators. We offer recommendations to address the strict-exogeneity issue in finance research.

This paper studies the effects of labor adjustment costs on corporate risk management. Labor adjustment costs attenuate the correlation between the internal funds of a firm and its investment opportunity, and create more incentives for the firm to smooth internal funds. Using a state border discontinuity approach, I find that state-level labor protection laws significantly impact a firm’s use of foreign currency derivative contracts. I further find that a firm holds more cash when labor adjustment costs are larger, and such an effect concentrates on firms that do not engage in derivative hedging.

We study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through business loans and illustrate subtle aspects of its functioning that relate to the contractual characteristics and the borrower–lender types of loans. We show that the puzzling increase in business loans in response to monetary tightening, documented before the Great Recession, is largely driven by drawdowns from existing commitments at large banks. Spot loans also rise and take a considerable amount of time to adjust. Banks, nonetheless, do curtail credit supply by shortening maturities of new loans. Following the Great Recession, the mechanism has worked differently, with loan responses to monetary tightening displaying a significant downward shift.

Using a sample of over 9,000 buyback announcements from 31 non-U.S. countries, we find support for the results of studies based on U.S. data: On average, share repurchases are associated with significant positive short- and long-term excess returns. However, excess returns depend on the likelihood of undervaluation and the efficiency and liquidity of equity markets. In contrast to findings in U.S. markets, we do not find that these long-term excess returns are simply a compensation for takeover risk or have become less significant in recent years.

We find a positive relation between the amount of pension deficits and the cost of bank loans. The effect of pension deficits on the cost of bank loans is driven by financial constraints, information-asymmetry problems, and higher pension-investment risk. Banks tighten lending terms for firms with larger pension deficits by requiring collateral, increasing the number of loan covenants, and shortening loan maturity. Borrowers with larger pension deficits are also more likely to violate covenants in the future. Collectively, these findings indicate that pension deficits represent an additional source of risk priced by banks.

In this article, we explored the relationship between inclusive leadership and innovative work behavior with the mediating role of psychological empowerment. We collected data from employees in the information technology and cargo sectors within the United Kingdom and Canada. The results revealed that inclusive leadership was positively related to innovative work behavior both directly and indirectly through psychological empowerment. Cognitive evaluation theory was used to support the findings. Implications of the study were discussed.