Maimonides famously says some rather radical things about God – radical even by philosophical standards – both about what God is like “in Himself” and about God’s relationship with the created universe. Maimonides’ most detailed and sustained presentation of these radical ideas is in his discussion of divine attributes in chapters 50–70 of the Guide. Indeed, it seems evident that Maimonides’ point in that section is to make plain these radical ideas. To put matters rather simply and straightforwardly, the radical ideas are these: Strictly speaking, God shares nothing substantive in common with created beings, neither existence nor life nor power nor knowledge. Indeed, strictly speaking, God has no intrinsic nature at all, no attributes at all, and stands in no relations whatsoever to the created universe – save for negative attributes and attributes of action. Even speaking strictly, God does have negative attributes and does stand in whatever relations to the created universe are entailed by His having attributes of action.

Moses Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is the greatest and most influential work in Jewish philosophy. It directly influenced Aquinas, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and the history of Jewish philosophy takes a decisive turn after the appearance of the Guide, in the wake of its Hebrew translation. Aquinas refers to “Rabbi Moyses” when he develops his own theory of analogical predication, and Spinoza has Maimonides and the Guide squarely in focus in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, when he presents his own theory of biblical interpretation.

Medieval Jewish philosophers thinking about creation were influenced by Aristotle’s model of an eternally existing world, by Kalam arguments for a created universe, and of course by the Biblical account of creation found in Genesis. Aristotle’s theory of time reinforces a cosmology supportive of an eternally existing universe, thus obviating the need for a creator. Although Aristotle’s eternity thesis is often regarded as the target of medieval philosophers, both Dhanani and Langermann suggest that it was possibly Galen rather than Aristotle who posed an equal if not greater threat. In contrast to Aristotle, both Greek and Islamic atomists denied the continuity of time, and posited the existence of discrete time atoms, thus undermining the very assumption that things “persist” through time. Like Aristotle, Galen was famous for having denied creation and emphasizing a self-contained natural order that eschewed a creator; because Galen was careful to reject atomism, the Islamic Kalam theologians might have gravitated toward atomism as an effort to develop an alternative world-view to the Galenic. Given Galen’s staunch anti-atomist views, Langermann suggests that “it is not beyond the realm of the possible that Galen’s notion of minima, and not just his reports concerning his atomist opponents, had some influence upon the Mutakallimûn.”

In delineating the causes or reasons for a thing’s being, Aristotle notes, “what something is and what it is for are one …” (Aristotle 1984, 198a25–6). The nature and structure of a thing and its purpose coincide. The nature and structure of a table is what it is for. The nature and structure of the heart is no different than its purpose, to pump blood. And so it is, as I shall argue, with Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed (c. 1190). The structure of the work is intimately related to its purpose and ultimate goal. That there is an overall structure needs to be unpacked, and that the structure, overall and even within its discrete parts, serves a particular end also needs to be clarified. If this programmatic essay succeeds, it will provide a framework for reading the essays that follow. Each essay may be read as offering insight to the specific issue at hand, but also may be read as, in its own way, aiming at the ultimate purpose of the work as a whole.