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1480 results in Medieval philosophy

Page 57 of 74

  • Chapter 1 - Introduction

  • Edited by Daniel Schwartz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book:
    Interpreting Suárez
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    15 December 2011, pp 1-18

  • Summary

    Francisco Suárez covered a considerable number of canonical philosophical problems. His exposition is always thoughtful and compendious. Without claiming to be exhaustive, the author simply selects a number of central themes such as metaphysics, God, mind, ethics, law, political power and war, within Suárez's work, and relates them to the chapters that compose this book. Suárez's most notorious metaphysical innovations comprise the definition of the subject matter of metaphysics, as 'being insofar as it is real being', his revision of Thomas Aquinas's position on the difference between essence and existence, and his rejection of Aquinas's account of individuation. In the Disputationes Metaphysicae Suárez also discussed, in typically thorough manner, transcendentals, causation, finite and infinite being, substance and accident, categories, God's existence and his nature, modality, quantity, relations and beings of reason.

  • Chapter 3 - The reality of substantial form: Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations xv

  • Edited by Daniel Schwartz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book:
    Interpreting Suárez
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    15 December 2011, pp 39-61

  • Summary

    This chapter traces two sets of arguments given by Suárez in Metaphysical Disputations xv. In the first set he confronts arguments intended to show that substantial forms do not, or indeed cannot, exist. Several of these arguments foreshadow in fairly obvious ways the arguments later deployed by Boyle, Locke, and others writing under their influence. Suárez has a clear if somewhat idiosyncratic conception of substantial form, one articulated, understandably enough, within the framework of his general Aristotelian hylomorphism. Suárez begins his consideration of the anti-substantial form position directly, even rather bluntly. It is important to bear in mind that Suárez's arguments on behalf of substantial form may be judged from two radically different vantage points. There are those who simply deny the phenomena, who think, for example, that there simply are no data of co-incidence, property subordination, or systemic equilibrium to be explained.

  • Chapter 8 - Suárez on distributive justice

  • Edited by Daniel Schwartz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book:
    Interpreting Suárez
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    15 December 2011, pp 163-184

  • Summary

    This chapter offers an exposition of Suárez's theory of distributive justice, which, until very recently, has not been the subject of scholarly attention. Suárez's immediate preoccupations were theological, there is a clear political dimension to his treatment. For Suárez politics provides the perfect platform for testing our intuitions about distributive justice. Suárez's discussion illuminates aspects of distributive justice too often overlooked by contemporary theorists. Suárez maintains that distributive justice is the sovereign's virtue, consisting in meeting and protecting the subjects' rights to acquire and remain in possession of portions of the common stock. These rights are created by a pact or conditional promise that specifies the personal qualities that ground the subject's rights to shares of the common stock. Distributive justice governs not only the fresh allocation of shares of the common stock, but also the conditions under which subjects can continue to own them.

  • Chapter 7 - Obligation, rightness, and natural law: Suárez and some critics

  • Edited by Daniel Schwartz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book:
    Interpreting Suárez
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    15 December 2011, pp 142-162

  • Summary

    Suárez holds a voluntarist conception of obligation, in so far as he takes obligation to depend essentially on the will of a superior, and, in the case of the natural law, on the will of God. Suárez accepts a voluntarist thesis about law. In his view, the character of a law consists partly in a command, and the natural law is a genuine law, measured by this criterion. According to Finnis, Suárez's voluntarist conception of obligation does not fit everything that Suárez wants to say about obligation. Suárez recognizes duties without obligations, because he sees that the expression of will introduces a distinct type of moral relation that is not reducible to a simple duty. He marks this distinct type of moral relation by speaking of 'obligation'. Finnis draws his evidence for Suárez's view of obligation from the treatment of obligation.

  • Chapter 6 - Action and freedom in Suárez's ethics

  • Edited by Daniel Schwartz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book:
    Interpreting Suárez
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    15 December 2011, pp 115-141

  • Summary

    Intentional action for Suárez occurs as the voluntarium, which consists in the occurrence of actions either of the will itself or of other capacities or faculties motivated by the will. Now Suárez's general conception of action is one he fully shares with such influential scholastic predecessors as Scotus and Aquinas. It is natural for many people nowadays to view freedom and law simply as phenomena that are opposed or that are at least in profound tension with each other. On this view, the function of law is to impose necessary constraints on freedom; and human freedom in turn imposes limits on the constraints that law can justifiably impose. For Suárez, the basic or foundational kind of freedom is freedom as a two-way metaphysical power. The distinctiveness of Suárez's view of freedom and the place he gives it in his moral theory can be appreciated by contrasting him with Hobbes.

  • Chapter 9 - Suárez on just war

  • Edited by Daniel Schwartz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book:
    Interpreting Suárez
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    15 December 2011, pp 185-204

  • Summary

    In the pantheon of scholastic just war theorists, a trio stands out: Aquinas, Vitoria, and Francisco Suárez. Of the three, Suárez was by far the most systematic in his treatment of issues relating to war. Suárez approached the question of legitimate authority in terms that had been broadly defined by Aquinas. Suárez did recognize one notable exception to his general rejection of what today is termed 'holy war'. This was a case in which people, subject to a non-Christian prince, wished to accept Christianity against his will. He promoted a moderate Christian exceptionalism on matters relating to just war. An overview of Suárez's teaching on bellum iustum has sought to clarify how he approached the core issue of just cause, and by extension legitimate authority, in relation to the positions staked out by his predecessors, most especially Aquinas, Cajetan, and Vitoria.

  • Chapter 4 - Suárez on the ontology of relations

  • Edited by Daniel Schwartz, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book:
    Interpreting Suárez
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    15 December 2011, pp 62-88

  • Summary

    Relations are a major topic in early modern philosophy, and not only on account of Leibniz. Following Aristotle, Suárez took some relations to be accidents constituting a category of their own. Like most scholastic philosophers and theologians, he considered such categorical relations to be ineliminable and real properties in their subjects, distinct from any other non-relational accidents. The term of a real categorical relation must be an actually existing entity, according to Suárez, and it must be really distinct from the foundation and the subject. Suárez argues against the view that there is a real distinction between foundation and relation on the grounds that it leads to unnecessary ontological profligacy. It could be argued further that if Suárez succeeds in avoiding the danger of undermining the reality of the relation, it is only at the cost of building an incoherent ineliminably relational reference to its term into the absolute foundation.

Page 57 of 74