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A disillusioned Martin Luther was losing his faith until he experienced freedom of conscience with the gospel of grace that he found from his un-authorized re-reading of the Scriptures. This experience stimulated Luther's desire to free the Christian religion from teachings that could burden the human soul. In doing so, he offered a grammar for a Christian theology that is both mystical and liberating. Kirsi Stjerna here offers a contemporary reading of Luther's vision of a religion that is guided by concerns for freedom. Her study first considers Luther's understanding of the profound tension in human experience as simultaneously broken and holy; and second, how he aimed to orient Christians to live with freedom from despair via the security found in being grounded in God. Offering a critical reading of Luther's central insights and teachings, Stjerna invites readers to engage with Luther's story and contemplate the relevance of his theology in contemporary discourse on religion.
Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) made important contributions to ethics, social philosophy, and the philosophy of the body, and was also a prize-winning novelist. Her book The Second Sex (1949) made a huge impact as part of the second wave of feminist thought. This accessible study examines Beauvoir's philosophy across all her works, including not only The Second Sex, The Ethics of Ambiguity and her essays, but also her novels, autobiography, travel diaries and memoirs. Her key ideas are analysed, including freedom and self-creation -- with special attention to their constraints and limitations – solidarity, and the role of other people in a person's existence. Her views of women's lived experience, motherhood, the body, illness, and death are related to our own time, with examples from current affairs, literature, cinema, and social media. The result is a fresh perspective on Beauvoir's philosophy and its enduring power to illuminate existential and social realities.
This is a comprehensive introduction to one of philosophy's deepest and most fascinating puzzles, the Liar Paradox. It introduces key theories of truth and paradox, and combines accessibility with depth, tracing the paradox from its simplest formulations to the most sophisticated contemporary theories. Chapters by leading philosophers and logicians present both classical and non-classical approaches - supervaluationist, paracomplete, paraconsistent, and substructural - and examine broader families of paradoxes alongside general theories of paradoxicality. The volume also explores the paradox's connections to meta-mathematics, modality, vagueness, quantifiers, context-dependence, and natural language semantics, demonstrating its far-reaching significance and its central role in logic, philosophy of language, and theoretical linguistics. Structured for clarity, each chapter introduces key ideas and develops advanced arguments, making the book an essential resource for students, researchers, and professionals seeking a comprehensive understanding of semantic paradoxes and theories of truth.
When faced with a difficult problem or limited information about a novel domain, how do scientists advance their research? As historians of science have widely noted, one strategy common to the natural and the social sciences is to make use of analogy. Formulating hypotheses about an unknown system construed by analogy with what is observed in a more familiar system has repeatedly proven to be a source of discoveries. But what makes analogy such a useful tool for scientific inquiry? Although early reflections trace back to Aristotle, the question of the exact role of analogy in science remains an outstanding one in contemporary philosophy of science. This Element aims to clarify the main epistemological questions at stake and why seemingly obvious answers to them do not survive scrutiny. We provide an overview of the current debate and summarize insights from relevant case studies in the natural and social sciences.
Since Wittgenstein's death in 1951, readers have advanced numerous claims about his philosophy's political significance. Some take his philosophy to have a conservative or reactionary bent; others take it to have a relativistic leaning; yet others associate it with classical liberalism, neo-liberalism, or Marxism. The Political Wittgenstein surveys this terrain in four chapter-length narratives about the development of distinct views of the political significance of Wittgenstein's thought. This Element offers a thorough introduction to the question of a Wittgensteinian approach to political thought. It simultaneously makes a case for reading Wittgenstein's philosophy as, at base, political, liberating and pressingly pertinent.
This Element traces the development of Wittgenstein's views on belief formation throughout the different phases of his philosophy. Section 1 concentrates on the Tractarian period, where the sparse references to belief consist primarily of reactions to Russell. The logical purism of the early Wittgenstein led him to reject psychological stances such as those found in Russell's epistemological works. Section 2 explores Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, focusing on his evolving views on belief formation, influenced by his shift to viewing language as a social practice. It addresses key texts, including The Big Typescript and 'Cause and Effect', and links the psychological mechanisms of belief to Wittgenstein's later grammatical investigations in an analysis that extends to his reflections on mathematics and religion. Section 3 reconstructs the intellectual trajectory that would culminate in On Certainty, tracing the influence of Moore and Newman on the range of belief-forming processes Wittgenstein examines in his final writings.
In recent writings on popular science, there has been much handwringing about the apparently deterministic picture of human decision making suggested by the latest scientific research. Robert Sapolsky's bestselling Determined boldly argues that morality must be reformed because free will has been effectively refuted. But the question of whether free will and morality can be reconciled with a causally determined world is nothing new, nor is it the sort of question that can be answered by scientists. This Element examines how these questions were answered by Spinoza, history's most forceful defender of the claim that all things are necessarily determined, who also was keenly interested in the prospects for morality in a determined world. The Element aims to show that this figure from the past offers a timely and insightful explanation of how we can be free and responsible even if our actions are inevitable.
This Element is about Wittgenstein's engagement with skepticism. Two forms of skepticism will be at the center of this Element: skepticism concerning our knowledge of the 'external world,' and skepticism concerning our knowledge of 'other minds.' It will be shown that Wittgenstein is neither a skeptic nor an anti-skeptic. Rather, Wittgenstein thinks of the skeptic's doubt as a form of denial: a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have. The aim of this Element is to bring out what it means to think of the skeptic's doubt in a Wittgensteinian way, that is, as a doubt that manifests a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have, rather than a philosophical position about the possibility of knowledge that is either true or false and hence an object either of justification or refutation. Wittgenstein's relation to skepticism is therefore unique and highly original.
Hegel referred to Geist as 'self-conscious life' as a being which exists within a 'web' of sense it spins for itself both collectively and individually. As Geist collectively develops itself in history and in theory, it ties 'knots' in various parts of its web which then form the settled basis for further progress. John Dewey spoke of the fundamental 'deposits' laid down in history in the same way Hegel spoke of 'knots.' Both Hegel and Dewey thought that the kinds of obligations necessary in modern political life could only be actualized in terms of a larger conception of the good life individually and collectively led. However, Dewey argued that given the fact of democracy as a 'way of life' and not merely a form of government was the necessary replacement for Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) as the living good in which the watchword is freedom.
This element is a study on Hegel's dialectic. One motivation for turning to dialectic is the idea that in order to understand the complex and dynamic structure of reality and of our thinking itself, we need a different way of thinking from that provided by standard logic and by traditional philosophy. The aim of the book is to present Hegel's basic idea of dialectic and to explain it through an interpretation of the text, an account of its reception, and a survey of themes in the secondary literature. The main theses discussed are that Hegel's dialectic is primarily a method of thinking and that he develops a unified theory of dialectic in his various writings.
This Element focuses on contemporary forms of nativism (belief in innateness), which mostly concern the existence of domain-specific learning mechanisms with innate structure and content. After sketching some innate capacities that are widely believed to be shared with other animals, the Element thereafter discusses a number of (alleged) distinctively-human ones. One concerns a faculty of language, another our capacity for representing the mental states of others (and derivatively, ourselves). It then turns to discuss some proposed innate adaptations that support culture. These include a number of learning biases, as well as affective learning mechanisms that enable swift acquisition of cultural values. The final two sections then discuss 'tribal psychology.' This may include an innate disposition to stereotype social groups as well as innate 'tribal' motivations (both positive and negative). The over-arching thesis of the Element is that human nature might best be thought of as culture-enabling nature.
Traditionally, Christians have viewed unbelief as resulting from moral and/or cognitive shortcomings. However, a recent proposal such as John Schellenberg's 'divine hiddenness argument' for atheism has supported the idea that there is no-fault unbelief. In this Element, the author draws on important insights from medieval Christian thought to argue that both believers and non-believers should stop blaming each other based on mere evidence. Believers may recognise that no-fault unbelief can, in a sense, apply to them, too. They may find it perplexing that they neither believe nor achieve communion with God as much as they would like. Proponents of no-fault unbelief might focus on achieving communion with God rather than solely worrying about absolving themselves of blame. Ultimately, believers and non-believers alike might promote spiritual progress by setting aside the primacy of evidence and committing themselves to God and the good.
An investigation into the metaphysics of the logical properties. Textbooks define logical truth and logical consequence in terms of models. But what are models, and why is invoking them a good way to define these properties? The answers take us through questions about the bearers of logical truth, the distinction between logical and non-logical expressions, and, ultimately, to an account of what logic is.
The doctrine of divine simplicity is an important element of major monotheistic religions; not only Islamic and Jewish but also Christian theologians have affirmed and defended the doctrine. However, the historic doctrine is the subject of intense debate within these traditions. Historic expressions of the doctrine are surveyed, important objections are considered, and arguments in favor of the doctrine are summarized.
Heidegger characterizes the history and essence of metaphysics as ontotheological. Ontotheology concentrates on the being of entities and conceives of this being in two interdependent ways. First, as common to all entities, being serves as the ontological ground for their coherence and intelligibility. Second, being is understood theologically, that is, by recourse to a highest entity that both exemplifies what is common to entities and serves as the causal foundation of entities and their being. Heidegger often speaks of an ontological difference, but what interests him is not simply the difference between entities and their being but what enables us to make this distinction in the first place, that is, being itself. Notoriously, Heidegger accuses the philosophical tradition of neglecting this non-ontotheological, enabling condition. This Element reconstructs and critiques Heidegger's conception of metaphysics as ontotheological. It then examines his non-ontotheological understanding of being itself, God, and divinity.
In this book, Mikael Stenmark identifies and explores several prominent religious and secular worldviews that people in contemporary society hold. Three nonreligious worldviews are highlighted: scientism, secular humanism, and transhumanism. These are contrasted with four religious worldviews: Abrahamic theism, Buddhism, the new spirituality (the so-called 'spiritual but not religious' individuals, SBNR), and religious naturalism. Some challenges facing each of these worldviews are discussed toward the end of each chapter. The book offers a unique study of several key secular outlooks on life that go far beyond previous studies of atheism, nonreligion, and religious 'nones.' It also provides a rare insight into the beliefs, values, and attitudes that secular and religious thinkers consider essential to our identity and place in the world, as well as what we should deeply care about in life.
This Element is an introduction to classical computability theory and scientific efforts to use computability-theoretic notions to explain empirical phenomena. It is written for advanced undergraduates and graduate students in philosophy, assuming no prior exposure to computability theory. Its goals are threefold: (1) to introduce some important theoretical tools and results from classical computability theory; (2) to survey some of the ways these have been used to support explanatory projects in computer and cognitive science; and (3) to outline a few of the more prominent philosophical debates surrounding these projects.
What does it mean to be in the world with others? To what degree is sociality a dimension of our experience? This Element explores the social aspects of our experience as shared and common, focusing on Heidegger's thought on this theme in the period surrounding the publication of Being and Time. It begins by situating Heidegger's position in contrast to alternative phenomenological conceptions of the relations between self and others. From there, it continues to address a key challenge to Heidegger's approach: the problem of Dasein's individuation. Finally, in response to this challenge, the work reframes Heidegger's conception of sociality through the prism of part-whole relations. As social, Dasein emerges as a dependent part of an unfolding shared whole, yet as part of a complex social context, it retains its relative wholeness.
What is wrong with disobedience? What makes an act of disobedience civil or uncivil? Under what conditions can an act of civil or uncivil disobedience be justified? Can a liberal democratic regime tolerate (un)civil disobedience? This Element book presents the main answers that philosophers and activist-thinkers have offered to these questions. It is organized in 3 parts: Part I presents the main philosophical accounts of civil disobedience that liberal political philosophers and democratic theorists have developed and then conceptualizes uncivil disobedience. Part II examines the origins of disobedience in the praxis of activist-thinkers: Henry David Thoreau on civil resistance, anarchists on direct action, and Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. on nonviolence. Part III takes up the question of violence in defensive action, the requirement that disobedients accept legal sanctions, and the question of whether uncivil disobedience is counterproductive and undermines civic bonds.