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A disillusioned Martin Luther was losing his faith until he experienced freedom of conscience with the gospel of grace that he found from his un-authorized re-reading of the Scriptures. This experience stimulated Luther's desire to free the Christian religion from teachings that could burden the human soul. In doing so, he offered a grammar for a Christian theology that is both mystical and liberating. Kirsi Stjerna here offers a contemporary reading of Luther's vision of a religion that is guided by concerns for freedom. Her study first considers Luther's understanding of the profound tension in human experience as simultaneously broken and holy; and second, how he aimed to orient Christians to live with freedom from despair via the security found in being grounded in God. Offering a critical reading of Luther's central insights and teachings, Stjerna invites readers to engage with Luther's story and contemplate the relevance of his theology in contemporary discourse on religion.
Since Wittgenstein's death in 1951, readers have advanced numerous claims about his philosophy's political significance. Some take his philosophy to have a conservative or reactionary bent; others take it to have a relativistic leaning; yet others associate it with classical liberalism, neo-liberalism, or Marxism. The Political Wittgenstein surveys this terrain in four chapter-length narratives about the development of distinct views of the political significance of Wittgenstein's thought. This Element offers a thorough introduction to the question of a Wittgensteinian approach to political thought. It simultaneously makes a case for reading Wittgenstein's philosophy as, at base, political, liberating and pressingly pertinent.
An investigation into the metaphysics of the logical properties. Textbooks define logical truth and logical consequence in terms of models. But what are models, and why is invoking them a good way to define these properties? The answers take us through questions about the bearers of logical truth, the distinction between logical and non-logical expressions, and, ultimately, to an account of what logic is.
This element is a study on Hegel's dialectic. One motivation for turning to dialectic is the idea that in order to understand the complex and dynamic structure of reality and of our thinking itself, we need a different way of thinking from that provided by standard logic and by traditional philosophy. The aim of the book is to present Hegel's basic idea of dialectic and to explain it through an interpretation of the text, an account of its reception, and a survey of themes in the secondary literature. The main theses discussed are that Hegel's dialectic is primarily a method of thinking and that he develops a unified theory of dialectic in his various writings.
This is a comprehensive introduction to one of philosophy's deepest and most fascinating puzzles, the Liar Paradox. It introduces key theories of truth and paradox, and combines accessibility with depth, tracing the paradox from its simplest formulations to the most sophisticated contemporary theories. Chapters by leading philosophers and logicians present both classical and non-classical approaches - supervaluationist, paracomplete, paraconsistent, and substructural - and examine broader families of paradoxes alongside general theories of paradoxicality. The volume also explores the paradox's connections to meta-mathematics, modality, vagueness, quantifiers, context-dependence, and natural language semantics, demonstrating its far-reaching significance and its central role in logic, philosophy of language, and theoretical linguistics. Structured for clarity, each chapter introduces key ideas and develops advanced arguments, making the book an essential resource for students, researchers, and professionals seeking a comprehensive understanding of semantic paradoxes and theories of truth.
This Element launches a broadside against the visual-centric approach that has dominated philosophical and scientific discourse about the senses. Considering the variety and breadth of sensory experiences, from the deceptively familiar territories of smell and taste to the frequently overlooked experience of touch and interoceptive processes, it challenges us to rethink the philosophical bedrock of our theories of mind. It advocates a shift towards a more multi-modal and embodied approach that values biological realities and cross-cultural insights. It analyses traditional criteria for classifying sensory modalities and examines how sensory augmentation technologies provide insight for theories of perception by virtue of sensorimotor learning. The Element also highlights the disconnect between current scientific advancements and philosophical inquiry, suggesting that refocusing on the senses more broadly defined, especially on kinesthetic experiences, illuminates new paths through the thorny 'hard problem' of consciousness. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This Element explores the conceptual complexity of time reversal in the philosophy of physics. It aims to show that time reversal, as a symmetry transformation, should not be regarded as a mere mathematical artifice applied to physical equations. It is rather a conceptually rich and multifaceted notion, one whose meaning and implementation are shaped by a combination of metaphysical commitments and heuristic-methodological strategies. Far from being a neutral tool, the way we define and apply time reversal encodes assumptions about the nature of time itself, its relation to motion, about the role of symmetries in physical theories, and about the relation between mathematical symmetries and the world they purport to describe. Such conceptual complexity also has implication for related debates, such as that of the direction of time.
A sound philosophy of mathematical physics balances a philosophy of mathematics with a philosophy of physics, sharpening the general applicability problem of mathematics by also taking care of: (i) the early modern `mathematization of the world picture'; (ii) the theory-laden character of the targets of mathematical models of modern physics; and (iii): Wigner's `unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences'. Guided by a historical survey, I propose that theories of mathematical physics are meaning-constitutive a priori constructions, conventional but far from arbitrary and best described as hypothetical. Their models subsequently mediate between theory and nature, that is, between the a priori and the a posteriori. Models mediate by playing the role of Wittgensteinian ian yardsticks or objects of comparison to be held against nature as represented by data models, where the comparison is made via surrogative inference. This balancing act compromises realism.
The mathematical method and the nature of mathematical knowledge were subjects of intense philosophical discussion in the 17th and 18th centuries. In particular, there was a debate over whether metaphysical truths admit of distinct proof as geometrical truths do, and whether they may be known with the same degree of certainty. This comparison between geometry and philosophy required a proper understanding of how Euclidean demonstration secured certainty. This element examines attempts by Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, Lambert, Mendelssohn and Kant to address this question. The emphasis is on metaphysical and epistemological questions about geometrical demonstration in the 17th- and 18th-centuries.
This element describes an emerging and intriguing topic: computational indeterminacy. Indeterminacy occurs when a fixed physical system potentially computes several different functions, and there is no fact of the matter which of these is actually being computed by the system. The phenomenon of computational indeterminacy has potential significance for a number of fields, including neuroscience and cognitive science, artificial intelligence (AI), the theory of algorithms, and circuit design. Here we address foundational and philosophical issues. We also explain how the indeterminacy phenomenon impacts on current thinking about the nature of physical computation. Computational indeterminacy is the subject of a growing number of articles in specialist journals, and The Indeterminacy of Computation introduces the topic to a wider audience. The style is clear and informal, with many helpful diagrams. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Hegel referred to Geist as 'self-conscious life' as a being which exists within a 'web' of sense it spins for itself both collectively and individually. As Geist collectively develops itself in history and in theory, it ties 'knots' in various parts of its web which then form the settled basis for further progress. John Dewey spoke of the fundamental 'deposits' laid down in history in the same way Hegel spoke of 'knots.' Both Hegel and Dewey thought that the kinds of obligations necessary in modern political life could only be actualized in terms of a larger conception of the good life individually and collectively led. However, Dewey argued that given the fact of democracy as a 'way of life' and not merely a form of government was the necessary replacement for Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) as the living good in which the watchword is freedom.
This Element is about Wittgenstein's engagement with skepticism. Two forms of skepticism will be at the center of this Element: skepticism concerning our knowledge of the 'external world,' and skepticism concerning our knowledge of 'other minds.' It will be shown that Wittgenstein is neither a skeptic nor an anti-skeptic. Rather, Wittgenstein thinks of the skeptic's doubt as a form of denial: a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have. The aim of this Element is to bring out what it means to think of the skeptic's doubt in a Wittgensteinian way, that is, as a doubt that manifests a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have, rather than a philosophical position about the possibility of knowledge that is either true or false and hence an object either of justification or refutation. Wittgenstein's relation to skepticism is therefore unique and highly original.
The themes of love and loving are often, albeit not always explicitly, present in Kierkegaard's works. It is only his 1847 Works of Love, however, in which the topic serves as a central focus of inquiry. And while at first glance, this text may seem alien to Kierkegaard's poetic existentialism, revolving as it does around the commandment 'You Shall Love Your Neighbour as Yourself' rather than the drama of human existence and the mysteries of the human heart, the thesis that emerges is entirely existential: the capacity for loving is inherent to our very existence as humans. Focussing on Works of Love supported by a few short detours through other texts of Kierkegaard, this Element explores Kierkegaard's view of love as ultimately construing loving as a way of life.
The nature and importance of the Nachlass from Kierkegaard's hand is not well known, especially to researchers outside Denmark. At his death, Kierkegaard left behind an enormous amount of unpublished material in various folders, journals, notebooks, and on loose pieces of paper. This Element includes observations and analyses on various topics, sketches and outlines for possible works, reading and lecture notes, as well as autobiographical reflections. Although there are numerous introductory books about Kierkegaard, none treats the Nachlass in any detail. This Element is an attempt to make this rich and interesting material better known to international Kierkegaard readers. It shows how Kierkegaard's posthumous writings are interesting and valuable on their own and serve to illuminate his well-known published works.
This Element traces the development of Wittgenstein's views on belief formation throughout the different phases of his philosophy. Section 1 concentrates on the Tractarian period, where the sparse references to belief consist primarily of reactions to Russell. The logical purism of the early Wittgenstein led him to reject psychological stances such as those found in Russell's epistemological works. Section 2 explores Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, focusing on his evolving views on belief formation, influenced by his shift to viewing language as a social practice. It addresses key texts, including The Big Typescript and 'Cause and Effect', and links the psychological mechanisms of belief to Wittgenstein's later grammatical investigations in an analysis that extends to his reflections on mathematics and religion. Section 3 reconstructs the intellectual trajectory that would culminate in On Certainty, tracing the influence of Moore and Newman on the range of belief-forming processes Wittgenstein examines in his final writings.
When faced with a difficult problem or limited information about a novel domain, how do scientists advance their research? As historians of science have widely noted, one strategy common to the natural and the social sciences is to make use of analogy. Formulating hypotheses about an unknown system construed by analogy with what is observed in a more familiar system has repeatedly proven to be a source of discoveries. But what makes analogy such a useful tool for scientific inquiry? Although early reflections trace back to Aristotle, the question of the exact role of analogy in science remains an outstanding one in contemporary philosophy of science. This Element aims to clarify the main epistemological questions at stake and why seemingly obvious answers to them do not survive scrutiny. We provide an overview of the current debate and summarize insights from relevant case studies in the natural and social sciences.
Contemporary debates about faith and scepticism are best understood by tracing the development of our current assumptions back to their historical roots. Scepticism, particularly in the west, has its foundation in Socrates' famous claim that his knowledge of his own ignorance made him the wisest of men. Socrates' intellectual humility was then translated into the Christian philosophical tradition, where it came into contact with the doctrines of divine revelation and original sin. This Element will select key historical figures to illustrate the impact that belief in God has had on how we assess the claims of scepticism, and on how scepticism impacts belief in God.
This Element explores Nietzsche's thinking about fate. As a doctrine, fatalism asserts that whatever happens does so necessarily. 'Fate', however, implies an overall pattern for every individual life which imposes its own necessity on the events of that life, although with some contribution from chance. Nietzsche's ideas on fate were influenced by other thinkers, notably Emerson and the ancient Stoics, whom he treats with both sympathy and exasperation. After discussing this context, the Element turns to two of Nietzsche's key themes: amor fati and 'becoming what you are'. In a striking way, each of these 'formulae' presents two contrasted elements standing in a close but tense relationship. Behind them is a conflict between the givenness of fate and our capacity to live our lives in our own way. At the same time, each promises an answer to the question: how are we to live with fate?