Chapter 4 explores how rising perceived threats associated with globalization have led to a backlash, discussed in the newly emerging literature on “deglobalization.” The roots of this deglobalization movement were already evident in fractured globalization. On the one hand, identity needs tend to pull people to the local level but, on the other hand, economic forces are pushing people toward the global level. This sets up competing trends: for example, at the same time that integration into the European Union is ongoing, there is Brexit taking the UK out of Europe, and Scottish nationalism and Irish nationalism pushing to get Scotland and Northern Ireland out of the UK. The backlash against globalization is in part a reaction to perceived threats “against our group, our way of life, our culture, our language, our values, and everything about us” in the face of perceived large-scale “invasions” (examples of such perceived invaders are Mexicans “invading” the USA, Muslims “invading” Europe, Westerners “invading” Islamic societies, and so on).

Chapter 2 explores nationalism, patriotism, and national identity, in relation to immigration. These are constructions that depend largely on context, and can change as circumstances vary. Psychological theories of intergroup relations, that can be applied to relations between host populations and immigrants, are conceptualized as on a continuum. At one end of this continuum are purely material explanations, and at the other extreme are purely psychological explanations.

This chapter looks specifically at neural circuits, assemblies of neurons that influence sensory, motor and cognitive functions. I discuss the conventional criteria for understanding these circuits, which are reductionist in their approach, and highlight various caveats in experimental and conceptual approaches that are routinely followed. I also consider the use of motifs, arrangements of component parts of a circuit that serve specific functions like electronic components. I follow others in highlighting the utility of appealing to motifs, but again highlight caveats of these motifs that mean we cannot assume their presence or the function when we know they are present. I finish by discussing aspects that have been identified over the last few decades that may add to the aspects we need to study, including plasticity, glial cells, variability and ephaptic signals.

There is an established body of research providing clear evidence that certain types of media reporting of suicide, such as sensationalist reporting of celebrity suicides, can produce substantial negative effects. The most notable of these effects is a subsequent increase in the number of suicides. Conversely, emerging evidence also shows that suicide reporting focused on positive narratives of recovery from suicidal thoughts may confer protective benefits and lower subsequent suicide rates. This chapter provides a brief discussion of a possible theoretical mechanism for the impact of media portrayals of suicide on subsequent suicides. It also provides a brief history of research into the effects of fictional and non-fictional media portrayals of suicide, as well as portrayals and discussions of suicide in both traditional and newer media, including social media. The chapter focuses particularly on novel research findings related to suicide and the media. It concludes with a discussion of interventions that attempt to optimize the safety of media portrayals of suicide, and those that attempt to use various types of media proactively for suicide prevention purposes.

This chapter considers reductionism, a major aspect of neuroscience research. I consider reductionist claims that we can only understand nervous systems from knowledge of their component parts. I then consider reductionist approaches and what we have learnt by following them, highlighting that a complete reductionist account of any nervous system region hasn’t been and is probably impossible to achieve. I then discuss decomposable hierarchical and non-decomposable heterarchical systems, and how relational aspects suggest we cannot understand the latter systems from cataloguing their individual components. I then discuss two effects that have received little attention despite being known for decades – volume transmission and ephaptic signalling – that highlight the need to consider component parts in relation to the whole system. I finish by discussing non-reductionist views, equipotentiality, cybernetics, the holonomic brain and embodied cognition, highlighting, as many have in the past, that debating between reductionist and non-reductionist approaches is a false dichotomy.

This chapter looks at social influences on neuroscience. It outlines that science is a social system, and subject to various social pressures that can affect what we study, how we study it, and how we interpret the data we obtain. This includes financial conflicts of interest, claims to priority, scientific prizes, peer review, ‘scientmanship’ that attempts to promote or suppress certain scientific views and scientists, and the recent quantification of social pressures in science from surveys that suggest that social pressures and career structures introduce behaviours that make science a difficult career for those lower in the scientific hierarchy, including racial and sexual biases, and can see those higher up using their prominence to affect how science is done and the claims made. I highlight that awareness of these negative social influences is starting to lead to approaches that aim to address these issues.

In this chapter, clinical practice is addressed from three perspectives. First, what does good clinical practice in suicide prevention look like? Secondly, there are key matters pertaining to how we both maintain patient safety and avoid iatrogenic harm. These include: an excessive focus on risk; the way in which people can and do fall through gaps between services; the continued use of, contrary to evidence, guidance and humane clinical practice, of behavioural management approaches to self-harm and suicidality, and the risks to patients and service users of ‘group think’ and malignant alienation in clinical cultures. Finally, we will consider what needs to be done to maintain positive standards and values in clinical settings.

This chapter focuses on aspects of the philosophy of science, in particular the twentieth century views of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. It briefly covers earlier aspects, including Francis Bacon and William Whewell who highlighted the need for, and influence of, subjective factors in science. In discussing Popper, it considers inductive and deductive reasoning and his falsification approach, while discussion of Kuhn focuses on his view of scientific paradigms, normal science, anomalies and crises, and paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions. It highlights both Popper’s and Kuhn’s views using neuroscience examples, including chemical synaptic transmission, animal electricity and adult neurogenesis. The conclusion is that there is no formal scientific method, no formula for discovery: scientists use, and need to use, a diversity of approaches.

Disease surveillance, particularly of infectious diseases, has a long history. There are many book chapters and articles providing detailed accounts of systematically collated health information [1]. Conventionally, modern health surveillance commences with John Snow’s observations of the epidemic of cholera in London’s Soho district in 1854 [2], culminating in the iconic (but probably ineffective) removal of the handle from Broad Street pump. It is significant that although Snow did not know that the Vibrio cholerae bacterium was the causative organism, surveillance played a part in resolving the epidemic. Disease surveillance has a crucial role in evaluating and shaping responses to major public health problems, as was clearly demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. Not all causes of untimely death or ill health are due to the disease of interest, but surveillance provides a firm foundation for public health interventions of all types [1].

This chapter examines the complex relationship between declining trust, increasing ethnic diversity, and immigration in contemporary societies. Exploring psychological mechanisms such as stereotypes, prejudices, intergroup contact, and perceived threat, the chapter reveals how diversity can challenge and foster societal trust under certain conditions. Theories, including social identity, realistic conflict, and contact hypothesis, illustrate how intergroup perceptions shape trust, especially when natives view immigrants through lenses of ingroup/outgroup distinctions, competition, and cultural threat. While stereotypes and prejudices often undermine trust, structured intergroup contact has shown potential to counteract these adverse effects. Furthermore, the chapter argues that policies promoting inclusive intergroup interaction, equal treatment in labor markets, and educational initiatives can cultivate mutual understanding and trust. By aligning immigration and social policies with these insights, societies can mitigate trust erosion and create a foundation for social cohesion amidst increasing diversity.

Community-level interventions are a key part of suicide prevention. The effectiveness of these strategies vary and objective measurement of the efficacy of these interventions are often challenging. Evidence shows that preventing access to means of suicide in the community, and ongoing education and awareness among primary care healthcare professionals about mental illness and suicide, both are effective, universal-level preventive strategies. Increasing awareness and mental health literacy among young people in schools shows promise, though most evidence is from high-income countries. Trials have demonstrated that brief follow-up contact interventions (BCI), such as sending postcards, text messages or a follow-up phone call, are effective in reducing suicidal ideation and repetition of suicide attempts.

We tend to think that we are prima facie morally entitled to determine the course of our own lives to some degree, and to make our own decisions about matters that are personal to us. Dworkin speaks of our “right to make decisions about the character of [our] lives”. Feinberg suggests that we plausibly have a personal domain over which we are “sovereign” and hence where we “alone” have the final say about “what is to happen”. And Akhlaghi defends the idea that we have a pro tanto or defeasible moral right to “autonomous self-making” – viz. a pro tanto moral right to autonomously decide to make certain “transformative choices” that will influence how our lives will go and who we will become.