The Latin Americans watched with fascination and concern as the dramatic events of November of 1903 progressed in the Isthmus of Panama. There, early in that eventful month, the interests of Panamanian patriots who long had sought the independence of their region from Colombia and of the United States which wanted to begin the construction of a vitally needed inter-ocean canal coincided. The Panamanians declared their independence on November 3, and the presence of United States forces to prevent the suppression of that revolution by Colombia assured its success. On November 6, Secretary of State John Hay ordered the United States consul in Panama to enter into relations with the new government, thereby extending to it de facto recognition. De jure recognition followed on November 13, when Panama's representative to the United States, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was received officially in Washington. Five days later, Hay and Bunau-Varilla signed the treaty which gave to the United States the use, occupation, and control of a zone of land ten miles wide, extending across the isthmus from Colon to Panama City. In effect, Panama ceded sovereignty over that zone. The United States, for its part, guaranteed the independence of Panama, paid the sum of $10,000,000 to the new government, and promised an annual subsidy of $250,000.

After the coup d'etat which established the Estado Nôvo, Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas gradually destroyed two organizations that had helped to create the excited atmosphere in which the events of November 10, 1937 occurred: the Brazilian branch of the German National Socialist Party (NSDAP) and the Ação Integralista Brasileira. Vargas eliminated the first because it was a threat to Brazilian security and sovereignty, the second because it was a danger to his regime. Though apparently Vargas was never serious in his flirtation with the greenshirted Integralistas, he did welcome their support of his government until he consolidated control. Integralista sympathy for and possible connection with Nazi Germany precluded Getúlio's allying himself with the greenshirts but not from using them. He attacked the Nazi Party because it tended to preserve German nationalism among German immigrants and hindered their Brazilianization.

The man of the Revolution disputed the very nature of Mexico with the Roman Catholic. The revolutionary, whether Callista or Cardenista, believed that the church had had a pernicious influence on the history of Mexico. He claimed that Mexico could not become a modern nation until the government had eradicated all the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. The Catholic, on the other hand, was convinced that his religion was the basis of Mexico's nationality. Above all, the Catholic believed that Mexico needed a system of order. He was convinced that his faith had brought order and peace to Mexico in the colonial period, and as the faith declined, Mexico degenerated into anarchy.

The destructive results of the Chaco War have left an indelible mark on Bolivia and Paraguay. This essay has been undertaken to explore the body of diplomatic material regarding the efforts both to prevent and to halt this useless blood-letting, for it is felt that such an essay would be helpful to any person studying the Chaco dispute in the future. It should be made clear, however, that this is not a definitive bibliography, for it has been limited both to material the author believes would be most useful and to material that can be studied in the United States. Since this essay is concerned mainly with diplomatic aspects, it generally has avoided comment on material dealing specifically with the military phases of the dispute. Such material has been discussed, however, when it also contained information relating to diplomatic matters. The military consideration of the Chaco War deserves a bibliography of its own, for there is a continually growing body of material concerning this subject.

On June 26, 1861, Juan A. Quintero, special agent for the Confederate States of America, sat in the palace in Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico, listening to Governor Santiago Vidaurri relate a familiar but nevertheless surprising story. He had long been searching for some method whereby he could effectively resist the federal government, Vidaurri began, and now he hoped that he had found it. Initially he had thought that a Republic of Sierra Madre might be the solution, and many observers on both sides of the Rio Grande felt that this was the course he would pursue. But, for various reasons, that had been discarded. The new Confederacy presented a different alternative—one that he believed might be feasible. Would Southern President Jefferson Davis agree to annex the northern Mexican state of Nuevo León and Coahuila? Thus began a relationship that endured for over three years and did not end until the powerful caudillo fell from power.