In August, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson made one of his numerous attempts to remold Mexico in the image of the United States by sending a special executive agent, John Lind, to hasten the political demise of Provisional President Victoriano Huerta. Having refused Huerta diplomatic recognition because he achieved power by military coup d'etat, Wilson instructed Lind to insist that Huerta arrange an armistice with the Constitutionalists, the revolutionaries who had risen in rebellion rather than accept the usurper's rule. Free elections, in which Huerta was not to be a candidate for President, were to follow the armistice. Following his Anglo-Saxon instincts, Wilson assumed that, if all parties abided by the results of the elections, a constitutionally legitimate government would be installed and the source of Mexico's revolutionary strife would thereby be eliminated.

By The 1920's, the Brazilian population included a rich spectrum of racial and national groups dominated by an elite profoundly European in origin and outlook. At the same time, it was marked by extensive intermixture among the lower classes and public lip-service to racial tolerance, a condition attributed by Gilberto Freyre and others to Brazil's heritage, its physical environment, and its paternalistic division of labor. Most Brazilians believed that economic achievement and ability, not color, determined class standing, subscribing to the hypothesis of Brazil as a racial democracy unique among the nations.

One Of The salient characteristics of 20th century Mexican art and intellectual history has been preoccupation with the problem of national identity, or, put in another fashion, with the problem of defining lo mexicano. Most commonly, concern for lo mexicano and mexicanidad has been associated with the Mexican Revolution. The generally accepted assumption is that inasmuch as the Mexican Revolution was a revolution without ideology, it was not until Mexicans began questioning the meaning of their revolution that they asked—what are we? who are we? Yet, the volume and importance of the intellectual and artistic production of the post-revolutionary period notwithstanding, it is certainly true that Mexicans were concerned with the problem of national identity even before 1910.

On November 20, 1681 the cathedral bell of Lima announced the official arrival of the new Viceroy of Peru, Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata. The streets were decked with bunting and flowers and many people crowded windows and balconies to catch a glimpse of the new Viceroy. Palata, astride a white horse, led a procession of town councilmen, lancers, footmen, and coaches through the capital to the main plaza. There he was greeted by an artillery salute that shook the entire city. Thanking the officials who had accompanied him, Palata entered the viceregal palace and appeared at a window to the acclamation of the multitude.

In 1911 Francisco I. Madero overthrew the Mexican dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Unable to consolidate his initial victory and establish a stable government, Madero presided for sixteen months over the political destruction of the Mexican Republic. Then on February 9, 1913, the counterrevolutionary General Victoriano Huerta came to power following a coup d'etat.

Throughout the period of Madero's presidency the United States and the republics of Latin America had attempted without success to encourage stability in the Mexican Government. In order to begin the quest for a steadying influence in Mexico, John Barrett, the Director-General of the Pan American Union and an experienced American diplomat in Latin America, proposed that the international hemispheric organization mediate the situation, and thus work to insure an essentially Mexican solution to a Mexican problem. To this end Barrett sent a series of letters on February 13, 1913, to President Taft, Presidentelect Wilson and the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explaining his plan. To avoid the further decay of the Mexican situation, which could eventually lead the United States to intervene with force, Director-General Barrett proposed that an international commission of mediation be called under the auspices of the Pan American Union.

Veracruz was the most important strategic point in the defenses of New Spain throughout the three centuries of Spanish occupation. It was the only important commercial center which allowed easy access to the interior highlands of the viceroyalty and as such, attracted any potential invader who might wish either to carry out a raid on commerce or to undertake more ambitious conquests. This study will consider some of the major themes involved in the defense of Veracruz in the last three decades before 1810 to see how such a vital position affected military developments and to test a main theme of recent historical research on the period which has established the origins of praetorian-spirited, privilege-hungry soldiers in the period following the Seven Years War.