This commentary samples some of the major bodies of counterevidence omitted by Howe et al., including the strong relationship between IQ and academic excellence, the limited effects of early stimulation programs, and the measurement of musical aptitudes. The authors' selective review and analysis of the surveyed literature, especially studies of prodigies and in behavioral genetics, is discussed.

Although Howe et al.'s survey shows little evidence for the talent account, it is premature to conclude that individual differences in achievement can be attributed largely to training and early experience. Moreover, such an empiricist account has problematic social implications, especially in cultures in which effort is emphasized. The aptitude account is thus proposed as a third alternative.

Howe et al.'s rejection of traditional discussion of talent is clearly acceptable, but their alternative has a weakness. They stress practice and hard work while referring vaguely to some basic biological substrate. High scores on a valid test of general intelligence provide a cultural-genetic basis for talented performance in a wide variety of specialties, ranging from engineering to the humanities. These choices may be entirely environmentally determined, and the highest levels of achievement do require practice and hard work.

Our recapitulation of the work by Howe et al. is a clear approval of the passages in which the talent concept is critically questioned. On the other hand, Howe et al. must themselves come to terms with most of the accusations they place at the door of talent researchers. The evidence they present to support the experience concept is lacking with respect to current theoretical and methodological standards.

The tautological implications of “innate talents” are outlined. Analogies are drawn between the present review and the nature–nurture controversies of 40 years ago. Ferguson's (1954; 1956) theoretical positions are proposed as a context in which to consider present and future attempts to resolve this long-standing issue.

Innate talents supposedly limit an individual's highest attainable level of performance and the rate of skill acquisition. However, Howe et al. have not reviewed evidence that the level of expert performance has increased dramatically over the last few centuries. Those increases demonstrate that the highest levels of performance may be less constrained by innate capacities than is commonly believed.

Much has been learned about genetic influence on cognitive abilities that might be helpful in thinking about genetic influence on other abilities such as art and sports, which have not yet been investigated using genetic research strategies. Some new findings on cognitive abilities go beyond merely demonstrating genetic influence. Misinterpretations of the meaning of genetic influence are discussed.

Howe et al. have mistaken gene x environment correlations for environmental main effects. Thus, they believe that training would develop the same level of performance in anyone, when it would not. The heritability of talents indicates their dependence on variation in physiological (including neurological) capacities. Talents may be difficult to predict from early cues because tests are poorly designed, or because the skill requirements change at more advanced levels of performance. One twin study of training effects demonstrated greater heritability of physical skill after than before training. In summary, talents are real.

Skills cannot be divided into the innate and the acquired. Also, genetic effects may not come into play until well after early childhood, and evocative gene-environment correlations are to be expected. Special talents are common in autism and warrant more detailed study, but whether they have the same meaning as talents in nonautistic individuals is not known.

Howe et al. proposed that the “talent account” is not suited to explain exceptional performance in specific domains. Their conclusion that early experiences and deliberate practice are highly important for high levels of skill is supported by numerous studies on the acquisition of expertise. However, the two popular views they contrast (experts are born versus experts are made) do not seem representative of current theorizing. Models that integrate the effects of basic abilities and deliberate practice are more appropriate in light of the available evidence.

Support for Howe et al.'s conclusion that musical talent is largely a myth is garnered from the sport literature. One issue germane to the nurture argument is how and when motivation to practice is formed.

The Simonton (1991) study of 120 classical composers may provide evidence for the existence of innate talent. A weighted multiplicative model of talent development provides a basis for evaluating the adequacy of Howe et al.'s conclusions.

Howe and colleagues demonstrate that deliberate practice is necessary for proficient levels of competence, a fact that is uncontroversial. They fail, however, to demonstrate the role of biology in talent, because the studies they cite are almost all irrelevant to the issue.

Whereas the reality of “innate talent” is questioned by the authors, the role of “attributed talent” is not discussed fully. “Attributed talent” is the imputation of high, not yet unfolded ability to an individual. Only if talent is attributed to a novice will resources be invested in the development of expertise. An alternative for estimating future achievement is discussed.

Howe, Davidson & Sloboda's focus on learning has important implications because the amount and quality of training are relevant to all learners, not just those acquiring exceptional abilities. In this commentary, I discuss learning goals as an indicator of learning quality, and suggest that all learners can be guided towards more effective learning by shifting their learning goals.

Deliberate practice and experience may suffice as predictors of expertise, but they cannot account for spectacular achievements. Highly variable environmental and biological factors provide facilitating as well as constraining conditions for development, generating relative plasticity rather than absolute plasticity. The skills of virtuosos and idiots savants are more consistent with the talent account than with the deliberate-practice account.

Current evidence shows that “talent” is an unreliable concept, but the competing concept of “expertise” suffers from inadequacies too: its research designs are structurally incomplete (talent and training are confounded) and individual factors are largely ignored. The deliberate practice account should be advanced by investigating in more detail the motivational and individual determinants of successful practice.

The target article examines the role of practice in the development of excellence in several domains that vary in the degree of innovation involved. The authors do not differentiate domains, but they discuss the development of specifically creative skills only in passing. This commentary presents evidence that practice plays a role in the development of musical composition, through an examination of the careers of Mozart and the Beatles.

Howe et al. fail to provide evidence that practice is sufficient and ignore evidence of high ability before instruction. They unsuccessfully discount savants; provide weak evidence against heritability of music, criticize retrospective evidence selectively, using it when it supports their position; and ultimately both accept and deny talent. Finally, they conflate a scientific question with one of policy.

There is a problem with the definition of talent as presented by Howe et al. that makes it dependent on experts' ability to detect it in the untrained. In addition, the choice of musical performance as the example for innate talent is inappropriate, and musical board results are selective and biased tests of it. Outstanding mathematical reasoning ability offers much better evidence of genetic influence.