Self-protection can have psychological and behavioral implications. We contrast them with the implications of a self-enhancement strategy. Both self-enhancement and self-protection have costs and benefits as survival strategies, and we identify some of the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral tradeoffs associated with the differential preferences for each strategy. New analyses on a large existing data set confirm the target article's hypothesis that women are more attuned than men to potential negative consequences of innovations.

The target article presented a plausible argument that females' susceptibility to threats might be self-protection for staying alive, but some evidence requires scrutiny. We need to consider (1) the biases of narrative reviews, (2) subjective life quality, and (3) the shadow side of extreme reactions to threats before concluding that females' threat-based response is a self-protection mechanism that promotes survival.

Defense of reproductive choice is an important motivation in women's self-protection psychology for which the “staying alive theory” cannot fully account. Evidence indicates that some elements of women's self-protection psychology function to protect reproductive choice rather than survival, or may be equally well explained by either motivation. Integrating perspectives will result in greater explanatory breadth and precision in theory testing.

I ask three questions related to the claims made within the staying alive theory (SAT): Is survival more fitness-enhancing for females than for males? Does the historical record on sex differences in mortality support the SAT? Is it possible to talk about “independent selective pressures on both male and female traits” when all we have are sex/gender comparisons?

Incorporating theoretic insights from ageing biology could advance the “staying alive” hypothesis. Higher male extrinsic mortality can weaken selection against ageing-related diseases and self-preservation, leading to high male intrinsic mortality. This may incidentally result in female-biased longevity-promoting traits, a possibility that will require rigorous testing in order to disentangle from the adaptive self-preservation hypothesis presented in the target article.

The authors propose that many morbidities higher in women than men are adaptations protecting survival, selected because survival has been especially crucial to mothers' reproductive success. Following their lead, I pursue variation in tradeoffs between reproduction and survival recognized by Darwin that were likely central to the evolution of many traits that distinguish us from our great ape cousins.

Extending Campbell's (1999) staying alive theory (SAT) beyond aggression, we reviewed evidence that females are more self-protective than males. Many commentators provided additional supporting data. Sex differences in life-history adaptations, in the optimal relation between survival and reproduction, and in the mechanisms underlying trade-offs involved with self-protection remain important topics with numerous opportunities for improved understanding.

We extend Benenson et al.'s hypothesis from the individual level to the societal level. Because women have highly limited reproductive rates, societies have generally prioritized female survival and regarded males as expendable. We describe various lines of evidence that are consistent with this hypothesis, and we offer additional predictions about differential attitudes toward male versus female endangerment.

Evidence that women voluntarily expose themselves to some threats more than men do challenges the generalizability of the claim that women exceed men in self-protective responses. Examples include women's higher rates of living organ donation and rescuing Jews during the holocaust. In general, women's efforts to keep other people alive can take precedence over their efforts to protect themselves.

The target article takes myriad human female patterns and aligns them as a unit emerging from an expanded version of “staying alive” theory (SAT). Females and males do differ, however, to treat the complexity of human response to threats as an explicit, evolved sexually dimorphic package is not reflective of current knowledge regarding health, sex/gender, and behavior in Homo sapiens.

Extended staying alive theory (SAT) raises the issue of the extent to which its various attributes are linked or whether they provide alternative means to the same adaptive ends. Theories such as SAT that consider an array of sex differences may benefit from the application of the multivariate D statistic, rather than using a series of d values, as is common at present.

Staying alive theory explains why women have more effective self-protective mechanisms in terms of woman's role as a mother and caregiver. This theory reinforces stereotypes and the relationship of oppression and submission to men. Somewhat paradoxically, it also points to women's lower quality of life, which may be explained by their greater fear of threats caused by men's power.

We argue that Benenson et al. need to consider not only sex differences in the effects of care on offspring survival but also in age-specific fertility when predicting how longevity affects fitness. We review evidence that staying alive has important effects on both women's and men's fitness, and encourage consideration of alternative explanations for observed sex differences in threat responses.

Sex/gender is a continuous variable that researchers frequently treat as dichotomous. This practice can mask continuous underlying adaptive traits and yield spurious dichotomous “sex differences.” As such, many sex differences in self-protection may be evolutionary by-products of underlying adaptations rather than adaptations themselves. Binary analysis of continuous sex/gender is ill-considered science that can contribute to inequality and counterproductive public policy.

Benenson et al. postulate that human females evolved unique survival adaptations to facilitate maternal and grandmaternal care. This hypothesis is consistent with the broader hypothesis that female phenotypes are more ecologically optimal, but further evidence is needed to make a compelling case that sex differences in self-protection are not primarily the result of more intense sexual selection on males.

Pietraszewski contends that group representations that rely on a “containment metaphor” fail to adequately capture phenomena of group dynamics such as shifts in allegiances. We argue, in contrast, that social categories allow for computationally efficient, richly structured, and flexible group representations that explain some of the most intriguing aspects of social group behaviour.

Group representations based on recursive utilities can be used to derive the same predictions as Pietraszewski in conflict situations. Additionally, these representations generalize to non-conflict situations, asymmetric relationships, and represent the stakes in a conflict. However, both proposals fail to represent asymmetries of power and responsibility and to account for generalizations from specific observed individuals to collections of non-observed individuals.

Group representations need not reduce to triadic conflict roles, although we infer group membership from them. A conceptual primitive of <group> as one solidary, bounded unity or clique may motivate and facilitate reasoning about cooperative group interactions in context with and without intergroup conflict and may also be necessary for representing which agents would replace one another in a triadic conflict.

We welcome a computational theory on social groups, yet we argue it would benefit from a broader scope. A neuroscientific perspective offers the possibility to disentangle which computations employed in a group context are genuinely social in nature. Concurrently, we emphasize that a unifying theory of social groups needs to additionally consider higher-level processes like motivations and emotions.

Central to Pietraszewski's theory is a set of group-constitutive roles within four triadic primitives. Although some data from the developmental and biological sciences support Pietraszewski's theory, other data raise questions about whether similar behavioral expectations hold across various ecological conditions and interactions. We discuss the potential for a broader set of conceptual primitives that support reasoning about groups.