I respond to three continuing commentaries on Beyond modularity, two concerning the representational redescription (RR) framework and its attempts to account for the growing flexibility of human intelligence, and one relating to the putative mysteries of developmental timing. I discuss misunderstandings about the RR framework as well as some of its shortcomings. I strongly reject the notion of a genetic clock and go on to argue for epigenetic outcomes in which genes and environment interact during the protracted period of postnatal brain development.

The worldwide variation in mating strategies can be explained by differential paternal investment theory, which traces the differences back to the climates where the various peoples (races) evolved. Male provisioning is necessary for women and children to survive cold winters, which is less essential for tropical women. Androstenone may be the substance that makes symmetrical men smell better to fertile females.

The notion of a “familiar example” used in Page's definition of a “localist model” is shown to be meaningful only with respect to the types of tasks faced by the connectionist model. It is also shown that the modeling task ultimately dictates which choice of model: “localist” or “distributed” is most appropriate.

Gangestad & Simpson's account of the role of good-gene sexual selection in conditional human mating strategies is reasonably convincing, but could be more so with a little more attention to (1), dropping unnecessary sub hypotheses and especially (2) the inclusion of alternative evolutionary explanations.

The standard dogmatism ignores the fact that neural coding is extremely flexible, and the degree of “coarseness” versus “locality” of representation in real brains can be different under different task conditions. The real question that should be asked is: What is the operating point of neural coding under natural behavioural conditions? Several sources of evidence suggest that under natural conditions some degree of distribution of coding pervades the nervous system.

Gangestad & Simpson's central premise regarding individual differences is applied to their facultative-argument based on mating- strategy, for individual differences in susceptibility to contextual effects. Some individuals may be relatively fixed strategists who are rather unresponsive to context when it comes to mating, whereas others, perhaps most, may be, as G&S propose, flexible strategists.

No crucial experiment demonstrates that four hue categories are needed to describe color appearance. Instead, converging lines of evidence suggest that the terms red, yellow, green, and blue are sufficient and precise enough for deriving color discrimination functions and for a useful model constraining relations between color appearance and neuronal responses. Such a model need not be based on linguistic universals. Until something better is available, this “standard model” holds.

An extensive survey by Heathcote et al. (in press) found that the Law of Practice is closer to an exponential than a power form. We show that this result is hard to obtain for models using leaky competitive units when practice affects only the input, but that it can be accommodated when practice affects shunting self-excitation.

The distinction made by Page between localist and distributed representations seems confounded by the distinction between competitive and associative learning. His manifesto can also be read as a plea for competitive learning. The power of competitive models can even be extended further, by simulating similarity effects in forced-choice perceptual identification (Ratcliff & McKoon 1997) that have defied explanation by most memory models.

Page has performed an important service by dispelling several myths and misconceptions concerning the localist approach. The localist position and computational model presented in the target article, however, are overly restrictive and do not address the representation of complex conceptual items such as events, situations, actions, and plans. Working toward the representation of such items leads to a more sophisticated and articulated view of the localist approach.

There is a large body of research on conflict in nonhuman animal groups that measures the costs and benefits of intergroup conflict, and we suggest that much of this evidence is missing from De Dreu and Gross's interesting article. It is a shame this work has been missed, because it provides evidence for interesting ideas put forward in the article.

We argue that how players perceive the attack-defense game might matter far more than its actual underlying structure in determining the outcomes of intergroup conflict. Leaders can use various tactics to dynamically modify these perceptions, from collective victimization to the distortion of the perceived payoffs, with some followers being more receptive than others to such leadership tactics.

Attempts to understand the fundamental forces shaping conflict between attacking and defending groups can be hampered by a narrow focus on humans and reductionist, oversimplified modelling. Further progress depends on recognising the striking parallels in between-group conflict across the animal kingdom, harnessing the power of experimental tests in nonhuman species and modelling the eco-evolutionary feedbacks that drive attack and defence.

With respect to De Dreu and Gross's article, we comment on the psychological functions for attack and defense, focusing on associations between individual differences in psychopathic personality traits and the behavioral patterns observed in attack-defense conflicts. We highlight the dimensional nature of psychopathy and formulate hypothetical associations between distinct traits, their different behavioral outcomes, and associated brain mechanisms.

The distinction between attackers and defenders might help refine the understanding of the role of emotions in conflicts. Here, we briefly discuss differences between attackers and defenders in terms of appraisals, action tendencies, emotional preferences, and brain activities. Finally, we outline how attackers and defenders may differ in their response to emotion-based interventions that aim to promote conflict resolution.

We argue that adopting a sociocultural lens to the origins of intergroup bias is important for understanding the nature of attacking and defending behavior at a group level. We specifically propose that the potential divergence in the development of in-group affiliation and out-group derogation supports De Dreu and Gross's framework but does indicate that more emphasis on early sociocultural input is required.

The target article focuses on how attacker-defender conflicts are fought. This commentary complements it by considering how attacker-defender conflicts may be resolved at the bargaining table. I highlight multiple linkages between asymmetric intergroup conflict as modeled with the attacker-defender game and negotiation research and illustrate how the proposed model of attacker-defender conflicts can inspire new research on intergroup negotiation.

Gain or omission/termination of loss produces approach; while loss or omission/termination of gain produces withdrawal. Control of approach/withdrawal motivation is distinct from valuation of gain/loss and does not entail learning – making “reward” and “punishment” ambiguous. Approach-withdrawal goal conflict engages a neurally distinct Behavioural Inhibition System, which controls “anxiety” (conflict/passive avoidance) but not “fear” (withdrawal/active avoidance).

Modern societies are characterized by group-based hierarchies. Similar to attackers, disadvantaged-group members wish to change the status quo; like defenders, advantaged-group members wish to protect it. However, the psychological arrays that are typical of disadvantaged- and advantaged-group members are opposite to those of attackers and defenders – suggesting that the Attacker-Defender Game does not capture the dynamics between advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

The contribution by De Dreu and Gross oversimplifies the complexity of the topic. I provide counterarguments that undermine the two sweeping contentions on which the article's argument depends, and I argue that asymmetric conflict is best understood at the finer-grained level of studying the sequences of strikes and counterstrikes that the rival actors have in store for one another.