The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.

The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.

The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.

Most rhythmic behaviors are produced by a specialized ensemble of neurons found in the central nervous system. These central pattern generators (CPGs) have become a cornerstone of neuronal circuit analysis. Studying simple invertebrate nervous systems may reveal the interactions of the neurons involved in the production of rhythmic motor output. There has recently been progress in this area, but due to certain intrinsic features of CPGs it is unlikely that present techniques will ever yield a complete understanding of any but the simplest of them. The chief impediment seems to be our inability to identify and characterize the total interneuronal pool making up a CPG. In addition, our general analytic strategy relies on a descriptive, reductionist approach, with no analytical constructs beyond phenomenological modeling. Detailed descriptive data are usually not of sufficient depth for specific model testing, giving rise instead to ad hoc explanations of mechanisms which usually turn out to be incorrect. Because they make too many assumptions, modeling studies have not added much to our understanding of CPCs; this is due not so much to inadequate simulations as to the poor quality and incomplete nature of the data provided by experimentalists.

A basic strategy that would provide sufficient information for neural modeling would include: (1) identifying and characterizing each element in the CPG network; (2) specifying the synaptic connectivity between the elements; and (3) analyzing nonlinear synaptic properties and interactions by means of the connectivity matrix. Limitations based on our present technical capabilities are also discussed.

Dual functional brain asymmetry refers to the notion that in most individuals the left cerebral hemisphere is specialized for language functions, whereas the right cerebral hemisphere is more important than the left for the perception, construction, and recall of stimuli that are difficult to verbalize. In the last twenty years there have been scattered reports of sex differences in degree of hemispheric specialization. This review provides a critical framework within which two related topics are discussed: Do meaningful sex differences in verbal or spatial cerebral lateralization exist? and, if so, Is the brain of one sex more symmetrically organized than the other? Data gathered on right-handed adults are examined from clinical studies of patients with unilateral brain lesions; from dichotic listening, tachistoscopic, and sensorimotor studies of functional asymmetries in non-brain-damaged subjects; from anatomical and electrophysiological investigations, as well as from the developmental literature. Retrospective and descriptive findings predominate over prospective and experimental methodologies. Nevertheless, there is an impressive accummulation of evidence suggesting that the male brain may be more asymmetrically organized than the female brain, both for verbal and nonverbal functions. These trends are rarely found in childhood but are often significant in the mature organism.