The idea that consciousness and complexity are closely related has been a major driver of the popularity of integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness, despite its major formal, phenomenological, and neuroscientific shortcomings. Here, I argue that we can recover this intuition by replacing its biologically neutral notion of complexity with an evolutionary one that I shall dub “pathological complexity.”

Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf argue persuasively that integrated information is not identical to or sufficient for consciousness, and that projective geometries more closely formalize the spatial features of conscious phenomenology. However, these too are not identical to or sufficient for consciousness. Although such third-person specifiable functional theories can describe the many forms of consciousness, they cannot account for its existence.

Integrated information theory (IIT) is an example of “ironic science” and obstructs the scientific study of consciousness. By confusing the ontological status of a method to quantify network complexity with that of a theory of consciousness, IIT has to square the circle and spirals toward its panpsychism conclusion. I analyze the consequences of this fallacy and suggest how the study of consciousness can be brought back into the realm of rational, empirical science.

The study of sleep and wakefulness can inform debates about the nature of consciousness. We argue that sleep and wakefulness fall along a multidimensional continuum and that inconsistencies and paradoxes with the accounts put forth by Merker et al. and Tononi can be understood in terms of a pervasive false dichotomy between these two states.

In our response to a truly diverse set of commentaries, we first summarize the principal topical themes around which they cluster, then address two “outlier” positions (the problem of consciousness has been solved vs. is intractable). Next, we address ways in which commentaries by non-integrated information theory (IIT) authors engage with the specifics of our IIT critique, turning finally to the four commentaries by IIT authors.

This article questions the widespread use of experimental social psychology to understand real-world group disparities. Standard experimental practice is to design studies in which participants make judgments of targets who vary only on the social categories to which they belong. This is typically done under simplified decision landscapes and with untrained decision-makers. For example, to understand racial disparities in police shootings, researchers show pictures of armed and unarmed Black and White men to undergraduates and have them press “shoot” and “don't shoot” buttons. Having demonstrated categorical bias under these conditions, researchers then use such findings to claim that real-world disparities are also due to decision-maker bias. I describe three flaws inherent in this approach, flaws which undermine any direct contribution of experimental studies to explaining group disparities. First, the decision landscapes used in experimental studies lack crucial components present in actual decisions (missing information flaw). Second, categorical effects in experimental studies are not interpreted in light of other effects on outcomes, including behavioral differences across groups (missing forces flaw). Third, there is no systematic testing of whether the contingencies required to produce experimental effects are present in real-world decisions (missing contingencies flaw). I apply this analysis to three research topics to illustrate the scope of the problem. I discuss how this research tradition has skewed our understanding of the human mind within and beyond the discipline and how results from experimental studies of bias are generally misunderstood. I conclude by arguing that the current research tradition should be abandoned.

The flaws in social psychological research pointed out by Cesario have societal costs. These include ignoring crucial base rates thereby degrading the effectiveness of policy decisions, generalizing the conclusions derived from experiments on non-professionals thereby distorting the public's view of professional law enforcement personnel, questionable accusations of racism, and mis-attributions of the causes of racial differences in behavior.

Judgments differ from decisions. Judgments are more abstract, decontextualized, and bear fewer consequences for the agent. In pursuit of experimental control, psychological experiments on bias create a simplified, bare-bone representation of social behavior. These experiments resemble conditions in which people judge others, but not how they make real-world decisions.

Decisions are affected by the potential consequences as much as any factor during the decision-making process. This prospective influence represents another flaw overlooked by most experiments that raises questions about the use of certain laboratory paradigms. Lethal force encounters are a prime example of this problem, where negative consequences of slow decisions and wrong decisions should be considered alongside behavior.

This commentary expands the discussion of Cesario's Missing Forces Flaw by identifying and discussing variables that influence police shooting decisions but are often absent from bias-based research. Additionally, the closing identifies novel recommendations for future contextually related research.

We endorse Cesario's call for more research into the complexities of “real-world” decisions and the comparative power of different causes of group disparities. Unfortunately, these reasonable suggestions are overshadowed by a barrage of non sequiturs, misdirected criticisms of methodology, and unsubstantiated claims about the assumptions and inferences of social psychologists.

Cesario provides a compelling critique of the use of experimental social psychology to explain real-world group disparities. We concur with his targeted critique and extend “the problem of missing information” to another common measures of bias. We disagree with Cesario's broader argument that the entire enterprise be abandoned, suggesting instead targeted utilization. Finally, we question whether the critique is appropriately directed at experimental social psychologists.

Causal mechanisms' portability and their predictions in sometimes counterfactual settings point to the value of studies with details of interactions and/or convenience samples that depart from those in the proximate contexts of the phenomena of interest. The proper role of such contexts must be construed within an explanatory framework attentive to the nature and properties of relevant causal mechanisms.

We comment on Cesario's assertion that social psychological intergroup research focuses solely on stereotypes, neglecting actual differences between groups to explain group disparities. This reasoning, however, misses yet another explaining force: In addition to stereotypes, ample laboratory and field research documents relationships between group disparities, discrimination, and prejudice, which cannot be explained by people's accurate judgments of real-world group differences.

Cesario claims that all bias research tells us is that people “end up using the information they have come to learn as being probabilistically accurate in their daily lives” (sect. 5, para. 4). We expose Cesario's flawed assumptions about the relationship between accuracy and bias. Through statistical simulations and empirical work, we show that even probabilistically accurate responses are regularly accompanied by bias.

Cesario misrepresents or ignores data on real-world racist and sexist patterns and processes in an attempt to discredit the assumptions of implicit bias experimentation. His position stands in stark contradiction to substantive research across the social sciences recognizing the widespread, systematic, and structuring processes of racism and sexism. We argue for centering the relationship between structural racism and individual bias.

A growing trend, reflected in the target article, effectively shifts control of prejudice operationalization to align with right-leaning priorities (and away from disadvantaged groups' voices and social justice). The article would only be compelling if experiments misaligned with real-world findings, if experimenters ignored nuances and moderators, and if the call to consider the social context included the macro-level societal context.

We agree with Cesario's premise but reject his conclusion: Although experimental studies of racial stereotyping, weapons perception, and shoot decisions typically exclude real-world contextual factors and thus have limited relevance to race disparities (e.g., in policing), these excluded factors comprise systemic, institutional, and individual-level biases that are more likely to amplify racial disparities than negate them.

Cesario's analysis has three key flaws. First, the focus on whether an effect is “real” (an “effects flaw”) overlooks the importance of theory testing. Second, obsession with effects (a “fetishization flaw”) sidelines theoretically informed questions about when and why an effect may arise. Third, failure to take stock of cultural and historical context (a “decontextualization flaw”) strips findings of meaning.

We highlight several sets of findings from the past decade elucidating the relationship between implicit social cognition and real-world inequality: Studies focusing on practical ramifications of implicit social cognition in applied contexts, the relationship between implicit social cognition and consequential real-world outcomes at the level of individuals and geographic units, and convergence between individual-level and corpus-based measures of implicit bias.