Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are permeating all domains of our lives. Aside from the many opportunities they raise, their deployment can also hamper individual and societal interests. To counter these risks, regulators across the globe are therefore adopting normative initiatives to govern the technology. While these mostly consist of the promulgation of ethics guidelines and non-binding recommendations, the European Union (EU) opted for binding rules instead. In Spring 2024, it adopted a landmark regulation titled the Artificial Intelligence Act. The Act entered into force on August 1, 2024, and most of its provisions become applicable after two years. Since it systematically and punctiliously regulates the use of AI across sectors rather than focusing on a specific application domain, the AI Act is heralded as the first legal instrument of its kind. Its trendsetter status in the global AI regulatory landscape, coupled with its extraterritorial scope, means the Act is likely to shape the course of AI's uptake in Europe and beyond.

On July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered an advisory opinion on Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem. By votes of 11–4, the Court found that Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) was unlawful and needed to be ended as rapidly as possible. By a 14–1 majority, the Court also found that Israel was obligated to cease all new settlement activities, evacuate existing settlers from the OPT, and make reparation. The ICJ further opined by votes of 12–3 that all states and international organizations were obliged not to recognize as legal the situation arising from Israel's unlawful presence in the OPT, that all states must refrain from giving aid or assistance to the maintenance of that situation, and that the United Nations “should consider the precise modalities” required to bring Israel's unlawful presence in the OPT to an end.

While the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques offers great promise to society, there is growing public concern about AI's impact on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.1 As a consequence, many international organizations have developed legal frameworks for AI governance. These began with the Universal Guidelines for AI (2018), the OECD AI Principles (2019), later adopted by the G20 nations, the UNESCO Recommendation on AI Ethics, and most notably, the EU Artificial Act, a comprehensive framework for the regulation of AI.

The Artemis Accords (the Accords) reproduced below were signed on September 13, 2020, by the administrator of the U.S. space agency, NASA, and seven other space agencies. The intervening years since then have underscored their importance: they may give a boost to the development of the legal regime of outer space exploration and use as defined by the existing treaty framework, while supporting the U.S. interpretation of the non-appropriation principle, or they may upset the existing legal regime of Outer Space, leading to its fragmentation by abandoning multilateralism. This introductory note highlights those aspects of the Accords that may affect the edifice of the international law relating to Outer Space, even if the Accords themselves are not legally binding, as explained briefly below.

The Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (the Framework) was adopted at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on December 19, 2022. Despite the efforts made under the CBD, biodiversity loss has continued at an alarming rate, and the targets set under the Convention's Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 were not fully achieved. In 2018, the CBD Parties therefore adopted a decision to develop a post-2020 global biodiversity framework to guide international efforts towards the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity over the next decade. The Framework, the adoption of which was delayed by two years by the COVID-19 pandemic, succeeds and replaces the 2011–2020 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and its accompanying Aichi Targets. The Framework includes four overarching goals and twenty-three accompanying targets to be achieved by 2030, together with four long-term goals to achieve the 2050 Vision for Biodiversity.

On February 9, 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its reparations judgment in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) case. This followed from its December 19, 2005 merits judgment, which found that Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had violated international law vis-à-vis each other and were obliged to make reparations to each other. The ICJ ultimately held that, over five annual instalments of US$65 million from September 1, 2022 until September 1, 2026, Uganda was to pay the DRC a total of US$325 million for damage to persons, damage to property, and damage related to natural resources.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 constitutes a landmark in the development of International Criminal Law (ICL), which gained its first momentum after World War II through the foundation of International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. ICL is, however, not confined to these most prominent courts or their statutes providing for definitions of international crimes under their respective jurisdiction; rather, ad hoc international, or internationalized and hybrid special tribunals and criminal chambers also contribute to the development and shape of ICL and reflect its diverse legal and institutional basis. Perceived as another tribunal of “international character,” on August 18, 2020, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) pronounced its judgment on the merits in the Ayyash case. The long-awaited verdict raises the question of the Tribunal's contribution to the further evolution of ICL.

Genocide is the denial of the right of existence of a human group committed by intentional killing, destruction, or extermination of the group. Prohibited under international law as a jus cogens norm, it cannot be derogated from by international agreement or national legislation and imposes obligations erga omnes. Genocide is also an international crime, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war. On January 26, 2024, the ICJ delivered a provisional measures order (First PMO) requiring Israel to comply with its obligations under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) in relation to its military operations in the Gaza Strip. The Court found a plausible risk of Israel committing and/or inciting acts of genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and demanded, inter alia, that it prevent all such acts, in particular killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.

On April 9, 2024, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) seated in Strasbourg released its judgment in the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Switzerland case, which marks the first occasion where the Court found a violation of several rights of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) in a climate change litigation case.