International organization as a field of study is where the action is. The analytical shifts leading up to the current preoccupation with international regimes have been both progressive and cumulative. And the field is pursuing its object of study in innovative ways that are bringing it closer to the theoretical core of more general international relations work. As we point out, however, the study of regimes as practiced today suffers from the fact that its epistemological approaches contradict its basic ontological posture. Accordingly, more interpretive strains, commensurate with the intersubjective basis of international regimes, should be included in the prevailing epistemological approaches. In addition, as a result of its enthusiasm for the concept of regimes, the field has tended to neglect the study of formal international organizations. Interpretive epistemologies can also help to link up the study of regimes with the study of formal international organizations by drawing attention to the roles these organizations play in creating transparency in the behavior and expectations of actors, serving as focal points for the international legitimation struggle, and providing a venue for the conduct of global epistemic politics.

World politics is commonly referred to as anarchic, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian “war of all against all” does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, however, that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.

After laying out a typology of international regimes, eight international and regional human rights regimes are analyzed in order to (1) examine the utility of regime analysis in noneconomic issue-areas, and (2) assess the nature, extent, and evolution of international cooperation on human rights. There has been a remarkable growth of international action since 1945, when human rights were not even widely accepted as a legitimate issue-area. This growth can be explained largely by expanding perceptions of moral interdependence and community, increased national commitment, the growing ideological appeal of human rights, and changes in the distributions of international power. These same factors, however, suggest only limited future growth. On a broader theoretical plane, the case of human rights suggests a significant, if limited and principally heuristic, utility for regime analysis, especially to the extent that international relations is becoming increasingly concerned with specific issues.

Have scholars properly understood, anticipated, predicted, and in any way helped to shape international organization developments since 1945? Or have they merely reported on events as they unfolded, shifting their research foci from one momentary concern to another in response to the ebb and flow of conditions in the world around them? One pattern that characterizes the maturation of the field of international organization in the postwar era is the steady disengagement of international organization scholars from the study of organizations, so that today one must question whether such a field exists any longer except in name only. The discussion traces the rise and fall of international organization as a field of study, first describing the origins and the evolution of the field, then analyzing the failure of international organization scholars generally to anticipate or shape international organization developments, and finally offering some suggestions for reviving the field and the institutions themselves which are its raison d'être.

The similarity of state structures throughout Eastern Europe helps to explain why the reactions of states in that area to the international economic disturbances of the past decade resemble each other and why they differ from those of states outside the socialist bloc. Similar state structures, however, do not explain why the economic strategies of the East European states themselves in response to international economic shocks in the 1970s and 1980s diverged so noticeably. The role of state structure is to define “kto/kovo” (who can do what to whom) relationships in the state and economy. In this way state structures define problems that political leaders must solve, possibilities among which they may choose, and political resources and allies upon which they may draw in the course of their decision making. In contrast, strategy choices–“what is to be done”–are the outcomes of political processes in which leaders mobilize resources and allies to capture positions of power from which they can pursue the purposes they advocate. Thus differences in foreign economic strategies among member states in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance reflected differences in the dynamic interaction of the form and content of political processes that occurred within common state structures.

Many of the current theoretical debates in international relations focus on the connection between economics and security policies. Most traditional North American textbooks have considered the two policy areas as separate domains. Some scholars view the major economic trends and events of the 1970s as intertwined, whereas others argue that “state” interests properly should prevail when the two sets of values conflict. The traditional liberal, mercantilist, and neo-Marxist literatures shed some light on the nexus between politics and economics in foreign policy, but they offer very general statements that reflect only the conditions of the major powers. Two case studies of Japan and Finland in the postwar period suggest that generalizations must be applied cautiously, that some states are compelled to follow mercantilist policies to protect their political independence and autonomy, and that policies of welfare maximization often have to be subordinated to security concerns. The cases also reveal that the connection between economic and security concerns changes over time. A dynamic model of foreign policy will thus have to be sensitive both to the peculiar circumstances of a variety of states and to the sources of foreign-policy change.

In a recent paper, Barry Buzan disputes the widespread theory that associates a liberal international economic structure positively, and a mercantilist structure negatively, with international security. We do not take issue with Buzan's arguments on this point; rather we disagree with some of his assumptions concerning the relationship between mercantilistic policies and the international economic order. Those of Buzan's points that we question represent generally accepted views in the literature on mercantilism

Buzan's definition of mercantilism focuses essentially if not exclusively on protectionist trade policies. We prefer a more general definition based on Keynesian and post-Keynesian literature. By including the macroeconomic goals of neomercantilism, this definition accounts for a country's foreign economic policy.

The WHO/UNICEF International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes was passed by the 1981 World Health Assembly. Subsequent arrangements between the Nestlé Corporation and its nongovernmental critics for the implementation of the code indicate what is possible within the normative framework of an emerging regime on investment and transnational corporations. In the baby food case the context was particularly positive. A high level of consensual knowledge, the successful strategies of nongovernmental organizations, the susceptibility of the involved industries to pressure, the brevity of deliberations, and the conducive atmosphere of the international organization setting all helped negotiators to develop a detailed code of marketing. Actions inside and outside the UN system combined to delegitimize commonly accepted practices, modify global marketing schemes, and alter national health care practices. In other issue-areas, however, such as Pharmaceuticals, the same positive convergence of factors does not yet exist, and the achievement of equally precise codes will be more difficult.

If a “structural” theory is one that purports to explain behavior in terms of environmental conditions and that largely eschews analysis of the internal processes of decision makers, then it is difficult to identify a theory of commercial policy which is not “structural.” Most microeconomic theory is structural; so are most balance-of-power theories. In the realm of theories of commercial policy, hegemonic stability theories as well as some recently developed theories of international tariff levels fit this description. In the latter category Judith Goldstein's work, which attempts to account for American commercial policy in terms of the ideology of American central decision makers, and Charles Kindleberger's ambitious sketch of a general theory of 19th-century tariff changes in terms of the diffusion of liberal ideology constitute lonely examples of nonstructural research strategies.

The responses of East European states to changing international economic opportunities and constraints during the 1973–84 period are examined and contrasted with a sample of newly industrializing countries, including Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Mexico, Brazil, and Yugoslavia. The effects of external economic shocks and internal policy choices on balance-of-payments difficulties and borrowing requirements in the mid-1970s are assessed. With the exception of Korea, all the countries that chose to borrow heavily at this time, including all of the East European countries, confronted a debt crisis by the early 1980s and were compelled to introduce austerity measures. Economic performance under austerity is compared in terms of the policy instruments different countries used and their effects on output growth, distributional goals, the balance of payments, and debt levels. Long-term effects of the debt crisis on development strategy and economic and political structure are also considered.

Brazil's domestic computer industry, developed during the past decade, has excluded multinational giants such as IBM from Brazil's growing micro- and minicomputer markets. Changes in computer technology and in markets, as well as in domestic economic and political conditions, helped facilitate Brazil's progress toward technological independence. But primary support for the project came from technocratic and military elites who were determined for ideological reasons to reduce Brazil's computer dependency and to challenge the dominance of multinationals. Ideologically motivated technocrats used their positions in state bureaucracies to convince policy makers of the industry's viability and to set up institutions that would defend the autonomy model and turn a sectoral policy into a national policy. Brazil still depends on foreign software and microelectronics; however, bargaining theory correctly asserts that even dependency in sophisticated technological sectors can be partially overcome. Bargaining theories must not overlook the importance of cognitive and institutional processes, which can make the difference between taking action to reduce dependency or doing nothing.

The recent revival of the discipline of political economy challenges purely economic explanations of economic growth, technological innovation, and sectoral change. This approach recognizes that political actors, institutions, and strategies to organize the economic process together shape the economic development of industrial societies. Whereas economists have emphasized determinants of growth such as savings and investment rates, degrees of domestic and international competition in an industry, or the supply of labor, the new political economists view the political definition of property rights, the nature of state intervention in the economy, the resources of politically mobilized groups, and political actors' belief systems as critical determinants of economic transformations. Both economists and political economists, however, share the assumption that actors are rational; they pursue their interests in a calculated manner within a given system of institutional constraints.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is primarily a forum for bilateral bargaining between the Soviet Union and each of the other CMEA countries. The bilateral negotiations are conducted with tremendous concern for Soviet long-term preferences and for the short-term economic-political stability of East European countries. The CMEA provides the Soviet Union with an effective but cumbersome politico-economic policy-making apparatus that is becoming less effective and increasingly cumbersome over time. From the East European perspective, the CMEA tends to solidify the positions of the East European leaders yet generate long-term economic costs. What are the preferences upon which the CMEA is constructed? How are CMEA characteristics related to these preferences? What are the economic costs and benefits to member countries in static and dynamic terms? Why have costs for all member countries risen over time? How is intra-CMEA trade likely to change during the next decade?

Like two gigantic waves, the oil shocks crested over the advanced industrial world during the 1970s. The relatively stable postwar petroleum regime, managed by the large oil firms and protected by American diplomatic and military strength, collapsed. In seven years crude oil prices, adjusted for inflation, increased more than 500 percent. A multitude of national security, economic, and political challenges confronted the advanced industrial states. But unlike war, where the threat is observable and lines of conflict quickly become apparent, the oil shocks cast up problems that were more insidious—problems of energy security, economic adjustment, and industrial competitiveness. These international dilemmas could be defined in various ways, and a host of policy responses could be brought to bear upon them.

In a recent article, Stephanie Neuman examines several critical factors that separate developing countries into arms producers and arms nonproducers. She ranks countries according to a weighted index of military production capability (derived from length of production, production capacity, and technical capabilities) and also according to the following seven socioeconomic indicators: population, land size, size of military, gross national product (GNP), GNP per capita, number of professional and technical workers, and number of industrial workers. She computes correlation coefficients (Kendall's tau) by region (Latin America, South Asia, and the Far East) and for twenty-six arms producers worldwide.

What is Eastern Europe? There are geographical and political interpretations of the term. “Eastern Europe,” the territory east from the river Elbe, is first of all a historical category, for the region has evolved over thousands of years. Eastern Europe was already displaying specific traits as early as the very beginning of medieval European development in the 5th to 8th centuries. After the discovery of America and the merging Atlantic trade, Eastern Europe was left on the “periphery” of the modern world system, lagging behind Western Europe until the 18th century. The “double revolution” of the late 18th century–the Industrial Revolution in England and the socio-political revolution in France–posed many challenges to Eastern Europe. The region met these challenges with a series of reforms based on an imitative strategy of catchup. In the aftermath of World War I, Eastern Europe developed new patterns of reactions, prompted by backwardness and its belated start, by the hindrances and problems of economic, social, and national development, by the presence of numerous and only partly assimilated national-religious minorities. As a result of power relations within the world system, however, a specifically East European socialist model came to fruition following World War II. Political Eastern Europe became almost identical with historical Eastern Europe.