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Small Powers and Imperialism The Netherlands in China, 1886–1905*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 June 2011

Frans-Paul van der Putten
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Ever since its publication in 1966, Tussen Neutraliteit en Imperialisme (‘Between Neutrality and Imperialism’) has been the standard work on Dutch policy towards China between 1863 and 1901. In this study the author, F. van Dongen, stresses the adherence to neutrality towards the strong European neighbour states as the fundamental guideline for Dutch foreign policy, not only within Europe but also in the Far East. This policy stemmed from the fact that the European balance-of-power system had been extended to China in the late nineteenth century, through the participation of most European states in imperialist policies concerning that country. According to Van Dongen this adherence to neutrality slowed down imperialist tendencies, as the Netherlands were anxious to avoid entering in conflicts between the great powers, but at the same time the Dutch were forced to ‘play a modest part in the common Western policy towards China’. Whenever the great powers took a united stand the Netherlands must follow suit. So as a result of its European policy the Netherlands joined the imperialist powers in China, although usually careful not to take the initiative. The Netherlands were, therefore, classified by Van Dongen as a reluctant and generally passive element of imperialism in China: ‘the Dutch were at worst accessories after the fact’. Finally he concluded that whenever Dutch actions concerning China ‘savoured of imperialism, this was not the result of a deliberate policy to exercise control over the empire or to obtain Chinese territory, but an almost accidental by-product of the general aim of promoting the Netherlands’ economic interest'.

Type
Articles
Information
Itinerario , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1996 , pp. 115 - 131
Copyright
Copyright © Research Institute for History, Leiden University 1996

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References

Notes

1 van Dongen, Frans, Tussen Neutratileit en Imperialism: De Nederlands-Chinese Betrekkingen van 1863 tot 1901 (Groningen 1966).Google Scholar

2 Ibid., 376.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 As small powers in late-Qing China may be regarded: Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden-Norway and some Latin-American states.

7 The great powers were Britain, France, the USA, Russia, Germany and Japan: the only nations with enough military power available in the Far East to be able to enforce their wishes in China.

8 In his article ‘Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis’ in: Mommsen, Wolfgang J. and Osterhammel, Jürgen eds, Imperialism and After. Continuities and Discontinuities (London 1986), Osterhammel described an analytical model for the functioning of foreign influence in China. He excluded the small powers from the model because they did not produce an internally coherent system of business interests in China. His approach begins from the six great powers’ economic interests, and therefore is ‘national-economic’, rather than ‘nationalpolitical’ or ‘international-economic’.Google Scholar

9 Dongen, Van, Neutrạliteit en Imperiatisme, 360; and Pauline Baart, ‘Aktiviteiten van het Nederlands Bedrijfsleven in China, c. 1895–1949’ (MA dissertation; Utrecht University 1989) 21–22.Google Scholar

10 The most important Western-language studies on Sino-Dutch relations between 1863 and 1912 are: Dongen, Van, Neutraliteit en Imperialisme, on the diplomatic dimension until 1901Google Scholar; Beukelaer, Peter de, ‘De Toelating van Chinese Consuls in Nederlands-Indië: De Totstandkoming van de Chinees-Nederlandse Consulaire Conventie met Betrekking tot de Nederlandse Bezittingen en Koloniēn van 8 Mei 1911’ (MA dissertation; Nijmegen University 1979)Google Scholar, and Ching-hwang, Yen, Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch'ing Period, 1851–1911 (Singapore 1985)Google Scholar, on the matter of Chinese consuls in the Dutch East Indies; van Klaveren, Marieke. ‘Chinese Koelies voor Deli Tabak: De Directe Werving van Chinese Contractarbeiders voor de Tabaksplantages aan Sumatra's Oostkust, 1888–1932’ (MA dissertation; Leiden University 1994)Google Scholar and HJ. Bool, De Chineesche Immigratie naar Deli (n.p. n.y.) on the establishment and the functioning of the direct coolie trade between China and Deli; Brugmans, I.J., Van Chinavaart tot Oceaanvaart (Amsterdam 1952)Google Scholar, on the establishment of the Java-China japan Line after 1900. There is no literature on the NHM's involvement with the Boxer indemnity but the indemnity is one of the main concerns of Dutch diplomatic correspondence in the Foreign Ministry's archives on China after 1901.

11 For the Dutch version of the treaty see: Van Dongen, Neutmlileit en Imperialisme, 377–383.

12 The Deli Coolie Question, Deli Planters Association (Deli 1882).Google Scholar

13 Yen, Coolies and Mandarins, 140–153.

14 Ibid., 161–162.

15 De Beukelaer, “Chinese Consuls’, 15–35; Yen, Coolies and Mandarins, 177–203.

16 Van Klaveren, “Koelies voor Deli Tabak’, 4.

17 Ibid., 40.

18 Meyer, Günther, ‘Das Eindringen des deutschen Kapitalismus in die niederlandischen und britischen Kolonien in Südostasien von den Anfāngen bis 1918’ (doctoral dissertation; Humboldt University Berlin 1970) 56.Google Scholar

19 Meyer, ‘Eindringen des deutschen Kapitalismus’, 56.

20 The ‘Nisero’ incident, described in: Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de Opkomst van het Modeme Imperialism: Koloniën en Buitenlandse Politiek, 1870–1902 (Amsterdam and Dieren 1985) 107–110.Google Scholar

21 Ricklefs, M.C., A History of Modem Indonesia since c. 1300 (2nd ed.; Houndmills and London 1993) 143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 For a description of the ‘un-Dutch’ atmosphere at Deli: Anne-Marie van Dyck, ‘La “Côte Est” de Sumatra dans les romans néerlandais: autobiographic d'une société transitoire’ in: ed., Denys Lombard, Rêver l'Asie: Exotisme el littérature coloniale aux Indes, en Indochine et en Insulinde (Paris 1993) 369–381.Google Scholar

23 Cremer, J.T., De Toekomst van Deli: Eenige Opmerkingen (Leiden 1881) 24–25.Google Scholar

24 Bool, Chineesche Immigratie, 5–6.

25 For their earlier attemps during the 1870s: ‘Verslag omtrend de Ontwikkeling van de NV Deli Maatschappij, 1869–1879’, General State Archive The Hague (ARA), 2.20.46 Deli Company Archives, no. 25, pp. 22, 38 and 69.

26 Van Dongen, Neutraliteit en Imperialisme, 99–100.

27 Report of the Chinese Protectorate of Singapore and Penang for the year 1881, The Singapore Daily Times (4 April 1882); Jackson, R.N., Pickering: Protector of Chinese (Kuala Lumpur 1965) 70–72.Google Scholar

28 Dutch minister to China J.H. Ferguson to German Consul at Xiamen August Piehl 10 December 1888 (copy), ARA, 2.05.03, no. 244.

29 Per year f 1200 by the Deli Company and f 600 by the Amsterdam Deli Company and Arendsburg each: ‘Verslag omtrend de Ontwikkeling ran de NV Deli Maatschappij, 1879- 1889’, ARA, 2.20.46, no. 26, p. 30.

30 De Groot had been appointed by the Deli Company, Arendsburg, the Amsterdam-Deli Company, the Deli-Batavia Company and Nacher & Grob as their legal agent (notarieel gevolmachtigde): De Groot to Ferguson 12June 1887 (copy), ARA, 2.05.03 Ministry of Foreign Affairs - ‘A-files’ 1871–1918, no. 244 Chinese emigration to Deli.

31 Van Dongen, Neulmliteit en Imperialisme, 115.

32 Ibid., 62–63.

33 Deli Company director P.W. Jansen to the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs 25June 1888, ARA, 2.05.03, no. 244; De Groot to the Dutch Minster of Colonial Affairs 18 December 1888 (copy), ibid.

34 Head manager H.C. van den Honert in: “Verslag Deli Maatschappij 1879–1889’, ARA, 2.20.46, no. 26, p. 31.

35 Jansen to minister of Foreign Affairs 25 February 1888, ARA, 2.05.03, no. 244; ibid, early May 1888; ibid. 21 June 1888; ibid. 28 June 1888; ibid. 8 August 1888; ibid. 25 April 1889; Van den Honert to minister of Foreign Affairs 23 March 1889, ibid.; the presidents of the leading tobacco companies to the minister of Foreign Affairs 11 October 1889, ibid.; Cremer to minister of Foreign Affairs 23 December 1889, ibid.; ibid. 7 January 1890, Deli planters to governor-general 18 April 1888 (copy), ibid.; “Nota betreffende de Geschiedenis van de NV Deli Maatschappij vanaf Haar Oprichting tot 1922’, ARA, 2.20.46, no. 38, p. 104.

36 Jansen to the Dutch minster of Foreign Affairs 28 June 1888, ARA, 2.05.03, no. 244.

37 Van Dongen, Neutraliteit en Imperialisme, 126.

38 Ibid., 128.

39 Ibid., 126.

40 ‘Geschiedenis Deli Maatschappij’, ARA, 2.05.46, no. 38, p. 103.

41 Van Dongen, Neutraliteil en Imperialisme, 116.

42 Meyer, ‘Eindringen des deutschen Kapitalismus’, 62; ‘Geschiedenis Deli Maatschappij’, ARA, 2.20.46, no. 38.

43 Van Dongen, Neutraliteit en Imperialisme, 117.

44 Van Klaveren, ‘Koelies voor Deli Tabak’, 75.

45 Van Dongen, Neutraliteit en Imperialisme,143; De Beukelaer, ‘Chinese Consuls’, 30 and 34.

46 Van Dongen, Neulraliteit en Imperialisme,132–134.

47 De Beukelaer, 30.

48 Yen, Coolies and Mandarins,201–202.

49 This chapter is partly based on research done for my MA dissertation: ‘De Bokserindemniteit en China's Financiële Afhankelijkheid, 1901–1913’ (“The Boxer Indemnity and China's Financial Dependency, 1901–1913’) (Leiden University 1994).Google Scholar

50 The haiguan tael was the measure used by the Chinese imperial maritime customs to express the silver value of a given amount of Chinese or foreign money.

51 The Netherlands' total damage including interest was f 1,073,960.84. By far the largest part, f 650,000, was made up of the costs of the sending of warships to Shanghai. The estimated costs of the destroyed legation were only f 50,000, but an extra f 200,000 were demanded in order to finance a bigger building. During the negotiations it was agreed that in order to speed things up, only estimations of the damage would be used. Later, when the real figures would have been established, all allied governments would return what they would not need. This is the reason why all governments demanded more than the estimated costs. However, as the protocol did not require the governments to present evidence for their claims, in practice the estimations were maintained by most of them as die real damage figures. The Netherlands raised its claim with another f 162,839,26 to a total of f 1,436,800.00. For practical purposes all claims were slighdy modified during the negotiations, and eventually the protocol stipulated the Dutch share to be f 1,404,651,60: Van Dongen, Neutraliteil en Imperialisme, 334–335.

About two-thirds of the Boxer indemnity was to be paid to only three nations: Russia (29 per cent), Germany (20 per cent), and France (16 per cent). The enourmous amounts of money claimed by these three governments were meant as compensation for the costs of their (largely unnecessary in respect to the Boxer Uprising) military expeditions and occupations: see my ‘Bokserindemniteit’, 30. This explains why the Dutch share can seem to tiny when compared to the total indemnity.

52 The protocol is published in Van Dongen, Neutraliteil en Imperialisme,387–392.

53 Morse, H.B., The International Relations ofthe Chinese Empire(reprinted; New York 1966) 351.Google Scholar

54 Van der Putten, ‘Bokserindemniteit’, 32–33.

55 The NHM got the Dutch share not direcdy from the Chinese authorities, but out of the surplus of the seven banks that did receive it directly. Although officially not a ‘Boxer indemnity bank’ until 1913, because of this arrangement and Van Walree's membership of the committee there was no practical difference with the other seven banks: Stanly F. Wright and Cubbon, J.H., China's Customs Revenue since the Revolution of 1911 (3rd. ed.; Shanghai 1935) 190.Google Scholar

56 Morse, Relations,367–368.

57 Shanghai daotai to bankers’ committee 1 May 1902 (copy), Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive The Hague (BZ), Dutch representation in China 1872–1954, A12; bankers’ committee to Shanghai daotai 10 May 1902, ibid.

58 Van der Putten, ‘Bokserindemniteit’, 34.

59 Van Walree to the Dutch Minister to China Van Citters 18 July 1905, BZ, China, M305; British Treasury to Foreign Secretary 7 August 1905, Public Record Office London (PRO), Foreign Office (FO), 17, no. 1739 ‘Boxer Indemnity and Private Claims, 1905’. The annual instalment according to the silver-value was about 19.9 million taels.

60 Van Citters to the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs 1 January 1905, ARA, 2.05.03, no. 511; ibid. 16 August 1905; British representative to China E. Satow to British Foreign Secretary 5January 1904, PRO, FO, 17, no. 1738.

61 Extracts of the Report of W.P. Armstrong and J.S. McCoy to the Secretary of State, 3–22–1904, Department of State of the United States (Washington 1904).Google Scholar

62 Satow to British Foreign Secretary 2 June 1904, PRO, FO, 17, no. 1738.

63 Satow to Briush Foreign Secretary 31 March 1904, PRO, FO, 17, no. 1738.

64 Numerous letters of Van Citters to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout the year 1905, ARA, 2.05.03, no. 511.

65 Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs to Van Citters lOJune 1905, BZ, China, M305.

66 Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs to Van Citters 6 February 1906, BZ, China, M305.

67 Even though until 1911 the Boxer indemnity was paid mainly from provincial land tax rises and not from the central government's revenue, as it was already largely committed to the payment of the Japanese indemnity loans, the Boxer indemnity put a severe financial strain on the provincial governments and, even more importantly, it increased tension between Peking and the provinces. The fall of the dynasty in 1912 was a direct result of provincial dissatisfaction with the capital's financial policy.