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Functions and History: A Response to Garson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2025

Brandon A. Conley*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Washington & Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, USA

Abstract

Justin Garson has argued, contrary to the claims of proponents of purportedly ahistorical theories of functions, that there are no ahistorical theories of functions. In the interest of satisfying uncontroversial desiderata on a theory of functions, the most influential ahistorical views all smuggle in history. I argue that Garson’s case relies on a misinterpretation of the ahistorical accounts he targets and that the details of the misinterpretation are instructive. They highlight often unquestioned assumptions about how a theory of functions fits into a broader account of scientific practice and what theoretical work a definition of function should do.

Information

Type
Discussion Note
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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