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Accepted manuscript

Thick Concepts and Impartiality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 August 2025

Mark Risjord*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Emory University, Atlanta GA, USA
Kareem Khalifa
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, UCLA, Los Angeles CA, USA
Jared Millson
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Rhodes College, Memphis TN, USA
*
Corresponding author. mrisjor@emory.edu
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Abstract

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Thick concepts have both descriptive and evaluative dimensions to their meaning. Some have argued that because the descriptive and evaluative dimensions cannot be separated (they are “blended”), the implicit values influence the confirmation of any “mixed claims” containing the thick concept. Using the development of the concept of hypersegregation as a case study, we argue for a distinction between the semantic function of definitions and the epistemic function of indicators. While thick concepts are semantically blended, the evaluative meaning of a thick concept does not influence the function of epistemic indicators. Therefore, mixed claims can and should be tested impartially.

Information

Type
Contributed Paper
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Philosophy of Science Association