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Eudaimonism Without Virtue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2026

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Abstract

Eudaimonist virtue ethicists from Aristotle to contemporary Neo-Aristotelians have held (1) that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is the ultimate ethically justifying end of action and (2) that human flourishing consists in the exercise of virtues of character. This paper has two goals. First, I argue for separating these two commitments and distinguishing eudaimonism in general from its common virtue-ethical interpretation. To do so, I clarify the justificatory structure of eudaimonism. Second, I object to the conjunction of these two views, eudaimonism and the character virtue conception of flourishing. On the eudaimonist assumption that flourishing is the sole ultimate justificatory end of ethical action, whatever flourishing consists in must be a plausible ultimate end that does not require further justification. But character-virtuous activity is not a plausible ultimate end. The moral and prudential activities that exercise character virtues like justice, courage, and moderation characteristically aim to produce or distribute instrumental benefits which must serve, and be justified by, other ends in turn.

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Research Article
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Philosophy , First View , pp. 1 - 27
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy.

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