Wondering about the Impossible: On the Semantics of Counterpossibles by Maciej Sendłak, Synthese Library, Vol. 487, Springer International Publishing, 2024, 192pp., £99.99 (hbk) ISBN: 978-3-031-65360-5 doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-65361-2
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Wondering about the Impossible: On the Semantics of Counterpossibles by Maciej Sendłak, Synthese Library, Vol. 487, Springer International Publishing, 2024, 192pp., £99.99 (hbk) ISBN: 978-3-031-65360-5 doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-65361-2
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23 September 2025
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