Women, Gender Inequality, and Immigrant Integration

It has been well established that pre-migration experiences of foreign-born individuals influence their post-migration political attitudes and behavior. Scholars have found that migrants’ origin countries matter in explaining their gender attitudes (Röder and Mühlau Reference Röder and Mühlau2014), political trust (McAllister and Makkai Reference McAllister and Makkai1992; Voicu and Tufiş Reference Voicu and Tufiş2017; Wals Reference Wals2011), support for democracy and its alternatives (Bilodeau Reference Bilodeau2014), party attachments (Black Reference Black1987; Finifter and Finifter Reference Finifter and Finifter1989; Just Reference Just2019; Wals Reference Wals2011), and some forms of political engagement (e.g., Bilodeau Reference Bilodeau2008; Black Reference Black1987). There is also evidence that origin country characteristics influence citizenship acquisition among new arrivals, in part because host countries selectively grant citizenship to immigrants from some origin countries more than others (Hainmueller and Hangartner Reference Hainmueller and Hangartner2013), but also because newcomers from some origin countries are more likely to apply for citizenship (e.g., Bueker Reference Bueker2005; Dronkers and Vink Reference Dronkers and Vink2012; Helgertz and Bevelander Reference Helgertz and Bevelander2017; Jasso and Rosenzweig Reference Jasso and Rosenzweig1986; Liang Reference Liang1994; Logan, Oh, and Darrah Reference Logan, Oh and Darrah2012; Peters, Vink, and Schmeets Reference Peters, Vink and Schmeets2016; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers Reference Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers2013; Yang Reference Yang1994; Reference Yang2002). Specifically, those who came from states that are highly authoritarian, politically unstable, economically poor, or permit multiple citizenships are more likely to seek citizenship in their host country than immigrants from countries that are democratic, politically stable, economically prosperous, or do not allow dual citizenship.

Given the importance of origin countries for immigrant naturalization, it is surprising that previous research has so far devoted little attention to the role of gender inequality.Footnote ⁵ Part of the reason for this oversight may be that the consequences of gender inequality are unlikely to be the same for male and female immigrants. That women respond to gender equality differently than men is well known in existing research on the behavior and attitudes of ordinary citizens (e.g., Clayton, O’Brien, and Piscopo Reference Clayton, O’Brien and Piscopo2019; Desposato and Norrander Reference Desposato and Norrander2009; Green and Shorrocks Reference Green and Shorrocks2023; Newman Reference Newman2016; Simas and Bumgardner Reference Simas and Bumgardner2017). Studies show that women generally welcome gender parity because it provides them with direct benefits, such as better labor market opportunities along with improved access to education, health care, and political influence, as well as reduced domestic violence and mortality (e.g., Barnes and Burchard Reference Barnes and Burchard2013; Bock, Byrd-Craven, and Burkley Reference Bock, Byrd-Craven and Burkley2017, 191; Davis and Robinson Reference Davis and Robinson1991).

In contrast, men tend to perceive women’s empowerment as a force that erodes, or threatens to erode, their own social position and its spoils, such as higher prestige, larger wages, and more power in various spheres of society (e.g., Green and Shorrocks Reference Green and Shorrocks2023; Morgan and Buice Reference Morgan and Buice2013; Sanbonmatsu Reference Sanbonmatsu2008; Simas and Bumgardner Reference Simas and Bumgardner2017). Research in social psychology suggests that because men have traditionally occupied a superior social position, they are more likely to exhibit “social dominance orientations” — that is, believe that status differences are legitimate and support social hierarchy enhancing values and belief systems (Pratto et al. Reference Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle1994; Sidanius and Pratto Reference Sidanius and Pratto2001).

There are also reasons to suspect that the prospect of gender equality for men implies not only material but also identity costs. Some scholars argue that in many cultures the status of manhood is more precarious than the status of womanhood: while manhood must be earned and repeatedly proven through action, womanhood is usually defined in biological rather than social terms (Bosson and Vandello Reference Bosson and Vandello2011; Vandello et al. Reference Vandello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford and Weaver2008). This precariousness leads men to be more sensitive to threats to their identity and react to these treats with more anxiety compared to women (Vandello et al. Reference Vandello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford and Weaver2008). Thus, men respond to the rise in gender equality with trepidation. Considering that manhood has always been difficult to earn and easy to lose, men are afraid of losing not only their dominant social status but also their masculine self (Kilmartin Reference Kilmartin1994).

Not surprisingly, then, men see gender relations as a zero-sum game — that is, interpret women’s gains as occurring at the expense of men’s losses (Gidron and Hall Reference Gidron and Hall2017; Kehn and Ruthig Reference Kehn and Ruthig2013; Ruthig et al. Reference Ruthig, Kehn, Gamblin, Vanderzanden and Jones2017; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo Reference Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo1994; Wilkins et al. Reference Wilkins, Wellman, Babbitt, Toosi and Schad2015; see also Green and Shorrocks Reference Green and Shorrocks2023).Footnote ⁶ Zero-sum thinking often triggers a defensive response among dominant group members, such as efforts to restore the legitimacy of traditional social hierarchies or sabotage subordinate group members’ attempts to improve their status. Consistent with this view, experimental research shows that prompting men with messages about women’s advancement heightens men’s zero-sum beliefs that in turn undermine their support for workplace gender equity policies (Kuchynka et al. Reference Kuchynka, Bosson, Vandello and Puryear2018). Cross-national studies confirm that men are less supportive of gender quality in more gender equal countries, presumably because in these countries men are more strongly reminded of women’s encroachment on the previously male-dominated areas (Kosakowska-Berezecka et al. Reference Kosakowska-Berezecka2020, 1286).

In line with these findings, political science research reveals that men respond to the erosion of traditional gender relations either with resentment and backlash (Green and Shorrocks Reference Green and Shorrocks2023; Morgan and Buice Reference Morgan and Buice2013; Sanbonmatsu Reference Sanbonmatsu2008; Simas and Bumgardner Reference Simas and Bumgardner2017) or indifference (Breyer Reference Breyer2024). Numerous studies point to male backlash against gender equality as a major force in the rise and prevalence of populist or radical-right parties and candidates (Anduiza and Rico Reference Anduiza and Rico2024; Donovan Reference Donovan2023; Gidron and Hall Reference Gidron and Hall2017; Off Reference Off2023), voting for Donald Trump in the US 2016 presidential elections (Bock, Byrd-Craven, and Burkley Reference Bock, Byrd-Craven and Burkley2017; Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta Reference Schaffner, Macwilliams and Nteta2018), and public support for Brexit in the UK referendum to leave the E.U. (Green and Shorrocks Reference Green and Shorrocks2023). In contrast, women usually react to improving gender equity by becoming more politically engaged (Barnes and Burchard Reference Barnes and Burchard2013; Desposato and Norrander Reference Desposato and Norrander2009; but see Karp and Banducci Reference Karp and Banducci2008; Lawless Reference Lawless2004).

Taken together, these studies suggest that both men and women respond to gender equality in ways that are designed to protect and enhance their social status. Immigrants should be no exception to this rule. Because of higher appreciation of their host country’s gender equality, foreign-born women should be more likely to become citizens in their new homeland than foreign-born men, if they originate from countries with greater gender inequality. Previous research based on ethnographic evidence confirms that male and female immigrants differ in their motivations to naturalize, and that gender inequality plays a role in these motivations (Alvarez Reference Alvarez1987; Jones-Correa Reference Jones-Correa1998; Money et al. Reference Money, Kazemian, Klotz and Rodriguez2023; Preston, Kobayashi, and Man Reference Preston, Kobayashi and Man2006). However, quantitative studies have so far ignored gender inequality. Evidence of its relevance emerges only indirectly via the mixed findings of different studies with respect to how gender matters for immigrant naturalization. In particular, while some studies reveal a positive impact of being female on citizenship among immigrants (Corluy, Marx, and Verbist Reference Corluy, Marx and Verbist2011; Fougère and Safi Reference Fougère and Safi2009; Pantoja and Gershon Reference Pantoja and Gershon2006; Reichel and Perchinig Reference Reichel and Perchinig2015; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers Reference Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers2013; Yang Reference Yang1994), others fail to find a statistically significant effect (Dronkers and Vink Reference Dronkers and Vink2012; Jones-Correa Reference Jones-Correa2001b; Peters, Vink, and Schmeets Reference Peters, Vink and Schmeets2016).

Yet, several studies report that the extent to which gender influences citizenship acquisition varies across immigrant groups from different origin countries (e.g., Bueker Reference Bueker2005; Liang Reference Liang1994; Yang Reference Yang2002). Although these studies offer little explanation for this variation, looking closer at their findings reveals interesting patterns that are consistent with my expectations. For example, Bueker’s (Reference Bueker2005, 129) study of 10 immigrant groups in the US finds that women are more likely than men to naturalize in the host country if they originate from Mexico and India — countries with traditional gender relations — but not if they come from western democracies, such as Canada, Britain, or Italy, or socialist regimes, such as the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba — all of which are known to be relatively egalitarian in their treatment of men and women.

Furthermore, several studies find that among immigrants from Latin America — another region where gender relations remain traditional — women are more likely than men to naturalize and integrate politically in the US (Jones-Correa Reference Jones-Correa1998, 340-1; Pantoja and Gershon Reference Pantoja and Gershon2006, 1180). In addition, analyzing foreign-born Asian immigrants in the US, Yang (Reference Yang2002, 398) reports that women are more likely than men to become citizens if they came from Japan, China, Korea, and Vietnam, while no such gender difference emerges among arrivals from Philippines or India.Footnote ⁷ Because the former countries are more strongly shaped by Confucianism associated with a patriarchal structure of society (Yang Reference Yang2002, 398), these findings are in line with my theoretical expectations that gender inequality in the country of origin motivates female immigrants more strongly than male immigrants to settle in the new homeland by adopting its citizenship.

In short, because gender equality is generally welcomed and embraced by women, particularly if they experienced considerable gender discrimination in the past (Morgan and Buice Reference Morgan and Buice2013, 658; see also Newman Reference Newman2016), pre-migration exposure to greater gender inequality should motivate female immigrants more than male immigrants to become citizens of their host country. I therefore hypothesize that, among foreign-born individuals who have migrated to Western Europe from countries with more severe gender inequality, women should be more likely to report having their host country’s citizenship than men (Hypothesis 1). In contrast, among arrivals from countries with equal treatment of men and women, the gender gap in citizenship status should be considerably reduced or nonexistent.

Contingent Effects of Gender Inequality: The Role of Education

Beside the role of pre-migration gender inequality in shaping citizenship acquisition among first-generation immigrants, I am also interested in whether the effect of gender inequality among female immigrants is magnified by education. To be sure, women of all education levels are likely to benefit from a broader range of employment opportunities and higher wages in their host country if they originate from countries with greater gender inequality. In highly patriarchal societies, gender discrimination in the labor market is widespread (Money et al. Reference Money, Kazemian, Klotz and Rodriguez2023, 1501), and women either face resistance to being employed outside their home or are confined to socially isolated occupations (Pedraza Reference Pedraza1991). Better labor market opportunities in the destination country not only improve the economic well-being for many women but also bolster their influence within families and offer more autonomy from oppressive family relations (Alvarez Reference Alvarez1987, 341–3; Grasmuck and Pessar Reference Grasmuck and Pessar1991; Guendelman and Perez-Itriago Reference Guendelman and Perez-Itriago1987; İnce Beqo Reference İnce Beqo2019; Pedraza Reference Pedraza1991). Moreover, countries with higher gender equality provide women with better legal protection against gender-based violence (Money et al. Reference Money, Kazemian, Klotz and Rodriguez2023). Since physical and emotional abuse is more widespread in households with low levels of education (Abramsky et al. Reference Abramsky, Watts, Garcia-Moreno, Devries, Kiss, Ellsberg, Jansen and Heise2011; Kaukinen Reference Kaukinen2004), reducing exposure to domestic violence may be an especially important consideration to less-educated female migrants.

While pre-migration gender inequality can be expected to contribute positively to post-migration citizenship acquisition among all women, I expect this relationship to be particularly pronounced among better educated female migrants. Previous studies show that women’s individual resources interact with macro-level gender inequality in shaping their position within the family and society. For example, Fuwa (Reference Fuwa2004) finds that women with more substantial individual assets are more successful in negotiating their workload at home, but only if gender inequality in their country is low. Where gender inequality is high, women’s resources do not translate into more favorable outcomes for women.

Building on these insights, I expect that individual resources in the form of education amplify the positive relationship between pre-migration gender inequality and post-migration citizenship acquisition among foreign-born women. While originating from a country where women lack equal treatment should provide stronger incentives for them to naturalize in highly egalitarian Western Europe, it is education that enables individuals to overcome the information costs related to this process. In addition, education permits women to better discern how gender norms and practices differ between their origin and destination countries and figure out how to use these newly available labor market opportunities to their own advantage.

Furthermore, because schooling is generally linked with higher aspirations in the labor market, better educated women are not only more capable but also more motivated to benefit from improved gender equality following migration. Previous research suggests that women who have acquired more education desire careers more and, thus, have more to gain from gender equality than less educated women (Bolzendahl and Myers Reference Bolzendahl and Myers2004, 766). Moreover, an increase in female education in some developing countries in recent decades has outpaced the availability of jobs in which educated women could work, leaving many of them unemployed and willing to consider job opportunities abroad (Klasen Reference Klasen2020, 6). And because citizenship enhances newcomers’ access to better jobs and higher wages (Fougère and Safi Reference Fougère and Safi2009; Steinhardt Reference Steinhardt2012), education should amplify women’s interest in acquiring their host country’s citizenship. Hence, I hypothesize that the effect of pre-migration gender inequality on post-migration citizenship should be particularly pronounced among foreign-born women who are better educated than women who are less educated (Hypothesis 2).

Data and Measures

My empirical analyses rely on the individual-level data collected as part of the European Social Survey (ESS) project 5–10 rounds (2010–22).Footnote ⁸ The earlier rounds of the ESS data were excluded because they did not ask foreign-born respondents for the exact year of arrival to the host country. This information is crucial for the purpose of my study because it enables me to augment the ESS data with the origin country characteristics of foreign-born respondents, such as gender inequality, prior to migration. The relevant variables were available for 18 western democracies with considerable immigrant populations: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Foreign-born individuals in my data were identified using the survey question: “Were you born in this country?” Only respondents who said “no” in response to this question were kept in the sample, while those who said “yes” or did not answer the question were excluded. In addition, survey questions: “Was your father born in this country?” and “Was your mother born in this country?” were utilized to eliminate foreign-born respondents whose both parents are native-born. Finally, I dropped foreign-born individuals who had not resided in their host country long enough to qualify for its citizenship at the time of the survey.Footnote ⁹ The resulting sample of foreign-born respondents in 18 Western democracies and six survey rounds contains 13,977 observations (7.82% of the overall ESS 5–10 sample).

Analysis and Results

To test my theoretical propositions, I use data with a multilevel structure where one unit of analysis (the individual) is nested within another unit of analysis (country). Such data structure may lead to statistical problems, such as clustering, non-constant variance, and incorrect standard errors (Steenbergen and Jones Reference Steenbergen and Jones2002). Given the dichotomous nature of my dependent variable, the results reported below are therefore multilevel (random intercept) logistic regression estimates, listed as log odds with their standard errors in parentheses and odds ratios in italics.

The results of my base-line model (Model I, Table 1) reveal that foreign-born women are more likely than foreign-born men to be citizens in their host country. The coefficient of gender inequality in the country of origin is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that arrivals from nations with higher gender inequality are more likely to naturalize in the new homeland than newcomers from more equal countries. To ensure that gender inequality is not merely a proxy for political and economic conditions, Model II additionally controls for the level of liberal democracy and human development in the country of origin. The results of this more fully specified model indicate that while the substantive magnitude of the gender inequality coefficient is considerably reduced, it remains positive and highly statistically significant. Furthermore, to assess whether the consequences of pre-migration gender inequality differ for male and female immigrants, Model III includes an interaction term between gender and gender inequality in the country of origin. I find that while the additive term of pre-migration gender inequality remains positive and statistically significant, the interaction coefficient is also positive and statistically significant. Thus, in line with my expectations, the positive relationship between pre-migration gender inequality and post-migration citizenship among foreign-born individuals is more pronounced among foreign-born women than foreign-born men.

Table 1. Gender, pre-migration gender inequality, and citizenship among foreign-born individuals in 18 western democracies, 2010–22

Note: Multilevel (random-intercept) logistic regression estimates obtained using the Stata’s xtlogit command; odd ratios are in italics and standard errors in parentheses.

*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

Figure 1. Percent citizens among foreign-born individuals in 18 West European democracies ESS 2010–2022.

To gauge the substantive effects of my key variables in greater detail, Figures 2a and 2b plot the marginal effects of my main independent variables (with 95% confidence intervals), using the results presented in Model III, Table 1.Footnote ¹³ Specifically, Figure 2a reports the marginal effect of pre-migration gender inequality on citizenship in the host country separately for males and females among foreign-born individuals. This figure shows that the marginal effect of pre-migration gender inequality is positive and statistically distinguishable from zero for both genders, but as expected, it is considerably larger for females than males (.372 vs. .229). Further evidence of the interaction effect is evident in Figure 2b. I find that, at the low levels of pre-migration gender inequality, there is no gender difference in citizenship status among foreign-born individuals. However, once gender inequality reaches a score of .4 (on a 0–1 scale), the marginal effect of being female becomes positive and statistically significant, and its substantive impact is particularly pronounced (with a score of .12) at the maximum level of gender inequality.

Figure 2a. Marginal effects of gender inequality in the country of origin on the probability of citizenship among foreign-born males and females in 18 West European democracies, 2010−22.

Figure 2b. Marginal effects of female by gender inequality in the country of origin on the probability of citizenship among foreign-born individuals in 18 West European democracies, 2010−22.

Taken together, the results so far show that gender inequality in the country of origin contributes positively to citizenship acquisition among foreign-born individuals in their host country of Western Europe, and that this effect is more powerful among female than male immigrants. But are all female immigrants equally responsive to gender inequality when they consider becoming their host country’s citizens? Table 2 examines this possibility by interacting my key variables of interest with education. To this end, I classify foreign-born individuals into four categories: low-education males, high-education males, low-education females, and high-education females.Footnote ¹⁴

Table 2. Interaction effects of gender, education, and pre-migration gender inequality on citizenship among foreign-born individuals in 18 West European democracies, 2010−22

Notes: Multilevel (random-intercept) logistic regression estimates obtained using the Stata’s xtlogit command; odd ratios are in italics and standard errors in parentheses. The reference category for gender-education variables is low-education male.

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001(two-tailed).

Employing low-education males as the reference category for the other three groups, the results in Model I reveal that low-education females are not statistically distinguishable from low-education males. However, the coefficient for high-education females — and to a lesser extent for high-education males — is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that both groups are more likely to acquire citizenship in the host country than low-education males.Footnote ¹⁵ Model II subsequently interacts the gender-education variables with gender inequality in the country of origin. As expected, the interaction term between high-education female and pre-migration gender inequality is positive and highly statistically significant. In contrast, there is no evidence that gender inequality conditions the relationships between low-education female or high-education male and citizenship.Footnote ¹⁶

To provide more insight into the substantive impact of these variables, Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities of having the host country’s citizenship for high-education females and low-education females among foreign-born individuals (with 95% confidence intervals) at different values of gender inequality in the country of origin (using the results from Model II, Table 2).Footnote ¹⁷ The results reveal that, as we move from the minimum to the maximum value of pre-migration gender inequality, the probability of citizenship increases from .358 to .526 (a difference of .168) points for low-education females, and from .289 to .803 (a change of .514) points for high-education females. Thus, foreign-born women of all education levels are more likely to become citizens in their host country if they originate from a country with more severe gender inequality. However, as expected, the probability of having the host country’s citizenship is higher for better educated women than for women with less education.

Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of the host country’s citizenship by respondent’s education and gender inequality in the country of origin among foreign-born women in 18 West European democracies, 2010−22.

With respect to my control variables, there are some interesting patterns as well. While income is positively related to citizenship, I find no statistically significant effects of being unemployed, having manual skills, or being a member of a union. Moreover, married individuals are neither more nor less likely to be citizens in their host country than unmarried ones. In addition, immigrants who arrived in their host country at an earlier age, whose duration of stay is longer, and who speak their host country’s language at home are more likely to be citizens in their new homeland. At the same time, non-EU immigrants are more likely to naturalize in their host country of Western Europe than EU immigrants, and so are newcomers from less democratic or economically less developed countries. Moreover, while liberal citizenship policies in the host country contribute positively citizenship acquisition, anti-immigrant opinion climates have the opposite effect.

In short, the results confirm that gender at the level of individuals and gender inequality at the level of countries powerfully shape the patterns of citizenship among first-generation immigrants in Western Europe. Specifically, foreign-born women, particularly if they are highly educated, are more likely to become citizens in their host country than foreign-born men, but only if they were exposed to greater gender inequality prior to migration. In comparison, arrivals from countries where men and women are treated equally exhibit no gender difference in their citizenship status in the new homeland.

Robustness Tests

To test whether my results are sensitive to different variable measurements or model specifications, I performed several additional analyses. First, I reestimated my models with an alternative measure of gender inequality. Instead of using the level of gender inequality in the country of origin utilized in my main analyses, I employed the difference in the levels of gender inequality between the country of origin and the host country (both captured in the year of arrival).Footnote ¹⁸ The results, reported in figure B1a–b in the Appendix, indicate that my main findings remain essentially the same.

Moreover, I reestimated my models while additionally controlling for the levels of gender inequality in the host country (Tables B2a–b). This variable turns out to be statistically insignificant in all my models (both alone and in interaction with my key individual-level variables), while my main findings do not change. Furthermore, I reran my models separately for males and females among foreign-born respondents (Tables B3a–b). The results reveal that pre-migration gender inequality is no longer statistically significant for male immigrants but remains positive and highly statistically significant for female immigrants, alone and in interaction with education.

I have also examined whether my findings are sensitive to the alternative measures of some of my control variables. Specifically, to capture democracy level in origin countries, I replaced the liberal democratic index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data with the polity scores from the Polity V project (Jaggers and Gurr Reference Jaggers and Gurr1995; Marshall and Gurr Reference Marshall and Gurr2020). The results (shown in Tables B4a–b) indicate no difference in my main results. Moreover, using the overall migrant integration policy index (MIPEX) (Tables B5a–b) or its more specific measure of anti-discrimination policies (Tables B6a–b) instead of liberal citizenship policies reveals that while these various aspects of immigrant integration policies are positively related to citizenship, my core findings remain the same.

Furthermore, I have reestimated my models while additionally controlling for the share of foreign-born individuals in the host country because larger immigrant communities may provide better resources for immigrant naturalization (e.g., Yang Reference Yang1994; Reference Yang2002). I found no evidence that the size of foreign-born population matters for citizenship among first-generation immigrants in Western Europe, while my key variables remained highly statistically significant and in the same expected direction (Tables B7a–b). In addition, some scholars suggest that geographic distance between the origin and destination country increases the probability of naturalization because it magnifies the costs of return migration (Jasso and Rosenzweig Reference Jasso and Rosenzweig1986; Portes and Mozo Reference Portes and Mozo1985). I found that foreign-born individuals from more distant nations are indeed more likely to become citizens in their host country compared to those from more proximate locations (Tables B8a–b). However, even when controlling for this variable, the effects of pre-migration gender inequality remains substantively and statistically significant, alone and in interaction with gender and education.

Finally, I have reanalyzed my models with an additional control for the origin country’s passport ranking. Previous research suggests that arrivals from countries with lower ranking passports are more motivated to naturalize in western democracies because having a higher-ranking passport reduces barriers to international travel, enhances opportunities in the global economy, and serves as a status symbol for immigrants in their origin country (Money et al. Reference Money, Kazemian, Klotz and Rodriguez2023, 1487). My results reveal, however, that passport ranking falls short of the conventional levels of statistical significance (Tables B9a–b), while my key findings remain unchanged.Footnote ¹⁹ Taken together, the results confirm that the main relationships hypothesized in this study are indeed robust.