Many countries globally have adopted national policy commitments to address violence against women (VAW). Yet the implementation of these policies largely relies on subnational governments’ actions. Why do some but not all subnational governments adopt policies to implement VAW response services? Surprisingly, few studies have addressed this question. Drawing on norm diffusion and gender policy reform theories, we assess the factors driving the adoption of these local policies in Indonesia. Since Indonesia adopted its domestic violence law in 2004, only one-third of cities/regencies have adopted local regulations (peraturan daerah) on VAW response services. Using event history analysis, we analyzed data from 509 cities/regencies from 2004 to 2022. Our findings show that the presence of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) connected to national and transnational VAW advocacy networks, and women’s local legislative representation are significant factors. However, province-level morality regulations constrain the progressive effects of the VAW advocacy networks and women’s political presence.

Expert institutions are increasingly expected not only to provide the best professional expertise but also to ensure equal presence of women. Yet while descriptive gender representation in bureaucracies and courts is extensively researched, we largely lack studies of women’s presence on expert advisory bodies. Drawing on large-n data on the composition of Norwegian expert advisory commissions, the paper investigates and evaluates how the share of women on these commissions has developed over the last half-century. It finds that while overall gender parity was achieved in recent decades, women remain strongly under-represented among commission chairs, particularly academic chairs, and among academic members from the powerful economics discipline. Normatively speaking, the developments toward parity are promising, and we find no empirical indication that proportional representation and competence requirements are in tension. On the contrary, persistent gender gaps among economists on commissions and academic chairs may endanger adequate provision of expertise into policy-making.

Research on extremism has increasingly incorporated a gender perspective, revealing how the politics of extremism and gender fuel one another. Yet most evidence of the gendered politics of extremism is on far-right and Islamist non-state actors, neglecting other forms, including state-sanctioned extremism in which the state is complicit with the violent effects of extremism. This article investigates a type of state-sanctioned extremism, wherein nationalist movements, supported to varying degrees by governments, seek to “protect” Buddhism across Asia. Gendered motives, forms, and impacts of political extremism can be observed in Buddhist Protectionism movements, manifesting in societal conflict, hate speech and other acts of violence and intolerance against ethnic and religious minorities. We ask to what extent gender norms and structures affect the motives, forms, and impact of Buddhist extremism using an original dataset encompassing nationally representative surveys and qualitative research in selected communities in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. We find that extremist discourses and practices exist on a Buddhist Femonationalist Continuum across the three cases with misogyny and anti-Muslim threat narratives played up, both affirming the power of masculine hegemony and justifying the use of violence to control minority populations and women.

Past research alerts to the increasingly unpleasant climate surrounding public debate on social media. Female politicians, in particular, are reporting serious attacks targeted at them. Yet, research offers inconclusive insights regarding the gender gap in online incivility. This paper aims to address this gap by comparing politicians with varying levels of prominence and public status in different institutional contexts. Using a machine learning approach for analyzing over 23 million tweets addressed to politicians in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we find little consistent evidence of a gender gap in the proportion of incivility. However, more prominent politicians are considerably and consistently more likely than others to receive uncivil attacks. While prominence influences US male and female politicians’ probability to receive uncivil tweets the same way, women in our European sample receive incivility regardless of their status. Most importantly, the incivility varies in quality and across contexts, with women, especially in more plurality contexts, receiving more identity-based attacks than other politicians.

Partisanship is the primary driver of voter decision-making in the United States. Partisans expect to prefer their party’s candidates’ issue stances and personal characteristics. Even when they learn negative information, motivated reasoning often keeps them from changing their candidate evaluations or vote choice. However, there is a “tipping point” at which partisans will update their priors and may vote against their preferred party’s candidate. This study seeks to determine whether voters are more likely to reach that tipping point when they see a woman in their party, and under what circumstances. We use a unique experimental design to vary a candidate’s gender, congruence with major elements of the party platform, and their participation in a scandal. We find that women are often evaluated more negatively and that subjects rely on substantive information more when evaluating women candidates. Our findings suggest that campaigns and campaign information may matter more for women candidates.

Recently, former colonial powers in the Global North have begun addressing their colonial pasts through their foreign policies. Some of these states pursue a feminist foreign policy (FFP). However, to date, only one FFP makes explicit mention of colonial legacies: that of Germany, adopted in 2021. How does German FFP discourse address this and what political work does this do? Contributing to critiques of coloniality in FFP, we analyze the discursive representation of Germany’s colonial past in foreign policy texts since 2021. Drawing on the socio-critical concepts theater of reconciliation by Max Czollek and remembrance superiority by Mohamed Amjahid, we find that the discourse powerfully establishes gendered notions of caring, responsible, and reflexive German statehood. This organizes how Germany’s engagement with its colonial past is told and which forms of engagement with former colonies are rendered intelligible. We argue that German FFP erases colonial structures that permeate German foreign policy and reproduces coloniality through discursive representations.

The adoption of a feminist foreign policy (FFP) by Mexico took Mexican feminist civil society by surprise. In September 2019, without prior consultations or dialogues with local feminist civil society, the Mexican Foreign Affairs Secretary announced its FFP during the 74th session of the UN General Assembly. While the UN New York City headquarters roared with applause in response to the Mexican Foreign Affairs Secretary’s claim that the “Mexican government is feminist,” many feminists in Mexico interpreted the statement as an effort to pinkwash the government’s poor track record on gender equality within its borders. Moreover, Mexico’s FFP was charged with racial and colonial undertones since its inception, colloquially known as the “first FFP from the Global South” (Thompson 2020; Thompson, Ahmed, and Khokhar 2021).

As more governments commit to feminist foreign policies (FFPs), this commitment trickles down to a central foreign policy area: peacebuilding. As a field, peacebuilding has historically been dominated by western states and western-dominated institutions performing interventions along the hegemonic liberal peacebuilding paradigm (Lederach 1997; Mac Ginty 2008). This has, in turn, provoked significant feminist criticisms and interventions (Duncanson 2016; Hewitt and True 2021; McLeod 2018). When Germany, the largest peacebuilding funder globally (Rotmann, Li, and Stoffel 2021; UN Peacebuilding 2024), announced their FFP in 2023, this development opened up the prospect for substantial feminist change, but also raised questions about what such change might look like in practice.

LGBTQ+ people remain underrepresented in politics, leading scholars to examine a variety of barriers to office. Based on work on women in politics, this paper focuses on one possible barrier: political finance. Is there a political financing gap between straight cisgender and LGBTQ+ candidates? Are there inequalities among LGBTQ+ candidates? If so, what explains them? This article explores these questions by combining a dataset of out LGBTQ+ candidates in the 2015–21 federal elections with political donations data from Elections Canada. When we examine bivariate financing gaps, we find LGBTQ+ candidates receive less money than their straight cisgender counterparts. These gaps are gendered: queer cisgender women, transgender, and nonbinary candidates receive the least money. When we adjust for other variables, we still find LGBTQ+ candidates in the Conservative Party and transgender and nonbinary candidates across parties receive less money. This article contributes to work on gender and identity in campaign finance and LGBTQ+ representation.

How can everyday entertainment shape gender politics in authoritarian regimes? Despite autocrats’ heavy control over media, political scientists studying authoritarianism largely neglect television programming. Particularly surprising given their target demographics, cooking shows are absent in political science gender analyses. Drawing from over 600 hours of Turkish cooking show content, I introduce conservative gender edutainment to capture the mechanisms by which TV shows facilitate authoritarian regimes’ gender construction projects. Using quantitative analysis of cooking show content, I first identify two complementary pedagogies — modeling and othering — that respectively teach adherence to, and vilify deviation from, regime-specified behavioral norms. I then use intertextual analysis to extract content that engagingly instructs viewers in the ideal woman in “New Turkey,” the neoconservative vision articulated by Turkey’s ruling (Justice and Development Party) AKP. Findings provide novel insight into vernacular channels of gender construction, while underscoring the added value TV-as-data holds for studies of identity politics in authoritarian contexts.

The literature on vice presidencies fails to explain the women’s inclusion as vice-presidential candidates, as the strategies of ticket balancing predict a higher number of female running mates than what is observed. Based on theories of gender representation, this study develops hypotheses about the inclusion of women as vice-presidential candidates and tests them using an original dataset comprising 471 presidential tickets from Latin America (1978–2022), a region where women’s representation has expanded. The analysis reveals that small and left-wing parties nominate more women as vice presidents than major and right-wing parties. Although female vice-presidential candidates tend to have less political experience than their male presidential counterparts, they often add a diverse and complementary policy expertise to the ticket. The findings underscore that women’s inclusion as vice-presidential candidates depends mostly on partisan calculations, since gender quotas rarely apply to the vice presidency.

Over the past 20–30 years, women’s parties have consistently formed across Europe, aiming to improve women’s substantive representation by politicizing gender issues. Despite their potential impact on the policy agenda, empirical knowledge of the full range and scope of issues these parties mobilize is limited. This paper presents a novel mixed-method text analysis of the issue concerns in an original dataset of European women’s parties’ manifestos spanning a 30-year period. I find that parties across contexts share concerns in social justice and social policy. However, two subtypes of women’s party can be differentiated based on issue focus and framing. Essentialist women’s parties predominantly represent women’s material interests, whereas feminist parties additionally tackle structural gender inequality issues, including gender-based violence and human security. These findings provide a foundation for incorporating women’s parties into growing research on party competition over gender issues.

Gender-based violence (GBV) has become a prominent theme in feminist struggles across Africa (Medie 2019). A burgeoning literature has recently emerged as a result of debates about GBV in a variety of African settings, resulting in a multifaceted picture of the causes and consequences of GBV in the continent (Aroussi 2017; Ayiera 2010; Bennett 2010; Oku 2021). As laudable as this body of research is, certain lacunae are easily noticeable in respect to studying GBV in Portuguese-speaking countries, especially in smaller states such as Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. With a few exceptions (Henriques et al. 2015; Moura et al. 2009; Mourão 2009; Silva 2021, 2022), these countries are often neglected in feminist research in Africa, especially in English-speaking circles. There is even less attention paid to the particular political settings of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau and how they affect feminist agendas around GBV.

Do party elites strategically nominate (non)veiled women? While research exists on Muslim-minority countries, little is known about the dynamics of such strategies in Muslim-majority contexts, where the interplay of Islam, secularism, gender, and veiling is complex. To address this gap, I examine electoral competition in Turkey, investigating whether parties strategically nominate (non)veiled women for mayoral seats in opposing party strongholds to capitalize on the political symbols associated with women’s identities — a strategy I term “symbolic leverage.” Using an original dataset, elite interviews, and electoral discourse analysis, I find that parties leverage the symbolic value of veiled and nonveiled women candidates to appeal to rival party voters. Moreover, interviews with Islamist party elites show that nominating nonveiled women serves multiple objectives for them: signaling tolerance for secular lifestyles, assuaging concerns about Islamization, attracting swing voters, and projecting a democratic image. These findings illuminate how parties utilize women’s inclusion in polarized contexts.

Scholar-activism, which we define as scholarship that seeks to contribute knowledge to activism is often underappreciated. From a methodological perspective, the positionality of scholar-activists is too often misunderstood. Yet scholar-activism is a relatively common approach to generating new knowledge about hard-to-access, repressive contexts while also assisting political movements and their strategies. Feminist-informed scholarship necessitates scholar-activism because it is driven by an emancipatory purpose that demands critical reflexivity about the power of epistemology, boundaries, relationships, and the researcher’s situatedness (Ackerly and True 2020, 22). We argue that a deeper understanding of scholar-activism and lived experiences is vital for furthering knowledge and impact in the politics and gender field.

Gendered inequalities in campaign finance are generally considered an important impediment to the equal representation of women in parliament. A multivariate analysis of 11,897 Flemish candidates in the Belgian elections from 1999 to 2019 provides strong new evidence of the gender gap in campaign spending, showing that women candidates are significantly outspent by men. But this gender gap is only present after the introduction of strict quota and is limited to non-incumbents. It takes 16 years and five elections after the introduction of strict quotas before this gender gap narrows. In terms of the funding of their campaigns, women draw significantly less money from their personal wealth and receive less money from their parties when strict quotas are in place.