Buddhist Protectionism as a Phenomenon of Gendered Nationalism

Nationalism encompasses how nations “assign value [and] provide symbols around which to rally” based on gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, and so on (Thomson Reference Thomson2020, 3). In Theravada Buddhist countries, nationalism and religion are inherently linked as “the State is by definition Buddhist and exists to protect Buddhism” (Ramakrishna Reference Ramakrishna2021, 5, originally Walton and Jerryson Reference Walton and Jerryson2016).Footnote ⁹ Importantly, the protection of Buddhism is inherently gendered. Indeed, feminist analysis of nationalism across the world and historically highlights its heteronormative norms which require women to “reproduce nations, biologically, culturally, and symbolically” (Yuval-Davis Reference Yuval-Davis1997, 2). In other words, women are “reproducers of the boundaries of national groups (through restrictions on sexual or marital relations), active transmitters and producers of national culture, symbolic signifiers of national difference as well as political participants in national struggles” (Sjoberg and Peet Reference Sjoberg and Peet2011, 168, originally Yuval-Davis and Anthias Reference Yuval-Davis and Anthias1989). Introduced in the context of Buddhist Protectionism, four race and religion protection laws in Myanmar passed by the Parliament in 2015 epitomize this relationship between gender and the reproduction of groups. These laws aimed to protect Buddhism, the country’s dominant religion and culture and include measures related to population control, monogamy, religious conversion, and interfaith marriages (see Library of Congress 2015).Footnote ¹⁰ The laws situate “Buddhist women as reproducers of the ‘nation’” (Frydenlund Reference Frydenlund2021, 1), and “promote the majority ethnic Bamar” (Davies and True Reference Davies and True2024, 72–3) by restricting Buddhist women from marrying non-Buddhist men and enforced birth-spacing policies for minority ethnic groups, targeting Rohingya women (Walton et al. Reference Walton and Jerryson2016). As such, “women’s bodies, relations, and roles become the battleground for […] nationalist projects” (Pettman Reference Pettman1996, 193).

Buddhist Protectionism as a Classic “Protection Racket”

Feminist scholars have exposed how the concept of “protection” is highly gendered (and racialized).Footnote ¹¹ Given that women are the symbols of the nation and ensure “the reproduction of state, national, and/or ethnic identity,” biologically, socially, as well as culturally “they must be protected” (Sjoberg and Peet Reference Sjoberg and Peet2011, 168, emphasis added). Indeed, the protection of women by men to protect “the essence of the state/nation” is the consequence of a nationalist narrative (Sjoberg and Peet Reference Sjoberg and Peet2011, 174). Buddhist protectionism in this sense is a classic “protection racket” wherein a threat is constructed and protection offered to defend against it by the same state or nationalist actor (Tilly Reference Tilly, Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol1985). Protection rackets justify masculine hegemony and the subordination and control over women and their reproductive capacities. This gendered logic is evident in Buddhist Protectionism where the protectionist racket serves to keep women in their place and in service of the state/nation by “protecting” them in so doing, shoring up masculine hegemony.

To justify the protection of the Buddhist nation and its women, a threat is needed. In Buddhist Protectionism, minority ethnic and/or religious groups are constructed as threatening, specifically Muslims (Kyaw Reference Kyaw and Crouch2016).Footnote ¹² Frydenlund (Reference Frydenlund2021, 3–4) uses the term “Buddhist femonationalism” to convey how Muslim men are constructed as threatening by Buddhist protectionists in Myanmar. She adapts Sara Farris’s (Reference Farris2017, 4) concept, “femonationalism,” which describes how far-right nationalists (in the European context) exploit gender equality considerations for their anti-Muslim project, framing Muslim men as violent anti-feminist (Scheyer, True, and Bonotti Reference Scheyer, True and Bonotti2025). “Buddhist femonationalism” similarly promotes the narrative that Buddhist women need to be protected from hypersexual, threatening, Muslim men. Importantly here, femonationalism emphasizes that only certain women are deemed worthy of protection: women who are not willing to conform to male protection become outcasts without state support and can be attacked (Young Reference Young2003, 14).Footnote ¹³ Importantly, the women that are to be protected are cis, Bamar/Thai/Sinhalese, Buddhist women. Ethnic, religious, or gender minorities are not protected in Buddhist Protectionism, rendering the protection racket both gendered and racialized.

Buddhist Protectionism Underestimates Women’s Agency and Participation

Women’s political agency in extremist groups is often overlooked (True and Eddyono Reference True and Eddyono2021), particularly in groups that prescribe traditional gender roles where women have limited decision-making power (Parashar Reference Parashar2011). Political science and extremism studies have explored the paradox of women’s agency and participation in extremism groups that proscribe their roles based on gender stereotypes. We draw on key insights from this the third body of literature to analyze Buddhist Protectionism. For example, scholars have shown how women can influence the ideologies and practices of groups with strict gender ideologies, including Islamist extremism, Hindu extremism, and white supremacy groups (Amarasingam and Shweta Reference Amarasingam and Desai2024; Blee 2020; Brown Reference Brown, Väyrynen, Parashar, Féron and Confortini2021). Regardless of their roles within these groups, these scholars demonstrate that their participation is essential for the groups’ survival (McEvoy 2009; Parashar Reference Parashar2011).

In Buddhist Protectionism, a similar dynamic to other extremisms occurs wherein women also carry out traditional gender-prescribed roles that results in their contributions being publicly unacknowledged and often invisible. Crucially though, women fulfilling traditional gender roles are essentially carrying the organizations by extending their networks and providing (literally) the membership/follower base (Blee 2017; Gentry Reference Gentry2022; Parashar Reference Parashar2011). Indeed, women’s role in Buddhist Protectionism is central, not just because of their biological reproductive function but because they socially and culturally carry the narratives and ideology and “uphold the patriarchal and misogynist structures” (Gentry Reference Gentry2022, 217). Thus, while women meaningfully participate in Buddhist communities, albeit in ancillary roles that reflect gender stereotypes, they do not threaten masculine hegemony (Leidig 2021; Roose and Cook Reference Roose and Cook2025). It is important to highlight here that Buddhist Protectionism does not limit female agency by default; rather it may be attractive for women to join, providing new avenues for “protecting Buddhism” (Mckay and Frydenlund Reference McKay, Frydenlund and Hüsken2022).

In sum, feminist international relations and comparative political studies of nationalism, race, and ethnicity provide key insights into how gendered norms and structures within Buddhism influence Buddhist extremism and why protectionism targets ethnic and religious minorities, especially minority women. In the next part of the article, we discuss our methodological approach to further investigate to what extent gender dynamics affect the motives, forms, and impact of Buddhist extremism.

Gendered Motives

Gendered motives of protectionism appear when perpetrators target women’s dress and bodies to preserve hegemonic men’s control of Buddhist politics and monastic order (Bardall, Bjarnegård, and Piscopo Reference Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo2020). The gendered motives of Buddhist Protectionism can be internal or external and are used to justify violence against “outside the hegemonic male group (meaning women, but also non-dominant men and gay, queer, nonbinary, and trans individuals)” (Bardall, Bjarnegård, and Piscopo Reference Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo2020, 917). Such violence targets victims primarily “to keep political power in the hands of hegemonic men […] men who belong to their country’s structurally dominant cultural, ethnic, or religious group hold most political offices” (Bardall, Bjarnegård, Piscopo Reference Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo2020, 917). Internal gendered motives coming from “within” the religion or community of religion describe the threat to the gender hierarchy in the monastic order, whereas external gendered motives coming from “outside” the religion or community of religion describe various forms of anti-Muslim sentiment, such as “growth” of the Muslim population and the expansion of halal certification.

External Gendered Motives

In our study, Islam was mentioned as the most significant threat to Buddhism across Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. Research participants expressed various forms of anti-Muslim sentiment, including fears about the decreasing number of Buddhist followers due to the growth of the Muslim population, the expansion of Halal certification, or mosque construction. The narrative to protect Buddhism in the face of Islam’s increasing influence is pushed by Buddhist Protectionist groups (and to some extent the state). Anti-Muslim sentiment was also reflected in our survey responses to the two questions about the increasing presence of halal food labels and the other about the hijab.Footnote ²² As shown in Figures 1 and 2, in Thailand approximately 20% of people are concerned about these developments compared with 30% in Sri Lanka and 40% in Myanmar, following the Buddhist Femonationalist Continuum. Interestingly, the gender differences to these questions were least pronounced in Myanmar where anti-Muslim sentiments are most prevalent. As such, the overall higher level of othering of Muslims in Myanmar may have contributed to the institutional policies focused on miscegenation. In our key informant interviews and focus group discussions, we garnered more nuanced insight into the anti-Muslim sentiment across the three countries.

Figure 1. I am concerned about the increasing number of women wearing a hijab.

Figure 2. I am concerned about the increasing presence of the halal food label.

Moving to country level analysis, in Thailand the main external gendered motive threatening Buddhism is the expanding influence of Muslims, which according to a monk is an “invasion from dangerous others.”Footnote ²³ Various forms of anti-Muslim sentiment were reflected in the interviews and focus groups, including fears about a dwindling Buddhist population, the growth of the Muslim population in Thailand, and their political influence. This opinion was especially pronounced among male Buddhist protectionist supporters, older generations, and southernmost Buddhists but less so among younger generations.Footnote ²⁴

According to a male Buddhist Protectionism supporter, Buddhist Protectionism aims to “awaken Thai Buddhists to the reality of threats posed by Muslim rebels that form a movement focus groups.”Footnote ²⁵ The threat associated with Islam is mainly centered around Muslims having gained significant influence and leadership in administration, in the public and political sectors: “Muslims have been integrated into the Thai bureaucracy, and Muslim elites are also part of national elites.”Footnote ²⁶ A female Buddhist research participant, for instance, recounted her experiences of working together with other Buddhist Protectionist supporters and politicians to block Islam-related laws from passing. Those efforts proved unsuccessful as “members of the parliament raised their hands to approve laws for Islam, but not for Buddhism…my understanding is that the government takes side with Islam, which leads to continual threats that we face.”Footnote ²⁷ This sentiment reflects the priority and status of Muslims within the political and public sectors and Buddhists feeling that they are being discriminated against, leading to grievances against Muslims. The apparent feeling of discrimination of Buddhists can be summarized as “deep-seated fears of minoritization of the majority,” and as such, a threat to the hegemony of Thai Buddhists (Frydenlund Reference Frydenlund2021, 3-4).

The main external gendered motive in Sri Lanka is also the “expansion of Islam,” from which Sinhala Buddhists need protection, as they perceive themselves as a global minority.Footnote ²⁸ A journalist from Colombo argued that historical “anti-Tamil” sentiments are now being diverted toward MuslimsFootnote ²⁹ — a common enemy — to keep the majority of Buddhists occupied and under control.Footnote ³⁰ Anti-Muslim sentiment was reflected in the interviews and focus groups, where male and female participants shared their fears about the decreasing Buddhist population, growing Muslim population, the latter’s unity, the increasing prevalence of their halal food, mosque construction, and allegations of sterilization attemptsFootnote ³¹ of Sinhalese women.Footnote ³² A male government officer from Kandy, for instance shared this opinion: “A former Muslim politician gave five main pieces of advice for Muslims in his speech: buy as much land as you can, study as much as you can, marry Sinhalese people, have as many children as you can, and join politics if you can. All this is happening now. How can we say that there is no expansionism when it is practically visible on the outside?”Footnote ³³

This quotation shows the nationalist Buddhist Protectionist logic in the government in Kandy, an ethnically-mixed region where the 2018 deadly anti-Muslim violence erupted, that presented Muslims as a threat to Buddhist Sinhalese people (Gunaratna Reference Gunaratna2018).

In Buddhist majority focus groups with Sinhalese men there was constant discussion of polygamy and sterilization rumors (although most had doubts about their veracity): “There is a bakery in this area. If a Sinhalese comes, they will give the cake on the top showcase. If a Muslim comes, they will give one that is the bottom display case” (suggesting the Sinhalese cake sterilizes you).Footnote ³⁴ These gendered motives promoting fear of Muslims and targeting women’s reproductive capacities are also directly propagated by Buddhist Protectionist groups. De Votta (2018, 291) quotes a Bodu Bala Sena extremist monk who contends that Muslims are forcing Sinhala women “to become a Fathima and all the babies [to] become Mohammeds” (see also Silva Reference Silva and Holt2016).

In Myanmar, the main external gendered motive and threat to Buddhism is also Islam. As one nonbinary university teacher stated: “When we were young, we were told that Muslim men would come and arrest us if we kept crying. Then we stopped crying, but the fear of Muslim people stayed in our mind.”Footnote ³⁵ This shows that from a young age, anti-Muslim propaganda is promulgated, specifically to generate the fear of Islam. The connection between Islam and violence was underlined frequently by research participants, as this quote from a female civil society organization participant shows: “For Muslims, violence and extremism is normalized and they won’t feel anything strange about this.”Footnote ³⁶ Discussing Islam as being intrinsically linked to violence and extremism is an all-too-familiar narrative, reflecting broader global Islamophobic narratives operating within the context of the “war on terror” (Bakali Reference Bakali2021, 65).

Burmese research participants perceived Muslims to threaten their majority status due to the “population take over myth” since polygamy is permitted for Muslims. As stated by one male civil society organization participant: “[W]e KachinFootnote ³⁷ also value our race and clan and men. So Christian people also won’t let their sons mix blood with Muslims. People consider Muslim blood and genes to be very strong and appearance and color of people can change from mixing blood with Muslims.”Footnote ³⁸

This quotation shows that the threat of Muslims is not just internalized and propagated by Bamar Buddhists but also by other minority groups, including Kachin Christians, although they themselves might be targeted by Buddhist extremists.

Internal Gendered Motives

Internal gendered motives in Buddhist Protectionism are also prevalent. They are connected to the gender hierarchy in the monastic order, where protecting Buddhism means restricting women’s public role and opportunity instrumentalizing gendered notions of female sexuality which threaten monks’ celibacy. In Thailand, female research participants recounted prevalent strategies to preserve hegemonic men’s control that reinforce gender hierarchies in the monastic order, such as playing upon the stereotype that women are “sexually deviant.” Female sexuality is viewed as a threat to the celibacy of monks, who are bound by strict rules to remain celibate to uphold the purity of the monastic discipline and Sangha.Footnote ³⁹ One female Buddhist research participant recalled a piece of writing by her monastic teacher calling women “a threat to celibacy that can destroy Buddhism.”Footnote ⁴⁰ Connecting women to the destruction of Buddhism reflects deeply ingrained gender norms that underpin the gender hierarchy within Buddhism. As stated by a female Buddhist focus group participant in Bangkok:

[B]ecause women can potentially pose a threat to the chastity of monks, they need to exercise caution without being entirely excluded. This approach is also aimed at preserving the public image of the Sangha. In monastic organizations, inequalities exist, but we must prioritize the rights of monks over women’s rights in certain aspects. For instance, when walking, it is customary for women to let monks take the lead, and the same applies to entering a car or a room. This issue is closely tied to the matter of organizational advancement as well because [Buddhist] university regulations stipulate that only monks can hold senior executive positions. For instance, if a woman were to aspire to become the dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, that would not be possible unless there were legal amendments to permit it. While I acknowledge the existence of inequality, I am not perturbed by the special status afforded to monks.Footnote ⁴¹

While gender inequality within the monastic order is acknowledged by this female research participant, women’s sexuality is still presented as a threat, which ensures persistence of the monastic gender order and the non-recognition of female monks (Bhikkhunis). Simultaneously, portraying women’s sexuality as a threat allows men to be the protectors of Buddhism evoking the classic protection racket logic.

Similarly, in Sri Lanka, internal gendered motives in Buddhist Protectionism are connected to the gender stereotype that women are “sexually deviant.” A male civil society organization research participant from Colombo claimed: “Because of some unsuitable relationships some women have with priests, society looks at all women the same. That’s why women are afraid to go to the temple, take leadership and work closely with monks.”Footnote ⁴² Another research participant in the youth focus group in Colombo shared how women are cut out of temple activities due to such rumors: “I observe Sil [observing religious precepts] in an Asapuwa [a monastery owned by the Mahamewna sect]. It was built by the labor of women. Then there were rumors and stories of mismanagement and now women are not participating in any activities. These stories are about monks’ relationships with females. They wanted to avoid further occurrences of such events.”Footnote ⁴³

This interview shows how the monastic gender order is reinforced by employing prevalent fears of the sin of women being close to monks or “leading them” to break their vows of celibacy. Misogynist gender norms and stereotypes about women’s impurity and sexual provocation are invoked to enforce that women need to be controlled by men.

In Myanmar as with Thailand and Sri Lanka, the research findings suggest that gender norms in the monastic order, in Buddhist Protectionist groups, and the larger Buddhist majority society are deeply ingrained and serve to keep women submissive and men in leadership, including sexually deviant women: “Women can destroy the religion as they can allure the monks. Women should wear proper clothing so that the monks and the men can’t be persuaded by their improper clothing.”Footnote ⁴⁴ A female civil society organization participant — one of the few who voiced this perspective — expressed frustration about these “myths”: “Women’s improper clothing is irrelevant to Buddhism. These things set up a lot of restrictions on women and they are asked to sit at the back in the monasteries.”Footnote ⁴⁵

Gender stereotypes also affect female nuns (thila shinsFootnote ⁴⁶), where highly influential or outspoken female nuns might be perceived as a threat to the monastic order. To keep women “in their place,” gendered tactics are being employed, as one female research participant from a religious organization asserted: “There was a famous nun named Ketumala. Then the monks don’t like them and try to defame her by saying that she goes on overnight sleep trips and there are some men who follow her overnight sleep. As Myanmar society is so sensitive to this kind of sexual behavior, the monks strategically use to reduce her influence. And they don’t give her space.”Footnote ⁴⁷

Overall, across the three countries, the findings also suggest that women do not have any decision-making power and mainly perform supporting roles within the Sangha which has implications for Buddhist Protectionism. As a female civil society organization participant argues: “Men get more opportunities at their homes as well as in the monasteries. For the meetings including the meeting at the monastery, only men are invited and discussed about the matters […] If there are a few women who attend the meeting, they are said to make a lot of talks and complaints.”Footnote ⁴⁸

Despite these gender norms in the monastic order, as shown in Figure 3, in the survey we found that both men and women agree with the statement that “Women are an important base of the Buddhist religion.”Footnote ⁴⁹ However, women agreed more with the statement than men across the three countries, specifically in Thailand (almost a 14% statistically significant gender difference). This shows that while misogynist gender norms and stereotypes view women as needing to be controlled, they are still regarded as important to the religion. In other words, the more central women are viewed to Buddhism, the more likely they are excluded from decision-making in the monastic order.

Figure 3. Women are an important base of the Buddhist religion.

Patriarchal gender norms in the monastic order that present women as sexually deviant and threatening Buddhism serve to justify the protection and control over women. While some women may acknowledge the discrimination that women experience, such as the Thai Buddhist focus group research participant, they conform to these traditional gender norms and roles. Crucially though, choosing a subordinate gender role in the monastic order does not deny women’s agency, rather it provides a different avenue for “protecting Buddhism,” which does not threaten the patriarchal order (Mckay and Frydenlund Reference Kyaw2022). Having women in subordinate roles within the monastic order bolsters Buddhist Protectionism by having a labor force that can support and extend its influence.

Gendered Forms

Gendered forms of extremism show that gender structures how people perpetrate and experience violence from Buddhist Protectionism, “regardless of whether gender appears in the motive” (Bardall, Bjarnegård, and Piscopo Reference Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo2020, 918). In other words, gendered forms emphasize how experiences of discrimination and violence because of political extremism are shaped by different feminized bodies and roles, including that of minority women, LGBTIQ+, and women religious practitioners. Importantly, a feminist perspective allows us to analyze “structural violence, hate speech, gender-based violence or state violence” as extremism (Stenger and True Reference Stenger and True2024, 4; Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger Reference Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger2014). In Thailand and Myanmar, the experience of gendered forms of violence is discussed, whereas in Sri Lanka the perpetration of Buddhist Protectionist violence is analyzed.

In Thailand, the experience of gendered forms of violence was expressed by Muslim women who shared personal experiences of living in a Buddhist-majority country. Muslim women have encountered various forms of gender-specific hate speech and discrimination, including feelings of increasingly being under the public gaze as reflected across focus groups.Footnote ⁵⁰

“My direct experiences of living in a Buddhist society involve getting teased about whether I come from the Deep South or whether I carry bombs with me. I have experienced this from a young age until now, and the memory remains in my head. My friends make fun of my veiling, saying are you a ninja?”Footnote ⁵¹

“[B]being looked at from head to toe. Sometimes my Buddhist friends would say that here, look at this “khaek”Footnote ⁵² when they see a veiled female Muslim on a motorcycle.”Footnote ⁵³

As shown in these quotations the gendered form of anti-Muslim hate speech focuses specifically on Muslim women’s dress.Footnote ⁵⁴ The hijab makes Muslim women more than Muslim men targets in Thai society, where there is limited awareness of multiculturalism. Muslim women interviewed recalled situations where Buddhists distanced themselves from them on public buses, likely due to an association of their appearance with the violent unrest in the conflict-affected southern region.Footnote ⁵⁵ This highlights how visible markers of religious identity, like the hijab, can exacerbate the challenges Muslim women face in navigating public spaces in Thailand, intensifying the gendered and racialized discrimination that is legitimized by Buddhist Protectionism.

Another gendered form of extremism was discussed by self-identified “LGBT monks” in Thailand.Footnote ⁵⁶ They experienced discrimination and bullying and were prevented from displaying their identity and/or sexuality. Specifically, LGBT monks expressed that they are only respected by their disciples and Sangha if they have a masculine “external appearance.”Footnote ⁵⁷ The display of feminine attributes, specifically female gender expression, encompassing aspects like makeup, body language, voice, and emotional expression, is considered inappropriate and thus unacceptable. This is the case especially for newly ordained monks, as a male university teacher from the Southern border provinces claimed: “[I]f LGBT monks keep their manners appropriate and are well-behaved, they remain under the conventions of how Theravada monks should act.”Footnote ⁵⁸ LGBT monks shared in a focus group that they can become more recognized and respected with feminine attributes if their power is established, typically through development projects and community engagement.Footnote ⁵⁹

Yet this acceptance of LGBT monks is not extended to female monks (and nuns [mae-chiis]Footnote ⁶⁰). They are often perceived to have less influence than LGBT monks, who can have equal recognition and opportunities as heterosexual male monks, (provided they refrain from displaying femininity). The relative acceptance of LGBT monks reflects strict gender norms within the monastery, where hegemonic male dominance and the preference for masculine traits are evident. This gender hierarchy underscores broader gender disparities in Thai society and suggests that the more femininity a person expresses, the less power they have. In Buddhist Protectionist groups women have largely been on the periphery. In our research some leaders of Buddhist Protectionist groups struggle to recall the names of their female members, remembering them primarily for their roles as supporters or donors.Footnote ⁶¹ Most of the male leaders in these groups were previously ordained monks with advanced Buddhist education in Pali studies, which they cite as a key reason for the dominance of male leaders. They argue that protecting Buddhism requires individuals with a high level of religious education, thus justifying the exclusion of most women within the religious order and reflecting deep seated discrimination within Buddhist Protectionism.Footnote ⁶²

In Myanmar, gendered forms of political extremism were evident through anti-Muslim attitudes resulting in hate speech, discriminatory behavior, and structural inequalities. Although other religions minorities are also affected by structural inequalities, such as limited access to national identity cards or funding for religious buildings,Footnote ⁶³ the Muslim population is particularly negatively affected. As one female civil society organization participant recounted: “Muslim children faced discrimination in the school by their Burmese teachers. Muslim people did not get promotion, and they mostly had to work at the lower level. Then Muslim students were not accepted at the medical college, and they can’t be pilot/air hostesses. For those Muslim people, who are holding temporary citizenship cards they can’t perform as lawyers although they completed their bachelor’s degree in law. The momentum of hate speech got higher, and we can see the increasingly use of Burma majorities ideology.”Footnote ⁶⁴

Hate speech and rumors about Muslims that are being instilled in the Burmese population from a young age increase the anti-Muslim sentiment and foster gendered forms of extremist violence often targeted at minority women. Overall, anti-Muslim violence is gendered and intrinsically linked to Buddhist femonationalism, wherein the oppression of Muslim populations is justified by the protection of women from “hypersexual Muslim men” and also fueled by the obsessive focus on Muslim women’s dress, particularly the hijab, polygamy, and Muslim women’s reproduction and rumors of the sterilization of non-Muslims. Yet, within the Buddhist femonationalist protection racket only certain women are deemed worthy of protection — that is, Bamar/Thai/Sinhalese Buddhist women.

In Sri Lanka, gendered forms of Buddhist Protectionist violence perpetrated by Buddhist Sinhala were raised in focus groups and interviews. Most research participants argued that protecting Buddhism is a man’s job: “There are no women in Buddhist Protectionist groups. Can you name one woman in the BBS [Bodu Bala Sena] or other organizations? Also, they all have very masculine names […] this is alpha male and there are no female names.”Footnote ⁶⁵

As noted by the research participant, while there might be an absence of women on the frontlines of Buddhist Protectionist groups, this does not mean that women are not committed to the cause.Footnote ⁶⁶ Women support Buddhist Protectionism by carrying out roles that conform to gender norms, including donating money and actively pushing messages (e.g., that Buddhism is under threat) on social mediaFootnote ⁶⁷ or at the community level where they often have substantive networks.Footnote ⁶⁸ As participant in the youth focus group shared: “We see some women in those Buddhist Protectionist groups. They are wearing the uniform of Daham Pasal (Sunday school) teachers. They are connected to the monks as well. In the Sunday school I went to, there were young girls, who came to learn, quickly passed the exams and became teachers there. They get access to politics from there. They also use the title of ‘long term Daham Pasal teacher’ in their election campaigns.”Footnote ⁶⁹

These gender-conforming ways of propagating extremist ideas may be unacknowledged by the wider public, yet women are largely carrying Buddhist Protectionist organizations by providing a follower base and by extending their network (which is similar to other forms of extremism (Gentry Reference Gentry2022, 217). One female research participant, for instance, mentioned that because women are considered “more demanding and emotional” than men, they can convey protectionist ideas better. She suggested that women are instrumentalizing gender stereotypes precisely to promote Buddhist Protectionism.Footnote ⁷⁰ In the words of two further research participants from Colombo: “The dissemination of these ideas is given to middle-aged women. They don’t hold the mic to male attendants, they hold the mic to female attendants, to say that they have travelled so far to attend such rallies and how happy they are. It is these women’s opinions that are given the most weight. The feelings cannot be given to a boy, or a girl, or a middle-aged man, these feelings are undertaken by middle-aged women.”Footnote ⁷¹

“For example, Dematagoda, where I’m from is a very Muslim area, and we had a big issue with one of the grocery stores, and this Sinhalese lady was shouting: ‘Our people are going to beat you up and kick you out’. But even though it is a very Muslim area, nobody spoke and stood up to her because it’s like the concept of white women’s tears, there is a certain influence to the Sinhala-Buddhist woman’s tears. It is powerful and can be used to harm other people, and this is widely understood.”Footnote ⁷²

These examples of Buddhist Sinhalese women show the gendered form of extremism at work in Buddhist Protectionism. By carrying out roles within their gender norms and expectations, women’s contribution to fueling violence may be unacknowledged and downplayed, including by Buddhist men: “In these groups, the majority are male. Women were not there. Men go to those things on impulse. Men participate in political things, mainly.”Footnote ⁷³

Men’s gendered form of extremism conducive to violence was also described in our interviews, namely that they are the first to respond to ethnic violence incidents. Youth in Kandy stated that men were the ones who took the poles and rushed to the streets during the Digana incident.Footnote ⁷⁴ Research participants generally felt that men drive violence and extremism as it is expected and part of their masculine identity. Some male and female research participants discussed violent behavior as the ideal, arguing that Sinhala men are not aggressive enough.Footnote ⁷⁵ Men across Sri Lanka stated that they are expected to fulfil the role of the savior and soldier where masculine men protect Sinhala women. One activist in Colombo rhetorically asked: “Our women are being sterilized, what are you going to do about it?”Footnote ⁷⁶

Sinhala Buddhist men and women are both perpetrating gendered forms of extremism, although the extent to which it leads to violence may differ. It is particularly important to not ignore the Buddhist extremist discourses and practices carried out by women. In the survey, when asked whether violence is justified to protect Buddhism,Footnote ⁷⁷ Buddhist women across the three countries were more likely than men to agree and strongly agree with the use of violence with the highest agreement being found in Myanmar.Footnote ⁷⁸ This finding contrasts with prevalent stereotypes about women’s peacefulness and underlines the importance of not sustaining women’s contributions to Buddhist Protectionism as shown in the Sri Lankan example. As seen in Figure 4 below, the survey responses reflect the Buddhist Femonationalist Continuum, with the highest agreement with using violence to protect the Buddhism found in Myanmar and the lowest in Thailand.

Figure 4. Violence is justified in order to protect my religious views if someone criticizes or undermines my religion and what it stands for.

Gendered Impacts

Gendered impacts “capture how audiences understand the gender dimensions of political violence” (Bardall, Bjarnegård, and Piscopo Reference Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo2020, 918). In Buddhist Protectionism, these impacts refer to the subjective meaning-making processes that occur as different audiences react to extremism as “protectors” or “protected.” The gendered impacts of Buddhist Protectionism can be seen in the politics around reproduction and population growth in Sri Lanka, the laws regulating birth registration and spacing in Myanmar, and the reception of them by different ethnic-religious groups, illustrating the Buddhist Femonationalist Continuum.

To protect “Buddhist blood” (a gendered motive), Buddhist Protectionists in Myanmar have mobilized support through various gendered strategies and narratives that have “sexuality, conversion and mixed marriage […] at the core” (Frydenlund Reference Frydenlund2021, 4). Buddhist female research participants explain that women have the “responsibility to protect their race and religion,”Footnote ⁷⁹ because they “are considered as the image of the family and society.”Footnote ⁸⁰ The gendered impact of these discriminatory narratives and previously mentioned race and religion protection laws on (Bamar) Buddhist women is summed up by a female civil society organization participant: “Some Buddhist Protectionist groups said Buddhist women have to have as many children as the Muslim women.”Footnote ⁸¹ The gendered impact of Buddhist Protectionism for Buddhist women is the incitement to reproduce. Yet, for minority women, the gendered impact is to prevent them from reproducing. Consequently, the discriminatory narratives and race and religion protection laws propagated by Buddhist Protectionist groups have distinct gendered impacts on different ethno-religious groups of women, but they share an outcome: “In the name of protecting Buddhism, they [Buddhist Protectionists] violated the rights of women.”Footnote ⁸²

In Sri Lanka, the preoccupation with Sinhalese women’s sterilization and reproductive role also reveals the gendered impact of Buddhist Protectionism. While the gendered motive of spreading sterilization rumors is to “protect” Buddhist Sinhala women and thus, Buddhism itself as “Sinhalese women are assigned the role of bearers of the nation’s cultural purity and authenticity” (Jayasundara-Smits and Subedi Reference Jayasundara-Smits and Subedi2024, 224; DeVotta Reference DeVotta2018, 290); these have discriminatory gendered and racialized impacts.Footnote ⁸³ The impacts were visible in a minority focus group in Puttalam, which combined Muslim and Catholic Sinhalese women: The Sinhalese women said that “they [Muslims] can have more wives so they can have more children and spread their religion.”Footnote ⁸⁴ Thus, the gendered impact of Buddhist Protectionism is to stigmatize Muslim women, as well as relegate both Muslim and Sinhalese women to their reproductive roles, therein restricting their human rights. Overall, the gendered impact of Buddhist Protectionism is the further stigmatization and control of women’s bodies, with largely negative impacts on minority women (specifically Muslim) and vastly different impacts on majority Buddhists women.Footnote ⁸⁵

Femonationalist Protection Racket

Based on the analysis of our survey and qualitative data, we argue that a femonationalist protection racket exists in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar: Misogyny and anti-Muslim threat narratives are played up with Buddhist Protectionist groups both affirming the power of masculine hegemony and justifying the use of violence to control minority populations and women. Gender norms and structures fuel this Buddhist Protectionism; thus, tackling these norms and structures within Buddhism could contribute to reducing political extremism and its tendency to ignite and justify violence.

In Thailand, notions of merit, obligation, and karma are a heavy burden in certain religious contexts. As a woman civil-society organisation (CSO) leader stated: “Religious teachings have a lasting impact on women’s mental health, and it may take time for them to realize that they are being oppressed.”Footnote ⁸⁹ In Sri Lanka, oppressive gender norms and violence against women are condoned within Buddhism. As stated by a female monk: “If a woman suffers immeasurably, those things happen because of the heinous sins she has committed in a previous life.”Footnote ⁹⁰ Similar oppressive gender norms are pervasive in Buddhist communities in Myanmar where the presence of violent acts in the name of Buddhist Protectionism are most prevalent. In the words of a nonbinary university teacher: “Buddha never teaches us that we have to treat husbands and sons as masters.”Footnote ⁹¹ Such harmful gender norms normalize violence and limit women’s agency within the religion to act as moderating voices that consistently engage with other religious groups in the community.

This situation effectively condones violence within the religion that normalizes the use of violence in the broader community in defense of Buddhism. Many research participants argued that gendered hierarchy and abuse within monasteries is often not questioned because monasteries are viewed as sacred, safe places where no system of accountability is needed. Keeping women in a subordinate, albeit essential, role in Buddhism both undermines women’s agency and perpetuates extremism by affirming masculine hegemony and normalizing aggression externally. Addressing gender norms and structures, thus, has the potential to reduce extremism leading to violence. This may include programming that connects religion and gender inequality since discussions about religion and its influence on extremism typically do not consider their gendered motives, forms and impacts.

Enhancing the role of female monks and women religious leaders could help to resolve conflicts and prevent the spread of extremism. These religious women already substantially engage with communities and are often supported by them in order to be represented and to advance their positions within temples and the broader monastic order.Footnote ⁹² We found evidence that some, if not all, may have more nuanced understandings of how to preserve the Buddhist religion and do not support Buddhist Protectionist groups.