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An algorithm for NTRU problems and cryptanalysis of the GGH multilinear map without a low-level encoding of zero

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 August 2016

Jung Hee Cheon
Affiliation:
Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-742, Republic of Korea email jhcheon@snu.ac.kr
Jinhyuck Jeong
Affiliation:
Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-42, Republic of Korea email wlsyrlekd@snu.ac.kr
Changmin Lee
Affiliation:
Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-742, Republic of Korea email cocomi11@snu.ac.kr

Abstract

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Let $\mathbf{f}$ and $\mathbf{g}$ be polynomials of a bounded Euclidean norm in the ring $\mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$ . Given the polynomial $[\mathbf{f}/\mathbf{g}]_{q}\in \mathbb{Z}_{q}[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$ , the NTRU problem is to find $\mathbf{a},\mathbf{b}\in \mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$ with a small Euclidean norm such that $[\mathbf{a}/\mathbf{b}]_{q}=[\mathbf{f}/\mathbf{g}]_{q}$ . We propose an algorithm to solve the NTRU problem, which runs in $2^{O(\log ^{2}\unicode[STIX]{x1D706})}$ time when $\Vert \mathbf{g}\Vert ,\Vert \mathbf{f}\Vert$ , and $\Vert \mathbf{g}^{-1}\Vert$ are within some range. The main technique of our algorithm is the reduction of a problem on a field to one on a subfield. The GGH scheme, the first candidate of an (approximate) multilinear map, was recently found to be insecure by the Hu–Jia attack using low-level encodings of zero, but no polynomial-time attack was known without them. In the GGH scheme without low-level encodings of zero, our algorithm can be directly applied to attack this scheme if we have some top-level encodings of zero and a known pair of plaintext and ciphertext. Using our algorithm, we can construct a level- $0$ encoding of zero and utilize it to attack a security ground of this scheme in the quasi-polynomial time of its security parameter using the parameters suggested by Garg, Gentry and Halevi [‘Candidate multilinear maps from ideal lattices’, Advances in cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2013 (Springer, 2013) 1–17].